' IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, J.---Petitioner seeks leave to appeal against judgment, dated 29th January, 2000 whereby Federal Service Tribunal dismissed his appeal bearing No,1810(R) of 1999 being barred by time.
2. Precisely stating facts of he case are that petitioner was charge-sheeted for misusing OGDC's Vehicle bearing No,IDE-2953 without permission in his capacity as Administration Assistant. In pursuance of inquiry so held against him to prove the charge he was found guilty for misconduct.
As such vide office memorandum, dated 15th October, 1996 he was saddled with major penalty of reduction to the lower post i.e, Junior Admin. Assistant. Statedly departmental appeal was filed by him on 15th December, 1996 followed by reminders sent by him to the department for the decision of his appeal from time to time i.e, 8th May, 1997, 6th June, 1998 and 29th June, 1998. In response to last mentioned reminder the petitioner received office memorandum, dated 31st August, 1999 wherein it was mentioned that his appeal, dated 15th December, 1996 was examined and found time-barred but no reply, however, was given to him. Regarding reminders dated 8-5-1997 and 29th June, 1998 it was stated that no such applications were received. However, concerning application dated 6th June 1998 it was stated that no action was taken on it because a little earlier a similar application dated nil was received from Section Officer (Gas) vide his letter, dated 15-5- 1999. Reply of the same was given vide Letter No,407- 777-AS-10395-C, dated 12-6-1998. It was further stated that in application received with covering letter or slip of a MNA and then a Section Officer has to be replied to the Section Officer concerned. It is noteworthy that on 10th June, 1997 section 2-A was inserted in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") according to which a right was given to the employees of the Statutory Corporations, Authorities, Bodies etc., to approach the Federal Service Tribunal for redressal of their grievances and to limited extent employees of such Corporations etc., were treated to be civil servants.
3. Petitioner preferred appeal before Federal Service Tribunal on 29th September, 1999 without filing application for condonation of delay in filing of appeal. Learned Service Tribunal vide impugned order, dated 29th January, 2000 dismissed the appeal. As such instant petition has been filed for leave to appeal.
4. Learned counsel contended that appeal filed by the petitioner was within time from the date of receipt of reply, dated 31st August, 1999 but the Service Tribunal had wrongly treated it to be barred by time. According to him the petitioner had got a right to file appeal before Federal Service Tribunal after insertion of section 2-A in the Act with effect from 10th June, 1997 and as there was a confusion of law, therefore, instead of approaching Federal Service Tribunal petitioner had been sending reminders/applications for disposal of appeal, dated 15th December, 1996 result whereof was admittedly not communicated to the petitioner, therefore, in view of the judgments reported in 1999 SCMR 92 and 2000 SCMR 104 the appeal was within time.
5. Learned counsel for the department, however, contradicted the stand of the petitioner's counsel and contended that initially when the service of the petitioner was terminated on 15-10-1996 he had a right to file appeal which was required to be disposed of within 30 days and on having not received any response from the department it was incumbent upon the petitioner to have availed a remedy under the law if available before the competent forum having jurisdiction but despite lapse of sufficient period no legal proceedings were initiated by him. Inasmuch as after insertion of section 2-A in the Act petitioner could have filed appeal within period of six months in terms of section 4 of the Act but he did not avail this chance as well, therefore, Federal Service Tribunal was justified in dismissing his appeal being barred by time.
6. We have heard learned counsel for parties and have also carefully gone through the impugned order as well as relevant provisions of law on the subject. Admittedly petitioner challenged order, dated 15th October, 1996 on 29th September, 1999 before the Federal Service Tribunal despite the fact that departmental appeal dated 15-12-1996 filed by him was rejected but without communicating its result to him, therefore, on account of such lapse on behalf of the department he has been compensated legally by means of insertion of section 2-A in the Act according to which the employees of Statutory Bodies etc., were declared as civil servants for limited purpose to invoke jurisdiction of Service Tribunal and according to section 4 of the Act petitioner could have filed appeal within six months because prior to insertion of section 2-A in the Act petitioner had no remedy before the Tribunal because his status was not of civil servant for seeking redressal of his grievance. However, when a law is promulgated it is presumed that every one knows that it has come into existence, therefore, instead of wasting time and sending reminders/application to the department, petitioner could have filed appeal within six months from promulgation of section 2-A of the Act but he did not avail this opportunity. Learned counsel stated that after insertion of section 2-A there was a confusion about selecting a forum by an employee for redressal of his grievance and this confusion was removed by this Court in the judgment of Muhammad Afzal v.
Karachi Electric Supply Corporation and 2 others (1999 SCMR 92) and Muhammad Yaqub v.
Pakistan Petroleum Ltd. And another (2000'SCMR 830). In our considered opinion if the argument advanced by learned counsel prevail still the appeal would be barred by time because in the case of Muhammad Yaqub (ibid) it was held that judgment in the case of Muhammad Afzal (supra) having been published in January 1999 Issue of the SCMR according to which section 2-A of Act was deemed to have applied retrospectively providing remedy to the aggrieved person whose services were terminated even prior to insertion of this section. Therefore, it would mean that at least from the month of January, 1999 when the confusion was removed and it was held that employee of statutory corporation etc., have a remedy before the Service Tribunal the appellant may have invoked the jurisdiction of Federal Service Tribunal within period of 6 months up to June, 1999 whereas admittedly he filed appeal on 29th September, 1999 which was undoubtedly hopelessly barred by time. Thus, examining the case of petitioner from any angle no other conclusion can be drawn except that appeal was hopelessly barred by time. Therefore, the Federal Service Tribunal rightly declined to entertain the same for this reason alone.
' In view of above discussion impugned order being unexceptionable admits no interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. As such petition is dismissed and leave declined.