' SAAD SAOOD JAN, J.-This order deals with 39 Writ Petitions bearing Nos. 1034-R/73, 894-R/73, 905- R/73, 834-R/73, 665-R/73, 677-R/73, 700-R/73, 755-R/73, 761-R/73, 767-R/73, 768-R/73, 803-R/73, 806-R/73. 861-R/73, 874-R/73, 889-R/73, 944-R/73, 950-R/73, 949-R/73, 951-R[73, 952-R/73, 983-R /73, 990..R/73, 824-R/73, 1001-R/73, 1017-R/73, 1033-R/73, 1035-R/73, 1003-R/73, 107-R/74, 105-R/74 ; 112-R/74, 123-R/74, 264-R/74, 253-R/74, 274-R/74, 882.R/74, 863-R/74, and 1059-11/73. There are being taken together as similar questions of fact and law arise in them.
2. The petitioners in these writ petitions have in their possession verified claims for agricultural land abandoned in India in the wake of the Partition. Proposals for allotments of land were made in their favour against these claims by the relevant Settlement authorities in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 64 of the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme, Part II. However, before the proposals could be confirmed the office of the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Punjab, issued a memorandum on 25.6-73 addressed to all settlement authorities in the Province.
The relevant part of the memorandum reads as follows : "In pursuance of the decision of the Federal Government of Pakistan the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Punjab, has ordered that the allotment of rural evacuee agricultural land against verified claims/entitlement certificates be stopped with immediate effect. It is, therefore, requested that all the Assistant Commissioners/ Extra Assistant Settlement Officers, Extra Assistant Colonization Officers, and all other concerned may please be directed immediately not to make further allotment of rural evacuee agricultural land against any claim, entitlement certificates. Proposals already made and not confirmed will also stand cancelled."
' Acting on this memorandum the Settlement authorities either cancelled or refused to confirm the proposals already made in favour of the petitioners. Finding that no other remedy was available to them the petitioners have come to this Court to challenge the validity of the memorandum.
3. On behalf of the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner a preliminary objection as to the competency of the writ petitions has been taken. It is contended that before a person may invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution he must show that he is an aggrieved party, or, in other words, he possesses some right or a privilege which stands infringed or violated ; the mere fact that proposals for allotment of evacuee agricultural land have been made in favour of the petitioners does not confer any right upon them and as such they have not suffered any legal injury, by the cancellation of the proposals thus, they have no locus stand' to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court. In support of this submission reliance has been placed upon Ata Ullah Malik v. Custodial, Evacuee Property (1), M. Z. Khan v. Aziz Ahmad (2), Raji-ud-Din v. Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner (3), and Taj Din v. Razia Begum (4). The case, reported as Ata Ullah Malik v. Custodian, Evacuee Property, does not appear to be relevant. In M. Z. Khan v. Aziz Ahmad, the decision proceeded on the construction of paragraph 8 of the Martial Law Regulation 89 and is as such also of no help. In Rafi-ud-Din v. Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, their Lordships of the Supreme Court reiterated their view that there was no question of displaced persons coming to Pakistan being entitled as of right to get properties in Pakistan in lieu of the properties left by them in India and that the evacuee laws were intended entirely to alleviate their hardships and misery. Their Lordships went on to hold that whatever compensations were given to the displaced persons were only in the nature of a benefit or a privilege'. In Taj Din v. Razta Begum, the view taken was that an allottee upon whom permanent rights had not yet been conferred did not have the locus stand' to challenge the proceedings taken by the Custodian with regard to the determination of the evacuee character of the property, on the ground that he had not been given an opportunity of being heard.
4. We do not think that the objection taken on behalf of the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner can be sustained. The proposals were made in favour of the petitioners in pursuance of a statutory scheme which is still in force. In the usual course of events those proposals would have been confirmed. The memorandum in question has put a stop to the normal functioning of the Scheme. In the event it is found that the Chief Settlement and rehabilitation Commissioner was not legally competent to issue the memorandum it will mean that the petitioners have been deprived of a benefit which they would have otherwise received by an illegal act of the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner. It cannot, therefore, be said that the petitioners have no grievance against the issuance of the memorandum. It may also be mentioned that the office of the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner is a creation of the statute. If its incumbent acts in violation of the provisions of the statute he gives a cause of grievance to the persons affected by his act. Viewed in this light the authorities cited on behalf of the Chief Settlement and Rebabilitation Commissioner become irrelevant.
5. It is to be observed that the expression 'aggrieved party' as occurring in paragraph (a) of clause
(1) of Article 199 of the Constitution has a wide connotation and it would even embrace a person who though suffering from no violation of a legal right, has been deprived of a benefit, privilege, liberty or franchise by an illegal act or omission of a public (1) PLD 1964 SC 236 (2) 1970 SCM R 534
(3) PLD 1971 C 252 (4) PLD 1971 SC 97 authority. Thus in Montgomery Flour and General Mills Ltd. v.
Director, Food Purchaser (I) Kaik aus, J. Observed : "It is true that a petitioner must have some right if he applies to the Court for a direction or order under Article 170 (corresponding to Article 199 of the present Constitution but he need not have a right in that strict sense of the term which is mentioned above. Wherever an enactment empowers a public officer to pass orders that benefit or harm a citizen, the citizen gets a right that in a matter in which he is concerned an order be passed in accordance with law. This too is a right that can be enforced by the Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 170 of the Constitution of Pakistan. If the officer concerned passes an order that is not in accordance with law, any person whose interests are affected by the order can maintain a petition for a writ or direction under Article 170 All orders of executive officers are subject to challenge by those affected by the orders, and a person would be "affected" even if he loses some benefit or advantage which he would have gained if the order was in accordance with law."
' This view was approved by the Supreme Court in Ikram Bus Service v. Board of Revenue (2) and also In Fazal Din v. Lahore Improvement Trust (3), wherein Hamoodur Rahman, C. J. Stated- "------the right considered sufficient for maintaining a proceeding of this nature is not necessarily a right in the strict juristic sense but it is enough if the applicant discloses that he had a personal interest in the performance of the lega1 duty which if not performed or performed in a manner not permitted by law would result in the loss of some personal benefit or advantage or the curtailment of a privilege or liberty, or franchise."
We are, therefore, of the view that the petitioners have a right to challenge the legality of the memorandum which has prevented the confirmation of proposals already in exercise in their favour at the time of its issuance. The preliminary objection is accordingly overruled.
6. The main submission made on behalf of the petitioners was that the primary mode envisaged by the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act for compensating and resettling the displaced persons was by allotment of land to them. In support of this assertion reference was made to the long title, the preamble and subsection (1) of section 15 of the Act. It was then urged that the memorandum In question by stopping all future allotments and cancelling those which had already been made tended to defeat the very purpose for which the Act was passed. It was also submitted that as the Chief Settlement Commissioner was the creation of and a functionary under the Act he could not do anything which would frustrate its principal object or alter the primary mode prescribed by it for compensating and resettling the displaced persons.
7. There is considerable force in the contentions of the petitioners. The long title of the Act reads as follows: "An Act to provide for the permanent settlement of displaced persons on land and for matters incidental thereto connected therewith."
(1) PLD 1957 Lab. 914
(2) PLD 1963 SC 564
(3) PLD 1969 SC 223 ' This title does give the impression that the Act was primarily passed to settle the displaced persons on land and the other provisions appearing therein were intended only to give effect to the main object. This position is reiterated in the preamble of the Act which reads as follows: "Whereas it is expedient to provide for the permanent settlement of displaced persons on land in order to compensate them for the losses suffered by them on account of expropriation by the Government of India of their rights in property in India or in any area occupied by India, and for matters incidental thereto or connected therewith."
Here again it will be noted that the emphasis is on settlement of displaced persons on 'land'.
Although, not infrequently, the long title and the preamble do not furnish a sure guide for the interpretation or construction of a statute but in this case a perusal of the substantive provisions does suggest that they were intended to give effect to the object proclaimed in the long title and the preamble. Thus, subsection (2) of section 4 provides C for the acquisition of the evacuee property by the Central Government free of all encumbrances. The property so acquired is to form part of a compensation pool created by subsection (1) of section 5. Subsection (1) of section 14 requires the Chief Settlement Commissioner to frame a scheme for the allotment of land out of the compensation pool to the displaced persons. Subsection I 1) of section 15 reads as follows: "A Settlement Authority specially empowered by the Chief Settlement Commissioner in this behalf, shall in respect of such verified claims against which no allotment has been made before the commencement of this Act, proceed to make an allotment to the displaced persons concerned in accordance with any of the Schemes executed under section 14."
It will thus appear that after a scheme has been framed by the Chief settlement Commissioner this subsection casts a duty upon the person authorised by him to allot land in accordance therewith to the displaced persons who have unsatisfied claims in their possession. The binding force of this obligation gets strengthened from the long title and the preamble of the Act where, as already pointed out, for the payment of compensation to the displaced person, the emphasis is clearly on the allotment of land.
8. It is to be noticed that by two notifications issued on 15-4-195 (No, 1376-RR/4-R-59) and 8-6-1960 (R. S./1-60 (1462) almost the entire evacuee agricultural land was acquired by the Central Government and as such it formed part of the compensation pool. The Chief Settlement Commissioner also framed a scheme under subsection (1) of section 14 which was in substance an adaptation of the Pakistan Rehabilitation Scheme framed under the Pakistan Rehabilitation Act.
This scheme has not yet been rescinded. It is not the case of the Chief Settlement Commissioner that so far as land is concerned compensation pool stands exhausted, In the circumstances we do not see how he can by an executive order prevent his subordinate authorities from performing or absolving them of a statutory duty cast upon them by subsection (1) of section 15. He being a creation of the statute cannot act in a manner which would be in vitiation of his obligations under the Act. We must, therefore, hold the memorandum as ultra vires of his powers.
9. The learned Deputy Attorney-General who appeared for the Central Government at our invitation contended that the Chief Settlement Commissioner, was bound by the instruction of the Federal Government under subsection (2) of section 9 of the Act and since the memorandum in question had been issued by him under a direction of the Federal Government it could not be considered as ultra vires of his authority. This contention is again without any merit. As clearly provided by the said subsection the directions which the Federal Government may give to the Chief Settlement Commissioner must be in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The Federal Government cannot by giving directions to the Chief Settlement Commissioner make him and his subordinate authorities to refuse a duty cast upon them by the statute. A direction given in violation of the provisions of the Act must be considered as illegal and of no binding force. Thus, if the memoradum is otherwise invalid it cannot become valid just because the Federal Government has made him to issue it.
10. On 30-7-1973 subsection (1) of section 14 was amended by Ordinance VI of 1974. This amendment enabled the Chief Settlement Commissioner to frame schemes also for payment of cash compensations to the displaced persons. In pursuance of this amendment a scheme has already been framed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. This subsection was further amended on 15-5-74 by Act XXXVI of 1974. The new amendment empowered the Chief Settlement Commissioner to prepare a scheme for payment of compensation to displaced persons in the shape of bonds as well. We do not think that these two amendments have in any way whittled down the compulsive force of the Settlement authorities' obligation under subsection (1) of section
15. It is to be noticed that these two- amendments have not taken away the power of the Chief Settlement Commissioner to frame schemes for allotment of land to displaced persons. These have also not in any way diluted the mandatory nature of the direction contained in subsection (1) of section 15. Had the intention, been to stop all future allotments of land to displaced persons the amendment would have said so. In the absence of any manifestation of such an intention it is difficult to accept that these amendments were intended to alter the primary mode of compensation envisaged by the Act. It is to be noticed that apart from land fairly large sums of money also form part of the compensation pool. The two amendments may well have been intended to enable the Chief Settlement Commissioner to provide for the disposal of these amounts. In any case, since the scheme for the allotment of the land has neither been rescinded nor modified it cannot be said that the amendments made in subsection (1) of section 14 have absolved the Chief Settlement Commissioner and the authorities subordinate to him from giving effect to it.
11. Finally the learned Deputy Attorney-General submitted that the provisions of the Act should be construed liberally and in support of this submission he referred to the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Rafiud- Din v. Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner Their Lordships have said : __________________ As was pointed out by the Federal Court in the case of the Punjab Province v. L. Sita Ram and others, while considering the nature of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance, 1949, such legislations are legislations of an extremely special character which are from the very nature of things to be construed not so much on considerations that would weigh with Courts of law but also on considerations of policy. They were designed for meeting an extraordinary situation of a complex and confusing nature created by the influx of a large number of refugees who had to be settled and were tended to be so adaptable as to meet the changes in the situation that developed from time to time. They could not, therefore, be construed upon strict legal principles and certainly not in such a manner as to defeat the very object for which such special legislation was designed."
' We do not think that these observations were intended to cover the acts of the Settlement authorities which were against the very letter and spirit, of the statutes under which they operated.
It is, therefore, difficult to see how observations are relevant here.
12. For the reasons stated above, we accept these petitions, hold the memorandum in question to be of no legal effect and direct that the proposals already existing in favour of the petitioners should be considered as still subsisting and be disposed of in accordance with law. The petitioners shall also have their costs in this Court.