' Petitioner. Is an Advocate and is aggrieved by an order, dated 7-7-2001 passed by Executive Committee of respondent No,
1. Vide the impugned order, the Committee has entertained an application by one Muhammad Iqbal alleging that professional degree of the petitioner was fake and forged and that the petitioner was cheating people by representing that he was a duly qualified Advocate. The Committee directed issue of notice to the petitioner for 11-8-2001 and also called for the comments of Mr. Muhammad Akram Malik, Member, Punjab Bar Council from Mianwali District. The Committee was further pleased to suspend the licence of the petitioner, in the meanwhile.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the complaint is based on mala fides as the petitioner is appearing as a counsel against the complainant in an election petition filed against him as well as against Mr. Muhammad Akram Malik, Member, Punjab Bar Council who was also elected as Nazim. It is also submitted that the Executive Committee has no power to deal with such complaints. It is further argued that in any case, even the proper Committee has no power to suspend the licence pending inquiry. By relying on section 41 and section 43(5) of the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), he has further argued that the power to suspend the licence is available to the Tribunal only, constituted under section 42(2) of the Act.
3. After hearing the case in limine in the morning it was directed that the Secretary Bar Council should enter appearance at 1-00 p.m. The Secretary alongwith Mr. Muhammad Ahsan Bhoon, Advocate and Vice-Chairman of the Bar Council entered appearance. Mr. Bhoon candidly conceded that the impugned order was completely without jurisdiction and cannot be defended.
He also stated that the Bar Council has constituted two Committees for dealing with the complaints against lawyers. If the complaint was that the professional degree was fake, the same is referred to and decided by Anti-Corruption Committee. If the complaint is otherwise against the misconduct of an Advocate, such a complaint is referred to Disciplinary Committee. It is pointed out that the Executive Committee does not possess any power/jurisdiction to deal with the present complaint. In view of the position thus emerging, learned counsel for the petitioner sought permission to delete respondent No,2, the complainant. This permission was granted. Learned counsel did the needful in Court.
4. A Bar Council is constituted under the Act. Under section 10 thereof a Provincial Bar Council has to constitute Standing Committee known as (I) Executive Committee, (II) A Disciplinary Committee
(III) One or more Enrolment Committees. Under subsection (3) of section 10, Provincial Bar Council can co stitute such other Committees as it may deem necessary. Chapter 7 of the Act deals with the conduct of Advocates. A complaint against the conduct of an Advocate has to be dealt with by the Disciplinary Committee under section 41(4). This Committee, unless it summarily rejects the complaint, has to hold an inquiry in the presence of the parties and if it does not reject the complaint, has to refer the same to a Tribunal for decision. Any person whose complaint has been rejected by the Disciplinary Committee is entitled to file an appeal before the Tribunal. Tribunals are constituted under section 42 of the. Act and in the case of Provincial Bar Council, the Tribunal is chaired by a Judge of the High Court nominated by the Chief Justice of that Court. Section 43 provides for procedure in inquiries and it is under subsection (5) of section 43 that on completion of the inquiry, the Tribunal may either dismiss the complaint -- or it may make an order for imposition of the penalties referred to in subsection (1) of section 41. Under subsection (6), the Tribunal, in case of sentence of suspension from' practice, has to specify the period of suspension.
It may also be noted that under section 41(1) an Advocate found guilty of misconduct, can be reprimanded, suspended, or removed from practice. All these provisions make abundantly clear that imposition of sentence of suspension can only be awarded by a Tribunal and that also after completing the inquiry prescribed in section 43. The Disciplinary Committee can only entertain and inquire into the complaint and refer it to the Tribunal, if it does not reject it. Even the Disciplinary Committee has no power of suspension, pending inquiry into the complaint. The Executive Committee has nothing to do with the complaints against the Advocates. The impugned order, therefore, is completely without jurisdiction and Mr. Bhoon is absolutely correct in not contesting this case.
5. For the above reasons, I accept this petition and declare the impugned order, dated 7-7-2001 passed by the Executive Committee of respondent No,1, to have been passed without lawful authority and consequently of no legal effect. Resultantly, the complaint shall be deemed to be pending and, if so advised, will be proceeded with, in accordance with law. No order as to costs.
6. Before parting, I must place on record my appreciation of the assistance rendered to this Court by Mr. Bhoon, the Vice-Chairman on a short notice as also the candidness with which he conceded the legal position.