' SHEIKH ABDUR RAZZAQ, J.--- briefly stated the facts are that on 11-5-2000 at about 2-30 a.m., the complainant/petitioner alongwith his family was sleeping in his house whereas his servant Muhammad Tariq was sleeping in the court-yard of his bungalow. As a result of some noise, the complainant/petitioner woke up, went to T.V. Lounge and saw that four persons armed with lethal weapons were present and had made his servant/Muhammad Tariq as a hostage. They threatened the petitioner not to make noise and forcibly removed him in his residential room. They obtained keys from his wife forcibly and thereafter opened almirah, boxes and plundered belongings lying over there. Muhammad Tariq, in the meanwhile, slipped away, raised alarm which attracted Masood Khan, Shahbad Khan, Ghulam Musafa and other residents of the locality. The police also reached at the spot. Upon which, the assailants opened firing at them. Muhammad Ramzan son of Khushi Muhammad and Muhammad Ramzan son of Mukhtar Ahmad accused were apprehended at the spot along with their respective weapons, while two other accused succeeded in making their good escape. The apprehended accused disclosed the names of their co-accused as Muhammad Yusuf son of Mukhtar Ahmad and Muhammad Yousaf son of Muhammad Fayyaz.
They further disclosed that they have committed the said offence at the instance of Yasin Yasir and Hafiz Nusrat. The complainant further observed that he had been deprived of his house-hold articles amounting to Rs,2,86,500. On the statement of the complainant, F.I.R. No,212 dated 11-5- 2000 under sections 392/458/411/353/324/109, P.P.C. Was registered at the Police Station, City Sadiqabad, District Rahimyar Khan.
2. Yasin Yasir, accused/respondent No,10 moved an application for post-arrest bail which was heard and disposed of by Magistrate Section 30, Sadiqabad, who refused to entertain the same on the ground that it involves the commission of offences under sections 353/324, P.P.C. Which fall within the ambit of Anti-Terrorism Act, so he returned the same vide order dated 24-6-2000 for presenting before the said Court. Accordingly, he moved a similar application in the Court of learned Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism, Bahawalpur who after analysing the evidence collected by the prosecution agency came to the conclusion that there was no evidence to invoke his jurisdiction and dismissed the application vide order dated 18-7-2000 directing the accused to seek relief from a Court of Ordinary jurisdiction.
3. The complainant-petitioner has felt aggrieved of the order dated 18-7-2000 and filed the instant writ petition.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record.
' The main stand of the learned counsel for complainant/petitioner is that the part attributed to accused falls within the definition of section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, so the said Court has the jurisdiction to try this case. While elaborating his contentions, he has referred to the last two lines of section 6(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act. His stand is that as in the instant case public servants have been prevented by use of force to discharge their lawful duties, so the accused have committed a terrorist act as defined in section 6 of the Act. He contended that as in the instant case firing has been exchanged and that too upon police party so the act complained in the instant F.I.R. Shall fall within the ambit of section 6 of the said Act. He thus, submitted that under these circumstances, the Judge, Special Court, constituted under the said Act, Bahawalpur, was not justified to hold that said Court had no jurisdiction.
5. Conversely, the stand of the learned counsel for the accused is that contents of F.I.R. Do not constitute any act which falls within the ambit of Terrorist Act as defined in section 6 of the said Act as such the impugned order has been passed in accordance with law. Further added that unless it is shown that the act was covered by earlier part of section 6, the last two lines of section 6(1) would not ipso facto bring the alleged act withiri the scope of terrorist act and placed reliance upon Zahid Ahmad v. Abdur Rasheed and others 1999 PCr.LJ 793. He further submitted that if the act attributed to Yasin Yasir as well as others is adjudged on the touchstone referred above it proves that the act conplained does not fall within the purview of terrorist act as defined in section 6 of the Act. He further submitted that act of terrorism is a pre-planned and organised system of intimidation, effects of which are made known to the people and widely circulated with exaggeration. Such act is neither hidden nor disguised and is committed with the sole object to terrorise the people and to feel them unsecure and placed reliance upon Jahangir Akhtar Awan and 2 others v. The State and 8 others PLD 2000 Karachi 89. He next argued that doing of an act or thing by using explosive or fire-arms, display of fire-arms or deterring public servants from performance of duties are offences under various general statutes, but when these acts are coupled with the mens reas, intention, aim or objective embodied in the definition given in section 6 of the Act, the offences under ordinary law becomes terrorist act and placed reliance upon Muhammad Afzal and another v. S.H.O. And others 1999 PCr.LJ 929. He concluded his submissions by saying that if the act attributed to the accused is considered in the light of his submissions then it becomes crystal clear that it does not fall within the purview of terrorist act and as such impugned order has been passed in accordance with law.
6. The only point which requires determination is, if the act attributed to the accused falls within the definition of Terrorist Act as contemplated by section 6 of the said Act which is being reproduced for ready reference:--
6. Terrorist Act.--- A person is said to commit a terrorist act if he,
(a) in order to, or if the effect of his actions will be to, strike terror or create a sense of fear and insecurity in the people, or any section of the people, or to alienate any section of people, or to adversely affect harmony among different sections of the people, does any act or thing by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive or inflammable substances, or such fire-arms or other lethal weapons as may be notified, or poisons or noxious gases or chemicals, in such a manner as to cause, or be likely to cause, the death of, or injury to, any person or persons, or damage to, or destruction of, property on the large scale, or a widespread disruption of supplies of services essential to the life of the community, or threatens with the use of force public servants in order to prevent them from discharging their lawful duties; or
(b) commits a scheduled offence, the effect of which will be, or be likely to be, to strike terror, or create a sense of fear and insecurity in the people, or any section of the people, or to alternate any section of the people, or to adversely affect harmony 'among different sections of the people; or
(c) commits an act of gang rape, child molestation, or robbery coupled with rape as specified in the Schedule to the Act."
7. There is no doubt that there is allegation of firing upon police but the fact remains that neither any personnel of police force nor any other person was injured in the instant incident. Thus, by no stretch of imagination, the act complained can be brought within the ambit of section 6 of Anti- Terrorism Act. The contents of the F.I.R. If scanned minutely reveal that there is mere allegation of using force against law-enforcing agency, which allegation does not find any corroboration as no empty has been recovered/secured from the place of occurrence. Learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to bring his case within the purview of last two lines of section 6(a) of the Act, but has failed to convince us even on that score. Even if it is assumed that the case stands covered within the purview of last two lines of section 6(a) still it will not constitute a terrorist act unless it falls in the earlier part of section 6 of the Act and has nexus with it.
8. In view of the facts stated above, we hold that the act attributed to the accused does not fall within the ambit of section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and as such the Courts constituted under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, have no jurisdiction to try the case. The impugned order has been passed in accordance with law and does not call for any interference. Consequently, the instant writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed.