' The present writ petition calls in question the order dated 26-6-2000 passed by respondent No,1 (Annexure A), whereby he has proceeded to ban the activities of the petitioner union. Admittedly the petitioner is a registered union and is a Collective Bargaining Agent. It has been stated in the writ petition that respondent No,1 has no lawful authority to ban the activities of the petitioner union. It has further been stated that no proceedings for cancellation of the registration of the petitioner union have been initiated in accordnace with the provisions of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Comments were called for. It has been stated therein that the impugned order has been passed because of "nefarious" activities of the petitioner union. The writ petition was admitted to regular hearing vide order dated 26-7-2000. Notice was accepted by the learned counsel for the respondents. Arguments have been heard today.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that it is a fundamental right of the workers to form a union and to join the same. According to the learned counsel the matter is governed by the provisions of I.R.O. 1969 whereunder the petitioner union was registered and also appointed as Collective Bargaining Agent. Learned counsel argues that no proceedings whatsoever have been initiated under the said law for cancellation of the certificate of registration of the petitioner trade union and the respondent No,1 does not figure anywhere in the said law in matters pertaining to trade union. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, argues that the petitioner union and its office-bearers had been indulging in, what the learned counsel describes as nefarious activities, and as such the respondent No,1 has proceeded to ban the activities of the petitioner union.
3. Article 17 of the Constitution confers an inherent right on the citizens of the country to form associations or unions. This right, however, is subject to any reasonable restraint imposed by law in the interest of sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan, public order or morality.. I have called upon the learned counsel for the respondents to cite any law which restricts the activities of the petitioner union on the said grounds noted in Article 17(1) of the Constitution. Learned counsel frankly conceded that there is no such law. I may refer here to the case of Civil Aviation Authority, Islamabad and others v. Union of Civil Aviation Employees and another (PLD 1997 SC 781). The Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice Ajmal Mian (as his Lordship then was), after recapitulating the history of trade union with reference to the labour movements, law and case law on the subject was pleased to observe as follows, in para. 17 at page 810 of the report:-- "In our view, the words 'subject to reasonable restrictions' employed in clause (1) of Article 17 of the Constitution do not admit and permit total denial of right as held by this Court in case of Jibendara Kishore Achharyya Chowdhury and 58 others referred to hereinabove."
' It may be stated here that in the said case, their Lordships were considering the effect of exclusion of the provisions of I.R.O. 1969 to the Civil Aviation Authority being a defence installation and also of regulations framed by the said Authority actually banning the trade union activities in the said Organization. Their Lordships were further pleased to observe at page 818 Of the report as follows:- - "(25)A perusal of the above quoted extracts from the above treaties indicate that an unincorporated union (sic) is to be registered strictly speaking, there can be a union without any registration but it cannot effectively function unless it is registered and a legal framework is provided within which it can operate as a collective bargaining agent for its members. The operation of a union is sine qua non for exercising the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 17(1) of the Constitution.
(26) Adverting to the facts of the cases in hand, it may be observed that it is an admitted position that the union was functioning in the establishment of the Authority prior to the enforcement of the Ordinance. The effect of the enactment of section 23 in the Ordinance as pointed out hereinabove is that the provisions of the I.R.O. Are no longer applicable to the Authority and to its employees. The above exclusion of application of the provisions of I.R.O. Is not violative of Article 17(1) of the Constitution as pointed out hereinabove. However, it does not follow from it that the registration of the union stood cancelled upon the enforcement of the Ordinance in the absence of any express provision. Whereas in the case of the Corporation, a number of unions were functioning and so also the Federation but section 3 of Ordinance (XV of 1978) provided that 'Notwithstanding anything contained in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (XXIII of 1969), the registration of, and the certificate of registration issued to all registered Trade Unions in all establishments of the Pakistan Television Corporation and the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation shall stand cancelled.' The purported effect of the above section is that the certificates of registration issued to all registered trade unions in the establishments inter alia of the Corporation stood cancelled, in our view, the aforesaid provision is violative of Article 17(1) of the Constitution as a right of a citizen to form a union and to operate it in accordance with law subject to reasonable restrictions is rendered nugatory and meaningless as without having a corporation status of union, its members cannot effectively exercise the above fundamental right conferred on them under Article 17(1) of the Constitution."
4. In view of the said dictum laid down by the Supreme Court of Pakistan the impugned order completely banning the activities of the petitioner union is wholly void being in conflict with Article 17(1) of the Constitution and as such cannot be sustained. Learned counsel for the respondents has argued with some vehemence regarding the allegedly "nefarious" activities of the petitioner.
5. I called upon the learned counsel as to whether he is in a position to demonstrate that any application was filed with the Registrar for the cancellation of the registration of the petitioner trade union in terms of section 10 of the I.R.O., 1969 for filing a complaint to the Labour Court. He answers in negative. When called upon to show as to whether any person involved in the said "nefarious" activities were proceeded against in accordance with law, the answer again is 'No'. In this view of the matter since the impugned order is wholly void and without lawful authority, I am left with no option but to allow this writ petition and to set aside the said impugned order of respondent No,1 (Annexure A). However, I want to make it clear that there shall be no embargo of any kind upon the respondents/employers to seek resort to law in the matter. In case the employers are satisfied that the workers/members/office-bearers of the petitioner union are involved in some unfair labour practice or that the petitioner union as a Body has violated the provisions of law under which it is registered, they can move the competent Authority under the said law for proceedings against the said persons or the petitioner union for appropriate relief. In case the employers find that the members/office-bearers of the petitioner union are violating the service Rules or any other Rules of .The respondents Local Council then to proceed against them in accordance with the terms of their service in accordance with law. With these observations this writ petition is allowed in the above terms leaving the parties to bear their own costs.