IRSHAD HASAN KHAN, C.J.---Through this common judgment, we intend to dispose the above petitions together for the reason that the questions of law and facts involved in all these causes are akin to each other.
2. Briefly stated the facts leading to the institution of these petitions are that the petitioners' services with respondent No,1-United Bank Limited were terminated and/or retirement orders passed on 10-10-1997 in consequence of the Retrenchment/Retirement Scheme enforced by the Bank on 9-10-1997. The prayer clause in all the appeals before the Federal. Service Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal revolves around the setting aside of the termination/retirement orders dated 10-10-1997 as being' illegal and void ab initio. Same is the position with regard to the relief regarding all consequential benefits.
3. It was in United Bank Limited through President v. Shahmim Ahmed Khan and 41 others PLD 1999 SC 990 that this Court set aside the judgment of the Tribunal in other similar causes upholding setting aside of the termination/retirement orders dated 10-10-1997 by allowing appeals of the respondent-Bank. Subsequently, the Tribunal examined in detail the retrenchment orders dated 10- 10-1997 in 395 appeals filed by some of the employees of the United Bank Limited including Appeal No,249(L) of 1998 ruling on 23-8-1999 that the bank is within its right to direct the retrenchment of its employees. This judgment of the Tribunal was Challenged before this Court through Civil Petitions No,1524 to 1529, 1576 to 1697, 1713, 1714, 1719 to 1721, 1776 and 1519 of 1999 and disposed of on 11-3-2000 by converting them into appeals in Akram Zahoor v. Federation of Pakistan 2000 SCM R 1232, with the following observations: "(i) Adjustment of loans obtained by the petitioners herein from the respondent-Bank shall be made strictly in accordance with the respective loan agreements executed between each of the petitioners and the respondent-Bank.
(ii) The grant of pensionery benefits shall be available to those petitioners who are found entitled in accordance with the Service Rules of the respondent-bank in force at the time of termination of their services."
4. The judgment of the Tribunal dated 1-6-2000 is the subject-matter of Civil Petitions Nos. 1167, 1184, 1186, 1196, 1198, 1203, 1204, 1205, 1206, 1208, 1209 to 1212, 1218 to 1251, 1274 to 1291, 1293 to 1329, 1331 to 1344, 1355 to 1365, 1373 to 1379, 1382, 1455 to 1457, 1572, 1578, 1646 to 1650, 1822, 1823 and 1874 to 1876 of 2000. Judgment dated 14-6-2000 has been impugned in Civil Petitions Nos.1193 to 1195, 1197, 1199, 1202, 1207 and 1330 of 2000. Civil Petition No,1556 to 2000 is directed against judgment dated 16-6- 1999. Challenge has been made to judgment dated 7-8-2000 through Civil Petitions Nos.1528 to 1551, 1573 to 1577 and 1645 of 2000 and Civil Petition No,1554 of 2000 has been brought to challenge judgment dated 23-8-1999.
5. The following Civil Petitions are beyond time as indicated against each:
1. C.P.No,I202/2000 by 8 days
2. C.P.No,1203/2000 by 2 days
3. C.P.No,1554/2000 by 353 days
4. C.P.No,1555/2000 by 353 days
5. C.P.No,1556/2000 by 422 days
6. C.P.No,1557/2000 by 353 days
7. C.P.No,1558/2000 by 353 days
8. C.P.No,1559/2000 by 353 days
9. C.P.No,1572/2000 by 72 days
10. C.P.No,1580/2000 by 353 days
11. C.P.No,1645/2000 by 6 days
12. C.P.No,1646/2000 by 79 days
13. C.P.No,1647/2000 by 79 days
14. C.P.No,1648/2000 by 79 days
15. C.P.No,1649/2000 by 79 days
16. C.P.No,1650/2000 by 79 days
17. C.P.No,1822/2000 by 80 days 18, C.P.No,1823/2000 by 100 days
6. Mr. Abid Hassan Mint(); learned Senior Advocate Supreme. Court appearing in support of the petitions of his clients was critical of the situation emerging with the insertion of section 2-A in the Services Tribunals Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) through Service Tribunals (Amendment) Act XVII of 1997 with effect from 10-6-1997 and the import of Articles 260, 240 and 212 of the Constitution regarding the within mentioned declaration, of the contemplation of Article 260 of the Constitution attracting only the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. According to him, the declaration that persons similarly placed, as the petitioners i,e,' employees of Public Sector Corporation etc. Are deemed to be in the service of Pakistan, has been made by a Competent Legislature in the exercise of its powers under Article 260 of the Constitution, therefore, the provision of Article 240 of the Constitution should have been applied to their case without more, by redoing their terms and conditions of service as mandated under Article 240 of the Constitution with the result that the 'application of Article 212 of the Constitution by this Court in United Bank Limited v. Shahmim Akhtar and others PLD 1999 SC 990 to his clients requires review for which proceedings are pending in this Court. The precise plea was that the Federal Government was required to lay down anew the terms and conditions of service of the petitioners and, in the event of not making or promulgating such terms and conditions for them, they were entitled to an opportunity of being heard before any action adverse to their interests could be passed by the respondent-Bank. He concluded-his arguments by making a composite prayer that the questions regarding the joint effect of (1) the 'declaration' under Article 260 of the Constitution, (2) requirement of framing/redoing of terms and conditions of petitioners' service under Article 240, of the Constitution and (3) the scope of Article 212 of the Constitution calls for a restatement of law by this Court in the case of his clients and, therefore, it is a fit case for grant of leave to appeal under clause (3) of Article 212 of the Constitution. He heavily relied upon Mabood Khan v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan 1989 SCM R 41 for the proposition that the declaration made in section 2-A (ibid) is not of limited import for the purposes of, attracting only the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under section 4 of the Act. The terms and conditions of service of his clients should have been redone, it is submitted with respect by Mr. Minto, as the following of such course has the support of the mandate in that behalf in Article 240 of the Constitution,
7. Mr. M.A. Zaidi, learned Advocate-on-Record has adopted the arguments addressed by Mr.Minto and so has Syed Muhammad Waris Shah petitioner in C.P. No,1184 of 2000.
8. Raja Muhammad Akram, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court appearing on behalf of the respondent-caveator-Bank has controverted the pleas raised by Mr. Minto and contended that his clients have meticulously complied with the directions issued by this Court in Shahmim Ahmad Khan (supra) and that the majority of the Bank employees who were party in the said precedent did not care to put in their applications detailing their grievances respectively and that the Bank had to make an in depth study of their causes by dealing with each and every item calling fit- determination to resolve the question of their entitlement to various perks after their termination/retirement on 10-10-1997, within the four corners of the Scheme of the Bank dated 9- 10-1997.
9. The question which calls for resolution in these causes revolves around the import of section 2-A
(ibid) in the context of its applicability being limited only to the provisions of a remedy of appeal to the petitioners after declaring their services to be compatible with the civil servants or whether such declaration will legally give rise to an obligation on the part of the Government to frame and promulgate appropriate terms and conditions of service for the petitioners (and others), as is the case in relation to civil servants generally.
10. According to Mr. Minto, his clients' case is that after the declaration under section 2-A (ibid) the law required that the Government should have gone ahead with redoing the terms and conditions of service of the petitioners is supported by Mabood Khan (supra), cannot stand a detailed examination of this precedent. Section 2-A of the Act reads thus: "2-A. Service under certain corporations,. Etc., to be service of Pakistan.--Service under any authority, corporation, body or organization established by or under a Federal Law or which is owned or controlled by the Federal Government or in which the Federal Government has a controlling share or interest is hereby declared to be service of Pakistan and every person holding a post under such authority, corporation, body or organization shall be deemed to be a civil servant for the purposes of this Act."
' In the precedent case leave had been granted to examine various provisions of the Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance, 1978 for determining the jurisdiction of the Tribunal as also of the President and the status of an employee of the Agricultural Development Bank who had challenged his removal from service of the said Bank on the ground that the professed object of promulgation of the Ordinance was "to invest the President with certain powers in respect of persons in Corporation Service". This Court considered various provisions of the Ordinance, including section 3 thereof through which power was conferred on the President notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or in the terms and conditions of service, in order to take action, against a person appointed in Corporation service or promoted during the period from 1st January, 1972 to the 5th day of July, 1977 and came to the following conclusions, among others: "5. Being not earlier to the Ordinance, in service of Pakistan, the President could not exercise in respect of such employees any power relating to the terms and conditions of their service.
Declaration by law of 'any other service' as service of Pakistan was provided for in Article 260 of the Constitution. This declaration having been made by section 5 of the Ordinance, the President acquired the power reserved in Article 240, by section 3 of the Ordinance, Reading section 5 of the Ordinance alongwith the Constitutional provisions just reproduced, it follows that in declaring the 'person in corporation service' to be 'in service of Pakistan', power under Article 240 of the Constitution was acquired by the President for determining their conditions of service. Nothing beyond should be read into that declaration. Next follows in section 5 the deeming provision whereby those employees who have been dealt with under section 3 have been provided a relief/remedy in the Service Tribunal. The deeming clause is available only to those who are proceeded under section 3 of the Ordinance and none else. On that view of the matter, as in this case action had not been taken under the Ordinance, the petitioner would not be deemed to be a civil servant for the purposes of Civil Servants Act or Service Tribunals Act. Therefore, Article 212 of the Constitution was not a bar to the petitioner seeking reliefs from the High Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction.
6. The questions whether the petitioner/appellant was a statutory employee and whether the protection available to him under the law had been denied to him, are questions which will be determined in the first instance by the High Court: The appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the proceedings are remanded for further proceedings in the matter. No order as to costs."
' The underlined portions of the above excerpts from Mabood Kean (supra) bring it to the fore that the existence or otherwise of statutory rules in relation to the employees of the Agricultural Development Bank rules the lis. Here, it is not even so much as alleged, muchless established on record, that the petitioners/employees of the U.B.L. Are being governed in the matter of their service under any statutory rules. We are not inclined to the view that the precedent case is of any help to the petitioners.
11. As regards the plea that in the absence of redone terms and conditions of service of the petitioners, they were entitled to at least an opportunity of hearing before passing the order, we suffice by observing that the main object of the declaration made under section 2-A (ibid) was to provide a remedy of appeal to the employees of the respondent-Bank (and others) to safeguard their interests against the orders/actions taken by their Employer/Corporation/Private Companies regarding action taken against them beyond the rules/regulations/statutes.
12. In view of the order that we propose to make in these petitions, the delay in filing Civil Petitions Nos.1202, 1203, 1554, 1555, 1556, 1557, 1558, 1559, 1572, 158021645, 1646, 1647, 1648, 1649, 1650, 1822 and 1823 of 2000 is condoned.
13. A bare perusal of the last but two paragraphs of the impugned judgment dated 1-6-2000 shows that the Tribunal observed that the case of the present petitioners is at par with that of the appellants in Akram Zahoor v. Federation of Pakistan 2000 SCM R 1232, and that: "If the appellants (petitioners herein) are still aggrieved with the decision of the respondent-Bank they shall be at liberty to approach this Tribunal afresh after satisfying the requirements of law and rules.
Consequently, the appeals of the appellants for setting aside termination orders, dated 10-10-1997 and reinstatement with back benefits are dismissed." (Underlining is for emphasis). This Court reiterated the contents of paragraph 6(i) and (ii) of the judgment in Akram Zahoor (supra) while allowing the same relief to 175 appellants in, among others, Civil Petition No,2110-L of 2000 etc. Vide an unreported judgment of this Court dated 23-10-2000.
14. Confronted with this, learned counsel for the petitioners were not in a position to say anything against the above course being followed in relation to the present petitions as well.
15. Resultantly, these petitions are converted into appeals and following the rule of consistency, we maintain the orders of termination from service of the petitioners, and remand the cases to the respondent-Bank to the extent indicated above. The appellants herein shall make separate applications to the respondent-Bank for redress of their grievances in terms of the above position stating therein the details of their respective claims against the Bank within 60 days from today.
The applications so moved by the appellants shall be disposed of by the Bank within 90 days of the expiry of the aforesaid period of the receipt of the applications by the bank on merits and in accordance with law. If any one of the appellants feels aggrieved to his extent, he shall be within his right to approach the appropriate Service Tribunal, thereafter. No costs.