SAYED ZAHID HUSSAIN, J.--- Muhammad Shafi, father of the petitioner was Lamberdar of Chak No. 680/21 G.B. Tehsil Kamalia, District T.T. Singh. On his death, the said post fell vacant and the issue of appointment of Lamberdar arose. The Deputy Commissioner/Collector, T.T. Singh invited applications. The petitioner and number of other persons made applications. The matter was processed by the Tehsildar who recommended the petitioner. In this process, number of other candidates withdrew their candidature in favour of Abdul Salam, respondent No. 2. After hearing the parties concerned, the Deputy Commissioner/Collector appointed the petitioner on 24.4.1995 that he being the eldest son of the deceased Lamberdar had a preferential right over others. Abdul Salam, respondent No. 2 challenged that order by filing appeal thereagainst which was dismissed by the Commissioner, Faisalabad on 8.4.1996. He then filed a revision petition before the Board of Revenue which was accepted by the Senior Member/Member (Revenue) Board of Revenue on 3.8.1998 for the view taken by him that the petitioner herein being an employee of Agriculture Developed Bank of Pakistan cannot devote his full attention in performing the duties of Lambardar who is liable to be transferred from one place to the other. This order has been assailed by the petitioner through this petition under Article 199 of the Constitution.
2. It is contended by the learned counsel that the service of the petitioner in A.D.B.P. Does not in any way disqualify him from being appointed as Lamberdar and that despite the declaration by the Shariat Appellate Bench of Supreme Court as to rule of primogeniture in Maqbool Ahmad Qureshi Vs. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan (PLD 1999 SC 484), the petitioner being the eldest son of the deceased Lambardar was entitled to preference and appointment. He has placed reliance upon Nawab Sajjad All Khan v. Ch. Fazal Ilahi, Speaker Legislative Assembly, etc. (PLD 1957 Lahore 940) and few other precedents of the Board of Revenue of the period prior to the judgment of Shariat Appellate Bench.
3. The learned counsel for respondent No. 2, on the other hand, supports the view taken by the learned Member, Board of Revenue and contends that rule of primogeniture having been found as repugnant to injunctions of Quran and Sunnah in Maqbool. Ahmad Qureshi's case (supra), the petitioner cannot seek preference in the matter of appointment as Lambardar and that in any case such rule was of a directory nature and had no imperative force and that he being in the service of A.D.B.P. Is liable to transfer from one place to other, the view taken by the learned member is amply justified by the circumstances. According to him, the findings recorded by the learned Member, Board of Revenue that respondent No. 2 who owns more land in the village can perform the duties effective his appointment cannot be interfered with in writ jurisdiction. It is further contended that Liaquat A.I had even defaulted in the payment of land revenue and is thus, disqualified for the post. In support of his above contentions, reliance is placed on Ghulam Hussain Vs. Ghulam Muhammad and another (1976 SCMR 75), Muhammad Shaffi Vs. Member (Revenue)
Board of Revenue, Punjab Lahore and 2 others (1972 SCMR 253), Abdul Ghafoor Vs. The Member(Revenue) Board of Revenue and another (1982 SCMR 202), Abdul Wahid Vs. The Member, Board of Revenue and another (1971 SCMR 719), Sharaf Din Vs. Qazi Abdul Jalil and another (1986 SCMR 1368), Allah Ditta Vs. Mian Nasir Ahmad and another (PLD 1973 Lahore 359), Masood Ahmad Vs. Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue and others (1982 CLC 357), Nazir Ahmad Vs. Roshan Din and others (1987 MLD 2269) and Muhammad Yousaf Vs. Member, Board of Revenue and 4 others (1996 SCMR 1581).
4. Although, Rule 19(2) of. West Pakistan Land Revenue Rules, 1968 concedes some preference in favour of the eldest son yet the said rule has always been considered of a directory nature in its effect. In Ghulam Hussain's case (supra), it was observed by their Lordships that "on its proper construction far from conferring any right much less a legal right, the rule at best is directory which provides a guideline for the choice of the successor Lambardar, the whole object being to appoint a person in the opinion of the appointing authority the most fit person from among eligible under Rules. It would be wrong to impart greater efficacy to the above rule. Moreover, fitness cannot be judged by any objective standard; it is primarily a subjective process, in which The opinion of the appointing authority is the crucial factor. Even on general principles, the appointment rests in the discretion of the graded hierarchy of Revenue Officer created by the- West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, who because of their experience and training are better qualified to make the choice than the Courts of general jurisdiction." In Nazir Ahmad's case (supra), the claim of the petitioner based on primogeniture rule was rejected and repelled observing that "the office of Lambardar is an administrative arrangement to serve as a link between the villagers and the local administration.
The petitioner had therefore, no vested right to get the. Appointment." Even prior to the declaration by the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court in Maqbool Ahmad Qureshis case (supra), in Muhammad Younus Vs. The Member (Judicial-I), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and, others (1994 MLD 1480), the view taken by a learned Judge of this Court was that the appointment of Lambardar like other appointments must be made on merits. Thus, being son of the Lambardar cannot be accorded a primacy in the matter of-appointment and other factors are also to be kept in view by the revenue authority.
5. It has also- been the consistent view of the superior Courts that no one has a right to claim appointment on the basis of any preference and the main criteria is the fitness of the person qua the responsibilities and duties. In Abdul Wahid's case (supra), it was observed that matter of appointment of Lambardar was essentially of an administrative nature and claim to that office could not be laid as of right. In Muhammad Shaffi's case (supra), the same principle was reiterated.
In Allah Ditta's case (supra), the petition was dismissed by following the above-mentioned principle. In Masood Ahmad's case (supra), again following the above-mentioned rule, the petition was. Dismissed. In Ch. Ghulam Ullah Vs. Board of Revenue, VVest Pakistan Lahore and 4 others (1984 CLC 2973), the petition was dismissed by reiterating the aforesaid rule. In. Muhammad Yousuf's case (supra), order of tl?e learned Member Board of Revenue was set aside by the High Court in writ jurisdiction which was reversed by their Lordships that the Board of Revenue had acted lawfully in the matter and that "law was fairly well-settled that apportionment or Lambardar rests in the discretion of the Revenue Authorities and as a general rule, an absentee is not to be appointed as a Lambardar particularly when a suitable candidate is available. The view taken by the learned Member was in accord with the settled law and based on correct appreciation of legal and factual position and the learned Judge was not quite right in taking the contrary view and holding that the respondent is not to be discarded simply because he had his permanent abode in the Chak." .
6. In the present case, the petitioner is admittedly though a son of deceased Lambardar, is employed with Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan. On consideration of the matter, keeping in view the nature of the duties and responsibilities, the learned Member did not endorse his appointment as Lambardar that "for all practical purposes, he is an absentee. Further his absence from the said revenue estate is not of temporary nature. Being in service, he can be transferred even further away. Even the institution of 'Sarbrah lambardar' is not meant to cover such permanent absence. Absence from the revenue estate, to my view, is a fatal disability. The petitioner owns more land in the village and can perform the duties effectively.' He thus, ordered the appointment of Abdul Salam, respondent No. 2. Being at the helm of the hierarchy, he found the petitioner to be not a fit person for appointment as Lambardar and appointed respondent No. 2.
The contention of. The learned counsel for the petitioner that being a government servant is not a disqualification by -itself for the appointment as ,Lambardar may have some merit but all the circumstances in determining the fitness of the person for the post become relevant. The assessm ent of these consideration persuaded. The learned Member, Board of Revenue to make appointment of the respondent. In Muhammad Yousaf's case (supra) the appointment of the person who was likely to be absent from the village was not approved by the Board of Revenue.
The said order was interfered with by this Court but on appeal, the order of the learned Member, Board of Revenue was restored by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the matter "rest exclusively in the domain of the revenue authorities who because of their experience and training are in a better position to make a suitable choice than the Courts of general jurisdiction."
7. The choice made by the Board of Revenue in the facts and circumstances of the case does not warrant interference by this Court in writ' jurisdiction.
For the above reasons, this petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.