MAULVI ANWAR-UL-HAQ, J.--- Feeling aggrieved of the addition of an amount of Rs.1,08,79,240/- in the electricity bill for the month of January, 2000 in respect of its premises, the petitioner had filed the present writ petition claiming that the addition of the said amount is without lawful authority as all the bills in respect of the electricity consumed in the said premises had been duly paid. The writ petition was entertained on 25.1.2000 when the respondent No. 2 was directed to appear in person and to file a report and parawise comments on 11.2.2000. Meanwhile, it was directed that the electricity connection of the petitioner shall not be discontinued for non-payment of the said outstanding amount. On 11.2.2000 the matter was adjourned to 28.2.2000 and the interim order dated 25.1.2000 was ordered to continue subject to furnishing of a security in the sum of the disputed amount. On 28.2.2000 comments were filed and the matter was adjourned for filing of a rejoinder. On 24,7.2000 C.M. No. 2950/2000 was put up before my learned brother Raja Muhammad Sabir, J. With a. Prayer by the petitioner that the main writ petition be heard as the statutory six months period provided in Article 199 of the Constitution was about to expire. The case was ordered to be heard on 25.7.2000 On this date the case was adjourned on the request of learned counsel for the respondents to 2.8,2000. On 2.8.2000 learned counsel for the petitioner was not available and the case was adjourned to 18.8.2000. It appears that some time after the said date the electricity connection of the petitioner was disconnected and C.M. No. 3431/2000 was filed. Since the case had already been ordered to, be heard on 18.8.2000 it was adjourned to the said date. On 18.8.2000 vide order in C.M. N0,3500/2000 the respondents were allowed to file some documents on the file and the case was adjourned to 22,8.2000. The matter was accordingly heard on the said date. Since both the learned counsel wanted to file some more documents the case was adjourned for today. The said documents have been filed and the arguments were concluded today.
2. It will be appropriate to refer here to the comments filed by the respondents. The plea taken in the comments is that the aforesaid amount is. Outstanding against Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd.
Rawalpindi on account of less charging of hydel and fixed charges and since the petitioner is one of the units of the same group of industries the amount is debited in its account under Section 24(1) of the Electricity Act, 1910 and this has been done because, the said Kohinoor Textile Mills is no more consumer of WAPDA. A reference has also been made that a refund of Rs.16,52,4000/- was received, by the petitioner while the said amount constitutes security of the said Kohinoor Textile Mills, Rawalpindi. In the rejoinder- it has been stated that Kohinoor Textile Mills, Rawalpindi is a public limited Company and the petitioner Company i.e. Kohinoor (Gujjar Khan) Mills Ltd.-is an independent public limited company and both are different entities. . It has further been elaborated that in the case of Kohinoor Textile. Mills Ltd. Two Directors have been nominated by the National Investment Trust whereas in the case of the petitioner company one Director has been nominated by the Investment Corporation of Pakistan. The two companies have separate share- holders and as such they are totally independent of each other and each company has a distinct legal entity of its own. Reference has also been made to an earlier demand against the said Kohinoor Mills Ltd.,' Rawalpindi which was disallowed by the Electrical Inspector as also Advisory Board of Appeal whereagainst W.P. No. 2137/97 filed' by the WAPDA was dismissed.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that neither the amount in question is due or even stated to be due from the petitioner company nor is it recoverable from the petitioner company in terms of Section 24(1) of the Electricity Act, 1910. Relies on the case of E.B.M. Company, Ltd. Vs, Dominion Bank (AIR 1937 PC 279), some observations in the cases of Ikram Bus Service and others Vs. Board of Revenue, West Pakistan, etc. (PLQ 1963 SC 564) and Tariq Saeed Saigal Vs. The District Excise and Taxation Officer Rawalpindi (PLJ 1982 Lahore 445).
Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, contends that the petitioner and the person against whom the said amount is allegedly due are one and the same. To elaborate his argument he has drawn my attention to several documents appended with C.M. 3500/2000.
According to the learned counsel the applicant for the electricity connection at Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd., Rawalpindi is one Mien Taufiq Saigal. For this contention he relies on the applications for electric connection (which are Annexures, A and B to the said C.M.). He, with reference to .Annexure G, contends that the applicant for the electric connection at Rachna Textile Mills, Gujjar Khan (it is an admitted position that the former name of the petitioner company was Rachna Textile Mills and was later changed to Kohinoor (Gujjar Khan) Mills Ltd. Vide Annexure M to the C.M. No 3500/2000) is also the said Taufiq Saigal. The precise contention of the learned counsel is that Taufiq being a common factor in the two applications it should be presumed that the consumer at Rawalpindi and Gujjar Khan is the same. Thereafter the learned counsel refers to an application filed on behalf of Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd. Rawalpindi before the learned Ombudsman and the order passed thereon. Learned counsel, particularly, has drawn my attention to the fact that in the said application a prayer was made for refund of meter security amount in respect of the account of Kohinoor Diaper Plant, Peshawar Road, Rawalpindi which stood permanently disconnected oh 19.2.1996 and an offer was made in the application that either the amount be refunded to the said applicant or in the alternate the same be adjusted against the account of Kohinoor Textile Mills at Gujjar Khan. The learned Ombudsman While directing the respondents to refund the amount ordered that if the security amount is not returned to the consumer directly, it may be utilised against the account of Kohinoor Textile Mills, Gujjar Khan. According to the learned counsel this fact also shows that the consumer at the two premises is the same. Learned counsel relies on the case of M/s. Pak lce Factory Vs. Wapda and others (1987 M LD 2277). Finally it is argued that this petition has not been filed by the competent person. In response to this last mentioned contention learned counsel for the petitioner has placed on record copy of the resolution passed 'by the petitioner company authorising Mr. Arshad Mehmood to file' this petition.
4. I have gone through the several documents placed on record by the parties from time to time and even today. Before proceeding further I. Find it necessary to reproduce here the provisions of Section 24(1) of the Electricity Act, 1910 as the primary question involved in this writ petition is as to whether the respondents while purporting to act under the said section can recover the amount 'admittedly not due from the petitioner under the provisions of the. Same and to disconnect the electricity connection of the petitioner. Section 24(1) reads as under:- "Discontinuance of supply to consumer neglecting to pay charge (11) where any consumer neglects to pay any charge for energy or any sum, other than a charge for energy, assessed against him by a licensee in respect of supply of energy to his premises, the licensee may after giving not less than seven clear days' notice in writing to such consumer and without prejudice to his right recover such charge or other sum by suit or otherwise, cut off the supply and for that purpose cut or disconnect any electric supply-line or other works, being the property of the 'licensee, through which energy may be supplied to such premises or to any other premises, other than domestic premises running distinctly in the name of such consumer, and may discontinue the supply until such charge or other sum, together with any expenses incurred by him in cutting off and reconnecting the supply and the minimum charges on account of continued reservation of supply during the period of such discontinuance, are paid, but not longer."
A reading of the afore-reproduced provision of law would show that where any consumer neglects to pay any sum assessed against him by a licensee in respect of supply of energy to his premises, then the licensee can adopt the following process subject to service of a notice of not less than seven clear days in writing:-
(i) To recover the amount by filing a suit,
(ii) To recover the amount as otherwise directed in the said Act,
(iii) Cut off the supply of energy to such premises, and
(iv) Any other premises other than domestic premises, runnin distinctly in the name of such consumers.
It is this last mentioned power that has been exercised by th respondents while purporting to act under the said Section 24(1).
5. It will be noted that the terminology used in the Section cis a -vis the said power to disconnect the premises otherwise than the one in respect whereof any sum is assessed against a consumer I somewhat unusual. There is no reference to ownership of the premises or its occupation by the consumer. The insistence is tha the said other premises should be running. Distinctly in the name o such consumer. To my mind. The only meaning that can be placed o the said wording is that apart from the premises in respect whereo any charge for energy or any other sum has been assessed against consumer , the supply of energy to any other premises could be discontinued provided the said other premises is running distinctly in the name of such consumer that is to say that the same consumer in the same name had obtained electric connection in two different premises and in case there is a default in respect of one such premises then as a result of such default within the meaning of Section 24(1) of the said Electricity Act, 1910, the said other premises can also be disconnected.
6. In the light of. The provisions of the said Section 24(1) the respondents have to demonstrate that the consumer Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd., Rawalpindi and at the premises of the petitioner company is the same. I have already referred to the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in some details above. I have examined the said documents which have been relied upon by the learned counsel. In Annexure A against Part- B in the column requiring mention.Of name of the applicant is the name of Mian Taufiq Saeed Saigal. In Para C the address at which the electric connection is required is mentioned as Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd., Peshawar Road, Rawalpindi. In Annexure C in part B the name of applicant is mentioned as Taufiq S. Saigal. In part C the address at which the electric connection required is mentioned as Diaper Plant of M/s. Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd.', Rawalpindi. In Annexure G which is the application for electric connection of the petitioner company against the column requiring mention of name of the applicant, name of Tariq S. Saigal is mentioned. There is yet another column requiring the mention of the name of the Directors in the case of a company, where the name of Taufiq S. Saigal is mentioned. In the column requiring mention of the address of the premises where the electricity is required is mentioned the name of Rachna Textile Mills, Gulyana Road, Gujjar Khan. The application is 'signed for the said Rachna Textile Mills. It is witnessed by the Mills Secretary-of Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd. It will thus be seen that even going by the argument sought to be pressed by the learned counsel for the respondents that the applicant for electric connection should be deemed to be the consumer, the consumer in the case of the premises at Rawalpindi is .Taufiq Saigal while the consumer in the premises at Gujjar Khan is Tariq Saigal and thus it cannot be said that the premises of the petitioner company is running distinctly in the name of the consumer, namely, Taufiq Saigal against whom the amount in question has been assessed by the respondents.
7. I may, however, state here that I am not in agreement with the said line of arguments of the learned counsel for the respondents.
According to the comments filed by the respondents the amount in question is due against Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd., Rawalpindi. It is not even the case of the respondents that the amount is due against the said Taufiq Saigal,. The relevant part B of the application forms (Annexures B&C) provide in vernacular that in case of a company the name of the competent officer be mentioned.
At the foot of the form Annex C, the applicant in fact is Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd., Rawalpindi. The possibility, therefore, cannot be entirely ruled out that the applications were in fact filed on behalf of the said company by Mian Taufiq Saigal.
8. Coming to the second contention of the learned counsel for the respondents based on the application to the learned Ombudsman and the order passed thereon, I find that the petitioner was not a party. To the said proceedings and the learned Ombudsman allowed the amount to be adjusted against the account of the petitioner on an offer made by. Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd., Rawalpindi who was the petitioner before the learned Ombudsman. This circumstance can also not be stretched so as to attract the provisions of said Section 24(1) of the Electricity Act, 1910 by assuming that the consumer in both the cases is the same.
9. Reverting back to the argument of the learned counsel for he petitioner I find that the petitioner in fact is a duly incorporated public limited company and so is Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd., Rawalpindi. In the case of E.B.M. Company Ltd. Relied upon by the earned counsel for the petitioner it was observed at page 284:- "Their Lordship believe it to be of supreme importance that the distinction should be clearly marked, observed and maintained between an incorporated company's legal entity and its actions, assets, rights and liabilities on the one hand, and the individual share-holders and their actions, assets, rights and liabilities on the other hand." e said observations were followed by the Supreme Court of kistan . In the case of lkram Bus Service and others Vs. Board of venue, West Pakistan, etc. (PLD 1963 SC 564). In the case of istan Vs. Pak Chrome Leather Company Ltd. (PLD 1983 Lahore ) a D.B..Of this Court in somewhat similar circumstances, while wing the said case of E.B.M.
Company Ltd. Rejected following submission made on behalf of the Federal Government:- "It was further submitted that the respondent company and Messrs Sindh Tanneries Limited were the sister concern. The Directors of tho two companies were the same. One family was running the two companies. The respondent owes more than one crore to the appellant."
I may point out here that the last mentioned case has arisen out of a civil suit wherein it was established that both the companies had. The same Directors. On the other hand, I find that the case of M/s. Pak Ice Factory relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents is squarely against the proposition sought to be propounded by the learned counsel. In the said case the consumer was the owner of the premises Which was leased out to some other party. The case of the consumer was that WAPDA should follow the lessee who was in fact consumer of electricity. His Lordship rejected the said contention and held that WAPDA was well within its rights to follow the consumer for payment of electricity charges. The present is the case of two different consumers altogether as would be evident from the definition of the term in Section 2(c) of the said Act.
10. In the said state of law that the contention of the learned counsel ,for the respondents that the said Taufiq Saigal being the signatory of the electric connection forms for the Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd., Rawalpindi and being mentioned as one `of the Directors of the petitioner company in the electric supply application form is enough reason to invoke the provisions of Section 24(1) of the Electricity Act, 1910, is not tenable.
11. Towards the end of his arguments learned counsel for the respondents has brought to my notice that the said Taufiq Saeed Saigal was served with a notice for payment of the said amount on 18.10.1999 and the amount still remains unpaid. He has further drawn my attention, to some correspondence with the National Accountability Bureau. Steps are being taken to refer the matter t the said Bureau under the. Provisions of Federal Ordinance XVIII o 1999 and that the matter is under inquiry by the Inter Service Intelligence. This may be so. I want to make it clear that nothin discussed herein above shall have any effect on any lawf proceedings against the consumer against whom the said amou has been allegedly assessed i.e. Taufiq Saigal or Kohinoor Texti Mills Ltd., Rawalpindi. In fact the learned counsel for the petition has drawn my attention to Sections 54- A and 54-B of the Electric Act, 1910 which gives ample power to the respondents to recover t said amount from the consumer against whom it has been assess as arrears of land revenue in accordance with the said provisions
12. In view of the above discussion I find that the respondents had no lawful authority to recover the amount in question from the petitioner company or to discontinue its electric supply in terms of Section 24(1) of the Electricity Act, 1910. I, therefore, allow this writ petition subject to the observations made in para 11 above and direct the respondents to restore the electricity to the premises of the petitioner. No orders as to costs.