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PLD 1978 Karachi 691

HASHMAT ALI CHAWLA AND 3 Other vs DIRECTOR GENERAL, EXCISE &

CitationPLD 1978 Karachi 691
CourtSindh High Court
Judge(s)Zaffar Hussain Mirza, I. Mehmood
ResultCase remanded

ZAFFAR HUSSAIN MIRZA, J.-The petitioners seek to challenge the validity of order passed by the respondent No. 1, Director-General Excise & Taxa--petition Department, Government of Sind, Karachi enhancing the assessm ent under the West Pakistan Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) of the property units owned by them and consequent demand notices on the basis of the enhanced assessment issued for recovery of the Tax.

2. The brief facts alleged by the petitioners are that the plot bearing No. I-K-3, Nazimabad, Karachi was the sole property of late Mr. Muhammad A.I Chawla who died at Karachi on or about 18-12-1970 and was succeeded by the present petitioners as his heirs. It is alleged that after the death of the said Muhammad A.I Chawla the property was mutated in the name of the petitioners as owners by the K.D.A. Authorities. Deceased Muhammad A.I Chawla had constructed on the aforesaid plot, a building consisting of shops as well as residential tenements which were sold to different persons on hire-purchase basis.

3. It is common ground that during the last general assessment, in the valuation carried out in the year 1969 by the Excise & Taxation Department (the G.A.R.V. Of the property was fixed) at the rate of Rs, 70,160. The deceased and after his death the petitioners were regularly paying the tax at the rate then fixed. It is alleged that in the year 1973-74, however, without notice to the petitioners, the Director-General, Excise & Taxation Sind (respondent No. 1) in suo inotu proceedings passed the impugned order dated 28-11-1974 whereby the G.A.R.V. Assessment of the property was enhanced from Rs. 70,160 to Rs. 1,92,120 with retrospective effect.

4. On 19-11-1975 the staff of the Assessing Authority (respondent No. 2) visited the building with an auction notice and petitioners were informed of this by the occupants of the building. On receiving this information, the petitioners made inquiries and allegedly learnt for the first time that demand notice in the sum of Rs. 1,28,17.93 on account of property tax and a sum of Rs. 4,860 on account of Betterment Tax had been issued by the respondents. On further enquiry it was revealed that the demand was being made as a result of order passed by respondent No. I on 28-11-1974.

5. On behalf of the respondents the allegation that the impugned order was passed without notice has been controverted. Respondent No. 2 in his counter-affidavit has asserted that in the records of the Department the property in question is entered in the name of Messrs Muhammad A.I Chawla & Co. He further stated that the petitioners never informed the authorities about the death of Mr. Muhammad A.I Chawla or that the property has devolved upon them. It was contended that the property was not properly assessed initially and was found to be not in accordance with the existing circumstances. Accordingly upon a reference by the Assessing Authority; the Director- General, respondent No. 1 in exercise of his suo motu powers commenced proceedings for revision of the original assess--ment. Notice was issued to the recorded owner Messrs Mohammad A.I Chawla & Co. The said notice was received by one of the petitioners who appeared before respondent No. 1 and contested the case. Petitioner No. 4 also appeared in the proceedings and obtained adjournment. Thereafter, however, petitioner No. 2 appeared and contended that the liability if any to pay taxes was upon the occupants and not petitioners, as they were in possession of the various tenements of the property by virtue of hire--purchase agreements. Respondent No. 1 after hearing petitioner No. 2 on behalf of the owners/asbessees passed the impugned order dated 28-11-1974 whereby the G.A.R.V. Of the entire property was fixed at Rs. 1,92,120 with retrospective effect. It seems after revising the assessment steps were taken for the recovery of the difference of Tax dues and demand notice was served upon the owners. In this connection show-cause notice dated 22-10-1975 was issued to Messrs Muhammad A.I Chawla & Co. By the Excise & Taxation Officer, `K' Division, Karachi. Subsequently coercive process in the form of notices for attachment was also issued. The petitioners then filed the present Constitutional Petition challenging the validity of the order revising the assessment and the legality of the demand and coercive process for the recovery of the same.

6. Mr. Saeeduzzaman Siddiqui in support of the petition first urged that the impugned order having been passed without notice to the petitioners is invalid and passed without lawful authority in violation of the rule of natural justice. In this behalf reliance was placed upon the various documents in an attempt to show that the property was entered in the name of Mr. Muhammad A.I Chawla in the records of the K.D.A. And on his demise was mutated in the names of the present petitioners. It was argued that intimation in this connection was given to the Director, Excise & Taxation Department, Karachi by letter dated 15-3-1971 from the office of the K.D.A. This fact is however denied by the respondents ad there is no proof that this letter was received by the respondents. It was then urged that in the records of the respondents also the property was entered in the name of Mr. Muhammad.A.I Chawla. Reliance was placed upon the copes of the extract from P.T. 1 register maintained by the Excise & Taxation Officer "l" & "K" Division, Karachi filed by the respondents themselves. We have perused these documents and find that except for one extract copy dated 20-3-1974 relating to 14 shops and 8 flats, apparently forming part of the property unit in which the name of Mr. Muhammad A.I Chawla is shown in the column relating to the name of the owner, in all the rest of the extracts relating to other parts of the building the owner's name is shown as Muhammad A.I Chawla & Co. Additionally in the treasury challan for the payment of the Taxes for the- years of 1971-72 the name of the assessee is shown as Muhammad A.I Chawla & Co. These payments apparently were made by the petitioners as they are for the period after the death of Mr. Muhammad A.I Chawla in 1971. We, therefore, find no force in the contention that the property was entered in the sole name of Mr. Muhammad A.I Chawla.

7. We also find no ford in the contention that the petitioners received no notice of the proceedings An which the assessm ent was revise The respondents have placed on record photocopy of the application by petitioner No. 4, Mr. Mazher A.I dated 25-8-1973 seeking an adjournment of the hearing before the respondent No. I. On the ground that his elder brother who deals with the matter was out of the country.

7-A. It was finally argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that, the impugned order was passed without jurisdiction inasmuch as ; the a. Valuation list originally prepared in 1969 for the rating area in which the ``='-' property in dispute is located, in terms of section 7 of West Pakistan Urban Immovable Property Act, 1958 was valid and in force, and could not be altered or amended except within the narrow scope of section 9 of the Act. It would be advantageous to set out the provisions of section 9 of the Act which reads as under "Subject to such rules, if any, as the Government may think fit to make in this behalf, the Assessing Authority may at any time make such amendments in a valuation list as appear to it to be necessary in order to bring the list into accord with existing circumstances and in particular may-

(a) correct any clerical and arithmetical error in the list ;

(b) correct any erroneous insertion or omission or any misdescription ;

(c) make such additions to or corrections in the list as appear to Authority to be necessary by reason of -

(i) a new building being erected after the completion of the valuation list ;

(ii) a building included in the valuation list being destroyed or sub--stantially damaged or altered since its value was last previously determined ;

(iii) any change in the ownership or use of any building or land Provided that not less than fourteen days before making any such amendment in the valuation list for the time being in force, other than the correction of a clerical or arithmetical error, or the correction of an erroneous insertion, omission or description, the Assessing Authority shall send notice of the proposed amendment to the owner of the building land and shall also consider any objection thereto which may be made by him."

8. The submission of the learned counsel was that in the facts of the present case none of the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction to amend current valuation list were present, inasmuch as the order was not passed on account of any clerical or arithmetical error or omission or any misdescription ; nor was there a question of a new building being erected after the completion of the valuation list nor of a building having been destroyed or damaged. We were taken through the impugned order and it was pointed out that respondent No. 1 has undertaken a review of the assessm ent list end determined the rental value of the property unit on the basis of fresh materials collected through the official agency.

9. However the learned Additional Advocate-General, on the other hand contended that the impugned order was passed not in exercise of the power conferred under section 9 of the Act but in exercise of the revisional power vesting in respondent No. 1 under section 10(2) of the Act which may also be set out as under :- "The Commissioner or such other officer appointed by the Government in this behalf, may of his own motion at any time or on an application, made within a period of one year from the date of taking of any proceedings or passing of an order by an authority subordinate to the Commissioner, call for and examine the record of the proceedings or the order for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of the same and may pass such order in reference thereto as he may consider fit."

We find great deal of force in this submission. Section 10(2) of the Ac confers power upon the Commissioner appointed under the Act to suo moto examine the record after ,proceedings taken by any subordinate officer for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of the same. It was therefore, clearly open to respondent No. 1 without limit as to time, A to revise the valuation list upon proper grounds as provided by law. We therefore find no substance in this contention that the impugned order was passed without jurisdiction. However the matter does not conclude with this.

10. Upon a closer scrutiny of the contents of the impugned order we find that respondent No. 1 has taken into consideration, as observed above. Information collected by the official agency relating to the normal rental value of the property of the same discription and character. It is not clear from the reading of the order, however, whether the information collected regarding the rental value related to the relevant period when the original valuation list had been prepared in the year, 1969.

The learned Officer has summarised the consideration upon which the valuation was revised in the following words "Keeping in view the location, condition prevailing rental value and advance money as per agreement, I consider that the following rental value is reasonable and fair for these blocks."

It is not clear from the order as to what the learned Officer meant by the expression "prevailing rental value" which was taken into consideration. It was argued by the learned Additional Advocate-General that this means that the rental value prevailing at the date of the original assessm ent in 1969 was considered. We are unable to agree with this submission as in the preceding part of the order the learned Officer has clearly stated that the information collected by the E.T.S.i. Of the area and found that the rent for accommoda--petition of different type "is" as mentioned in the order. The use of the word "is" clearly imports the meaning that the rental value prevalent at the time of the passing of the order seems to have been taken into consideration. This in our opinion does not amount to correct exercise of power as sub--section (2) of section 10 of the Act clearly envisages a re-examination of the original proceedings or order in the light of the prevalent conditions as obtained on the date of determination of the valuation of the property unit at the time of initial assessm ent. For taking into consideration subsequent events affecting the rental value the Act provides for a very limited scope in terms of section 9. Additionally it is also clear that information and other materials taken into consideration by respondent No. 1 were not brought to the notice of the petitioners. Admittedly the notice issued to the owner C did not disclose the nature and details of the information received by the ,respondent No. 1 making it necessary for him to amend the valuation. In the place provided for disclosing the reasons for the proposed amendment the notice accordingly stated as under : - "Your newly constructed property has assessed under section 9 of the Act, 1958. G.A.R.V. Is proposed at the rate of Rs. 15,120."

These words suggest that the proceedings were commenced under section 9 of the Act. However the impugned order does not clearly indicate whether the amendment in the assessment was sought to be effected under section 9 or in exercise of suo motu revisional power under section 10(2) of the Act. This is perhaps the reason why the learned Additional Advocate-General also thought that section 9 was not relevant. In either case as observed earlier the impugned order suffers from legal infirmities which render the same as having been passed without lawful authority.

11. The learned Additional Advocate-General also stated respondent No. 1 to redetermine the case after due notice to the petitioners. We accordingly quash the impugned order and remit the case back to respondent No. 1 for rehearing and fresh decision according to law after notice to the petitioners. In the circumstances there will be no order as to costs.

12. The decision in this case was announced on 12-3-1978 by a short order these are the reasons therefor.

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