' This appeal arises from an order of the learned 4th Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller, Karachi, East, dated 5-8-1998, directing the appellant's ejectment from Shop No,A-1/2, Abdullah Apartment, Block No,16, K.D.A. Scheme No,36, Gulistan-eJauhar, Karachi, on the ground of default in payment of rent and the bona fide personal need of the respondent/landlord.
2. Briefly the facts appear to be that the appellant was put in possession of the demised shop as a tenant by the respondent pursuant to a tenancy agreement with effect from 1-8-1995. The agreed monthly rent was Rs,4,000 and Rs,24,000 had been deposited by the appellant by way of security deposit. According to the respondent, while rent up to December, 1995 was paid at the agreed rate for which receipts were issued, the appellant for no justifiable reason paid only Rs,3,000 per month for the period between January and April, 1996 and thus, committed default to the extent of Rs,4,000. In June, 1997 the rate of rent was admittedly raised to Rs,4,500 per month. The respondent further alleged that the demised shop was required by him in good faith for his bona fide personal use as well as that of his son Muhammad Shamsul Arfin. The appellant in his written statement repudiated both the allegations of default and personal need.
3. The appellant contended that counter-foils of the receipts for the months of January to April, 1996 purporting to evidence payment of Rs,3,000 were fabricated documents and as a matter of fact there was no consistent practice of issuing regular receipts by the landlord. It may also be pertinent to mention that on 27-8-1997 the appellant filed a Civil Suit bearing No,807 of 1997 in the Court of 8th Civil Judge, Karachi, seek to restrain the respondent from dispossessing him, otherwise than through due process of law, but the said suit was withdrawn on 30-9-1997.
4. The parties filed their respective affidavits-in-evidence before the learned Rent Controller and were duly cross-examined. The learned Rent Controller vide the impugned order recorded its finding both on the question of default and personal need and directed the appellant's ejectment from the demised premises within 60 days of the order.
5. Mr. Abdul Karim Siddiqui, learned counsel for the appellant in the first instance attacked the findings of the learned Rent Controller on the question of default pointing out that the respondent had himself admitted that sometimes rent was received by his wife and sometimes by his relative Munawar and contended that this fact itself makes the averment of issuing regular receipts extremely doubtful. In any event since rent was admittedly enhanced in June, 1997, and such enhancement could possibly be treated as novation of the agreement, I am doubtful whether a default committed prior thereto could be enforced as a ground of ejectment.
6. Nevertheless, the appellant was confronted with a far more formidable case on the question of personal need. Mr. Abdul Karim Siddiqui in the first place argued that such ground was urged by way of a mala fide attempt to seek ejectment of a tenant who had hardly established his business in the demised premises during a short period of two years, and therefore, the need of the respondent could not be assumed to be bona tide. Moreover, he contended that the respondent had falsely alleged that he was jobless and concealed the fact that he was working in the Merchant Navy in his application for ejectment. Such concealment of fact prejudiced the appellant in raising his defences and only when it came to the knowledge of the appellant he confronted the respondent with the same, who admitted in cross-examination that he has been working with the Merchant Navy. Learned counsel further argued that the respondents had also failed to disclose the nature of business that he intended to establish in the demised premises.
7. With profound respects, I am not impressed by either of the Contentions raised by the learned counsel. It has been authoritatively settled by the Honourable Supreme Court in Sara Bai v. Syed Anisur Rehman (1989 SCM R 1366) that nondisclosure of the nature of business is no ground for rejecting an application for ejectment- by the landlord. Moreover, there does not appear to be any material concealment of fact who could prejudice the appellant from raising his defences. It is a matter of common knowledge as was indeed candidly acknowledged by Mr. Siddiqui that persons qualified to work in Merchant Vessels are engaged on a voyage to voyage basis and a Merchant Mariner is not a permanent employee of any Shipping Company. A person may choose not to undertake any voyage for any period of time and it is quite understandable that he decides to remain at home with his family and avoid the loneliness of a long voyage. Moreover, the mere fact that a landlord is qualified to perform another vocation is no ground for refusing ejectment of his tenant, if he shows his preference to use the premises for business purposes. Again though it may be quite inconvenient for a tenant to vacate the business premises after having barely settled down and established his business therein, the law does not create any embargo upon the landlord, restraining him for apply for ejectment. In view of the above this appeal and C.M.A. No,1155 of 1998 are liable to be dismissed.
8. Nevertheless keeping in view the hardship that the appellant might confront, Syed Muhammad Haider, learned counsel for the respondent, candidly agreed that reasonable time may be granted to the appellant to vacate the premises. I, therefore, granted 9 months' time to the appellant to vacate the premises subject to regular payment of rent. However, since an amount of Rs,24,000 is admittedly available with the respondent as security deposit the obligation to pay regular rent would arise after this amount is adjusted.
' These are the reasons of my short order announced in Court on 16-8-1999.
Appeal dismissed/