1. ' ABDUL MAJID KHANZADA (CHAIRMAN).---The brief facts of the appeal, according to the appellant, are that while undergoing training (after being selected through prescribed procedure of advertisement of vacancy and selection by the prescribed Selection Board) as A.S.-I. At Police Training College, Saudabad, Karachi, his services were terminated: vide impugned order dated 1-4- 1997 passed by respondent No,1 in exercise of powers under Rule 12.8 of the Police Rules--by way of 'discharge'. The appellant alleges that the said impugned order was not served upon him, but it was communicated to the Principal of Police Training College, Saudabad, Karachi and in persuance thereof his name was struck off from the roll of that college and the appellant came to know about the said orders through him. He therefore, filed Civil Petition No,859 of 1997 alongwith 7 others removed in similar way. S.S.P., Larkana filed his written statement which was brought on record, Principal Police Training College, Saudabad also filed his written statement. The Civil Petition was dismissed as not pressed with the observation that appellant may persue his remedy with Sindh Service Tribunal. The appellant also filed departmental appeal against the impugned order dated 1-4-1997. The respondent No,2 was pleased to call for comments from respondent No,1-- followed by reminder on 16-3-1998. In response thereto, he was supplied a copy of the order dated 2-7-1997, whereunder his departmental appeal was rejected, under covering letter dated 21-3- 1998. The counsel for the appellant argued that he was discharged allegedly 'because of bad reputation, in the locality, not of good character and involvement/mixed up with criminals and not (likely) to become good police officer, as per comments of S.S.P., Larkana in Civil Petition No,859 of 1997 filed in the Hon'ble High Court of Sindh as per Annexure F/1. In the comments of the Principal, Police Training College, Saudabad, it is recorded that the services of the appellant and others were dispensed with by way of discharge under the orders of D.I.-G., Larkana. He asserted that the appellant after his selection/appointment as A.S.-I. On 22-4-1996 was undergoing training at Police Training College, Saudabad, Karachi till his discharge on 1-4-1997 i,e, for about one year. The Principal of P.T.C. Concerned was the relevant/concerned authority to report any 'misconduct' against him--but the comments of that officer are devoid of any such charges. For the same reasons i,e, the appellant was living beyond the jurisdiction of S.S.P. Larkana or D.I.-G., Larkana at relevant time, these authorities had no jurisdiction for such report--because his character/antecedents were got verified prior to his appointment in 1996 by the same authorities and he could not be appointed as A.S.-I. If there was any charge of the said nature as alleged by the respondents, in their comments. He specifically pointed out to Rule 12.14 sub-rule (1) of the Police Rules, which provides the 'recruits shall be of good character'. Therefore, prerequisite for the appointment in Police was good character. Had the appellant been of bad character--or mixed.
2. Up with criminals as alleged by the respondents--appellant naturally could not be appointed as A.S.-I. In 1996. He further substantiated his argument by pointation to Rule 12.18 (sub-rule (1) of the said Police Rules, which provide a detailed procedure for character verification and suitability of candidates for appointment in Police through verification from Lambardar of the area in which the candidate resides, followed by taking of his fingerprints and clearance of Finger Print Bureau, followed by report of S.H.O. Of the area prior to the appointment. The legal presumption of the appointment of the appellant as A.S.-I. In 1996 is that the respondents had followed the prescribed procedure and there was nothing adverse against him on the record of police/respondents prior to his appointment. If the allegations related to the period after his appointment, the Principal, P.T.C., Saudabad was the concerned/appropriate authority to report the same--but in his comments filed before the Hon'ble High Court in the abovesaid Civil Petition he did not make any adverse report against the appellant. He, therefore, concluded that the charges against the appellant were false and have nowhere been established through evidence/record. He further submitted that according to Police Rules 12.30 and 12.31 the D.I.-G. Range is the competent Authority to pass discharge order (under Rule 12.8) who has to follow a. Prescribed procedure i,e, has to examine 'all the routine events and character rolls in which entries have to be made/signed by a gazetted officer/Superintendent of Police. According to him the D.I.-G. Larkana, did not follow the prescribed drill/procedure and simply acted on a reference from S.S.P., Larkana, did not exercise his mind judiciously nor called/examined for the evidence if any against the appellant nor evaluated the merits of such evidence and its evidential values. He emphatically stated that Rule 12.8 under which the impugned order of discharge was issued, does empower the range D.I.-G. To discharge such directly appointed persons during probation of 3 years only if--
(i) They fail to pass the prescribed examinations/trainings including riding test--but this is not the case of the respondents that the appellant failed to pass any prescribed examinations/trainings;.
(ii) they are guilty of grave misconduct--but again there was neither any report, of misconduct from the Principal, P.T.C., Saudabad or anywhere else and this is not the case of the respondents;
(i) they are deemed for sufficient reason unsuitable for service in police. The catchwords being 'sufficient reason' implying thereby substantive evidence in this regard, whereas there is no substantive evidence in record of police or with respondents regarding such grave charges of being mixed -up with criminal, having had character. Lastly, such allegations cause 'stigma' on the character of a person, amount to his character assassination and the Service Tribunal(s)/Hon'ble Supreme Court, have repeatedly held that allegations which amount to stigma on the character of a person, do not carry any weight unless proved by a (full-fledged) departmental inquiry-- otherwise these amount to hearsay of no evidential value being word against word at the most.
3. ' In support of his arguments he placed reliance upon:--
(i) 1996 PLC (C.S.) p.1085.
(ii) Judgments of this Tribunal in identical Service Appeals bearing Nos.34 of 1998, 35 of 1998; 49 of 1998, 50 of 1998, 51 of 1998, 60 of 1998 and 61 of 1998 which were allowed.
4. ' He argued lastly that what cannot be done directly--could not be done indirectly implying thereby, that if the range D.I.-G.--in the abovesaid circumstances, could not discharge the appellant under Rule 12.8--he could not do so on a reference of S.S.P., Larkana, without independent, judicious, exercise of his own mind. He also specifically pointed out that there was nothing wrong with the appointment of the appellant and when an earlier Civil Petition bearing No,D-82 of 1996 was filed by one Ali Gul Dehto, the respondents in their written statement/comments filed before the Hon'ble High. Court not only categorically stated that the appellant was properly selected, after observing the prescribed formalities of advertisement, selection through the competent forum viz. Selection Board duly constituted, verification of his age, antecedents, physical fitness etc. And, therefore, cannot take the plea that the appointment of the appellant was illegal/or irregular in anyway.
5. ' He, therefore, strongly urged that the impugned original and appellate orders may be set aside and appellant be reinstated with all past service benefits.
6. ' A.A.-G. Argued briefly and remained basically confirmed to the written statement of the respondents. He asserted that the impugned original order is dated 1-4-1997. The appellant tiled his departmental appeal on 2-5-1997 which was dismissed on 2-7-1997. According to him, even if the appellant had not received any copy thereof--Civil Petition No,859 of 1997 which was dismissed on 22-8-1997, by the Hon'ble High Court, wherein the appellant came to know as per written statement of the defendants/statement of A.A.-G. That his departmental appeal has been dismissed on 2-7- 1997. Therefore, he was fully aware of this fact on 22-8-1997 at least he should have approached Sindh Service Tribunal and filed his service appeal within 30 days thereof as required--but he filed the service appeal on 2-4-1998. However, this service appeal, according to him was hopelessly time-barred. When it was pointed out to him that respondents have not taken time bar plea in their written statement he stated that all Courts are required to take notice of limitation whether time- barred plea is taken or not by the respondents. He also stated that this appeal, according to the diary of 5-11-1998 was admitted by this Tribunal subject to all just exceptions including the point of limitation to be considered at the time of final arguments. The Chairman pointed out to A.-A.G. That in the same diary it is also recorded that the learned A.A.-G. Was not in a position to establish actual service of the letter (impugned order) upon the appellant and conceded for the admission of the appeal-he stated that this Tribunal was bound to consider the point of limitation-- irrespective of his conceding the same or otherwise. He, therefore, pleaded that the appeal may be dismissed specially because it was provided under Rule 12.8 of the Police Rules that no appeal lies against an order passed under the above said rule. He placed reliance on:-- ' 1998 PLC (C.S.) page 586.
7. ' We have gone through the arguments of both the sides carefully and perused the documents filed with the help of the counsel and also gone through the citations quoted.
8. ' The facts, undisputed are that the appellant was appointed on regular basis i,e, by way of proper advertisement of post and selection through the prescribed Selection Board, as probationer A.S.-I.
9. And was undergoing training at P.T.C., Saudabad, at the time of issuance of his discharge by the D.I.-G. Police, Larkana, under Rule 12.8, of the Police Rule, 19.
10. ' We are in agreement with the counsel for the appellant that the abovesaid rule does empower the D.I.-G. (of the range) to discharge a probationer-but it is an established principle of law that the exercise of power vested in any authority should be with a judicious/independent mind. In this appeal, the appellant was discharged on the report of S.S.P., Larkana-while living beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Reporting Officer. The alleged charges particularly of being mixed up with criminals .Were serious charges and the competent Authority should have looked into the matter judiciously by calling for the evidence and examining the veracity of such charges. In the absence of any corroborating evidence on record, the report of S.S.P. Concerned amounted to hearsay which under the provisions of Evidence Act, is no evidence. It is also an established legal proposition as upheld by this Tribunal and the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan that where the alleged charges amount to 'stigma' it is necessary to hold a proper full-fledged departmental inquiry in the matter and if the charges are established/proved against the accused then only he can be convicted of the same--followed by award of appropriate penalty. In the instant case, the appellant was not apprised of the alleged, charges against him by way of charge- sheet/departmental inquiry. Even a 'show-cause notice' was not issued to the appellant which means that he was condemned unheard, which is in contravention of the principles of natural justice, fairplay and equity, upheld by all the superior Courts in Pakistan. The catchwords in Rule 12.8 are 'deemed for sufficient`reasons' unsuitable for service in Police. Sufficient reasons necessarily require 'evidence' and all senior police officers of P.S.P. Cadre are taught Evidence Act and expected to be well-conservant. 'Sufficient reasons' implies presence of incriminating/corroborating evidence--but nothing has been shown to us in evidence that a criminal case was even registered against him--what to say of- being convicted by a competent criminal Court. Therefore, it is our considered view that it is a case of no evidence.
11. ' The counsel for the appellant has rightly pointed out that under Police Rule 12.18 there is a prescribed, procedure laid down for verification of character antecedents and the past colonial masters/framers of these rules had taken great pains so that black sheep do not infiltrate in the major law enforcing agency/police which includes clearance of the Lambardar, S.H.O. Of the area Police Station and Finger Print Bureau. The appointment of the appellant through prescribed procedure/completion of codal formalities prima facie. Proves that at the time of his appointment there was nothing adverse against him and after his appointment nothing adverse was reported against the appellant by the Principal, P.T.C., Saudabad, Karachi. We observe that the appointment of the appellant was resented by one Ali Gut Dehto as evident from the record of Civil Petition No,D- 82 of 1996, could be the mole on which a mountain was created--but the respondents not only defended the appointment of the appellant but in their comments gave a clean chit to the appellant.
12. ' In view of what has been stated, we have no option but to set aside the impugned order. As regards the point of jurisdiction and the plea of A.A.-G. That an order passed under Rule 12.8 of the abovesaid rules is "non-appealable" the established legal position as enunciated by the C ,superior judiciary all over Pakistan is that even where the jurisdiction is barred specifically the superior Courts/legal forums can look into the bona fides of such action and whether the necessary required formalities have been observed. The established legal maxim is that no one can be condemned unheard. In the instant appeal, the respondents never apprised the appellant of the alleged charges against him, did not even issue a show-cause notice to him, nor provided a personal hearing to him to defend himself. Such arbitrary actions are considered 'bad' in law and lack legal sanctity.
13. ' Consequent to the setting aside of the original/appellate order the appellant shall be reinstated in service. The intervening period, shall be treated as. 'Leave due' at par with the decision in earlier-- similar appeals as cited by the counsel for the appellant. There is no orders as to the cost.#TE## ' Given under our hands and signature on 25th day of May, 1999 at Karachi. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.