' MIAN MUHAMMAD AJMAL, J.---By this common judgment were proposed to dispose of Civil Appeals Nos.642 to 644 of 1993 as they have arisen out of the same judgment and involve identical questions of law and facts.
2. Brief facts are that Shamsul Huda Ansari, Haider Imam and S. Zahid Hussain, respondent No,2 in all the appeals employees of M/s Matri Publication Ltd., Karachi, filed separate applications before the Implementation Tribunal for Newspaper Employees (hereinafter to be called the Implementation Tribunal), that the establishment, respondent No,1 was not implementing the Fitment as stipulated in para. 46 of the Fourth Wage Board Award. Admitted position was that the respondents-employees were drawing their basic pay as Rs,1,250 p.m. In Grade-III and dearness allowance of Rs,100 p.m. Under the Third Wage Board Award. After the Fourth Wage Board Award, the management, purporting to implement the Fitment contained in para. 46(i) Thereof, merged the existing pay and dearness allowance of the respondents-employees into one sum i,e, Rs,1250+Rs,100 =1350. The management did not comply with said para. In its entirely as it did not fix the employees pay at such stage of the new consolidated pay scale "as was next higher to the sum so reckoned". In addition thereto one increment was to be given to every employee for every five years of completed service in that grade to the maximum of two increments, which the management failed to do. Before the Implementation Tribunal, the plea of the respondent- employer was that it had taken legal advice before implementing the Award and acted accordingly, which was repelled by the Implementation Tribunal, who on the basis of admitted chart of pay scales of the employees submitted before it, came to the conclusion that the management though acted correctly in fixing their pay by merging the existing pay and dearness allowance admissible to the respondents-employees under the Third Wage Board Award but failed to fix their pay in the new consolidated pay scales in terms of para. 46(i) of the Fourth Wage Board Award, which required fixation of pay at the next higher stage from their aggregate pay arrived at after merging the dearness allowance in their existing pay. The employees were also held entitled to an increment for every 5 years' of completed service in that grade subject to the maximum of two increments. Resultantly, the Implementation Tribunal vide its common order, dated 4-2-1988, accepted all the three petitions directing the management to rectify the patent error and carry out the exercise for implementation of Fourth Wages Board Award in the light of the observations made in the order. The operative paragraphs of the order of the Tribunal are reproduced hereinbelow:-- "(3)
'We have ourselves undertaken the exercise. Thus, the correct fixation of each petitioner as regards his basic pay in the new consolidated pay scale of Rs,1350-100-2850 would be next higher stage to the aggregate of Rs,1,350. Accordingly each petitioner shall be fixed at the next higher stage in the new consolidated pay sclae which comes to Rs,1,450.
(4) Before parting with the cases, it needs to be observed that the leraned counsel did not wish to enter to a cavil as regards the Tribunal's jurisdiction to carry out scrutiny in order to find out whether the Fourth Wage Board Award had been implemented by the newspaper establishment in respect of its employees.
(5) The management shall rectify the patent error and carry out the exercise for implementation of the Fourth Wage Board Award in the light of the observations made above. It must also be observed that the petitioner in each case has been made to suffer and deprive of his lawful right and due wages on account of misreading .And misapplication of the relevant provisions of para. 46(i) of Fitment Formula of the Fourth Wage Board Award, resulting in wrongful implementation thereof. The petitioners will be entitled to the arrears of short fall in their wages with effect from 15- 4-1985.
(6) The petition of Mr. S. Zahid Hussain, Sub-Editor-cum-Reporter daily 'Hurriyat' and two other connected petitions are accepted in the above terms. There shall, however, be no order as to costs."
' Feeling aggrieved, respondent No,1 employer filed three Constitutional petitions bearing Nos.938, 939 and 940 of 1988 before the High Court of Sindh, Karachi, which were allowed vide its common judgment dated 11-1-1993, impugned herein, operative paragraph wherefrom is reproduced hereinbelow:-- "A plain reading of section 51 would indicate that when any money due from an employer under a settlement or under an award or a decision of the arbitrator, Labour Court or a Tribunal is to be recovered, the same on the application of the person entitled to such recovery may be recovered as arrears of land revenue or as a public demand. Consequently, before any Court or Tribunal acts under section 51 of the I.R.O., it is imperative that there should be no dispute as to the entitlement of the applicant to the recovery of money but the amount in respect of which proceedings can be initiated under section 51 must be a predetermined amount. If there is a dispute in respect of the entitlement of such amount or the amount is not pre-determined then it cannot be recovered under section 51 of the I.R.O. As is clearly evident from the impugned order, there was a dispute between the respondents and the petitioner in regard to the entitlement of the respondents to the amount claimed by the said respondents. Since the Implementation Tribunal has not been vested with any powers of adjudication in regard to individual disputes, in our opinion, the learned Tribunal was not empowered to pass the impugned order in present case. The Tribunal being constituted under the Act could exercise only such powers which have been conferred upon the Tribunal under the said Act. The Tribunal, therefore, could not assume powers which have not been conferred upon it by the Act. We, therefore, find ourselves in complete agreement with Mr. Muhammad Humayun; learned counsel for the petitioner, that the impugned order has been passed by the Tribunal with lawful authority. In the result, we allow these petitions and quash the impugned order.
The parties are left to bear their own costs."
' The appellant impugned the correctness of the above judgment through Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeal Nos.171, 172 and 173 of 1993, wherein leave was granted to consider the following proposition:- ' "The learned counsel for the petitioner contended before us that section 12-A of the Act LVIII of 1973 clearly spells out the purpose of constitution of the Tribunal as implementation of the decision of Wage Board constituted under the Act. Therefore, if the Tribunal had passed the order which only secured the implementation of the award of the Fourth Wage Board, the order could not be defeated on a narrow interpretation of section 55 or 51(1),of the I.R.O.The contention requires examination. We, accordingly, grant leave to appeal to consider the above contention. The operation of impugned judgment is suspended meanwhile."
3. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that section 13 of the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act No,LVIII of 1973, (hereinafter to be called the Act) has not been correctly construed and interpreted by the learned High Court, therefore, the conclusion drawn by it is not sustainable. The Wage Board had fixed the rate of wages in respect of newspaper employees and decision given in this respect by the Board was binding under section 15 of the Act, on all the employers, therefore, the High Court was not correct to hold that the amount was not determined and it could not be recovered under section 51 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter to be called the Ordinance) by the Implementation Tribunal. He further contended that the Federal Government under section 12-A of the Act has constituted a Tribunal to implement the decisions of the Board, which under section 13 of the Act, while exercising same powers as that of the Labour Court, had competently issued direction under section 51(1) of the Ordinance for recovery of money due, which did not warrant interference by the High Court. The Board had given its Fourth Award which was notified vide Notification dated 16-10-1985 and it was binding on all the employers of the newspapers establishment and every newspapers employee was entitled to be paid wages as fixed by the Board in view of section 15 of the Act.
4. To appreciate the contentions raised by the learned Deputy Attorney-General, it is necessary to go through the relevant sections of the Act. According to section 2(a) "Board" means the Wage Board constituted under section 9 of the Act. Section 9(1) empowers the Federal Government to constitute a Wage Board for fixing rates of wages in respect of newspaper employees in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Section 10 postulates that the Board while fixing rates of wages would take into consideration the cost of living, the prevalent rates of wages of comparable employments, the circumstances relating to the newspapers industry in different regions of the country and any other circumstances which it considers relevant. It further empowers the Board to fix rates of wages for time work and for piece work and by virtue of section 11(2) the decision of the Board published under subsection (1) would come into operation from the date specified in the decision. Section 12 envisages that the decision of the Board published under section 11 would be deemed to be an award of the Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission and subject to the provisions of the Act, all the visions of the Ordinance applicable to such award, including the provisions of sections 51 and 55 thereof, so far as may be and with necessary modifications, would apply to the decisions of the Board. Section 12-A empowers the Federal Government to constitute Tribunal consisting of one or more members to implement the decision of the Board made under section 11 of the Act. Section 13 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in section 64 of the Ordinance, the Implementation Tribunal would have the following powers:--
(a) to try an offence punishable under section 55 of the Ordinance if the offence relates to failure to implement any decision of the Board.
(b) of its own motion, or on the application of a party, to withdraw from any Court (except the Supreme Court or a High Court) any application, proceeding or appeal relating to such an offence and dispose of it; and
(c) refer any such application, proceeding or appeal to any such competent Court for disposal.
' Subsection (3) of section 13 of the Act contemplates that the Tribunal would follow the same procedure and exercise the same powers as the National Industrial Relations Commission under the Ordinance and subsection (4) thereof enunciates that the Implementation Tribunal would have the power to issue a direction which a Labour Court has under subsection (1) of section 51 of the Ordinance. Section 13-A provides an appeal to a person convicted and sentenced for a period not less than six months by the Tribunal under section 55 to the Supreme Court with the leave of the Court. Section 14 provides powers and procedure of the Board for fixing rates of wages. Section 15 stipulates that the decision of the Board would be binding on all employers in relation to newspaper establishments and every newspaper employee would be entitled to be paid wages at a rate which, in no case, would be less than the rate of wages fixed by the Board.
5. The persual of the above provisions of the Act would show that the purpose of enactment was to facilitate constitution of the Wage Board for fixing rates of wages in respect of newspaper employees in accordance with the Act and to provide effective implementation of the decision of the Wages Board by the Implementation of the decision of the Wage Board by the Implementation Tribunal. In exercise of the powers conferred by section 9 of the Act, the Federal Government constituted a Wage Board for fixing the rates of wages in respect of newespaper employees vide Notification, dated 14th of October, 1984, whose decision was published in Notification, dated 16th October, 1985 as required under section 11 of the Act, which came into operation on 15th April 1985 as specified in the decision which was binding on all the employers in relation to newspaper establishments and every newspaper employee was entitled to the wages, in no case, less than the wages fixed in the decision under section 15 of the Act. As per Award, the establishments were also directed to pay the arrears to the employees so accruing not later than 30th June, 1986. The Federal Government constituted a Tribunal to implement the decision of the Board, which under subsection (4) of section 13 of the Act could exercise the same powers as that of a Labour Court, to issue directions under section 51(1) of the Ordinance which provides that any money due from an employer under a settlement or award or decision of the Arbitrator be recovered, upon the application of the person entitled to the money by the Labour Court or the Tribunal as arrears of land revenue. It may be noted that the Legislature in its wisdom has only conferred the powers on the Implementation Tribunal under section 51(1) of the Ordinance which the Labour Court could exercise for the recovery of money due from an employer under a settlement or award and it has specifically excluded subsection (2) of section 51 of the I.R.O., whereby amount was to be determined and recovered. As is apparent from the nomenclature of the Tribunal itself that it is an "Implementation Tribunal" for newspapers' employees constituted under section 12-A of the Act by the Federal Government to implement the decision of the Wage Board which has determined the rates of wages in respect of the newspapers' employees. Since money due from the employers had been determined in the award/decision of the Wage Board; therefore, no further determination was required and the Tribunal specially constituted to implement the decision of the Wage Board was competent to issue a direction for the recovery of the money due against the employers under section 51(1) of the Ordinance and the High Court was not correct in observing that the amount in respect of which the proceedings were initiated, was not determined. The decision of the Wage Board duly notified was binding on the employers and was within the competence and jurisdiction of the Tribunal to implement the same.
6. In view of the above, this appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi dated 11-1-1993 is set aside and that of the Implementation Tribunal dated 4-2-1988 is restored. No orders as to costs.