1. M. R. KHAN, J.----The Opposite-Parties 1 to 5 who belong to a minority community have brought Title Suit No. 67 of 1966 in the First Court of the Subordinate Judge, Chittagong, for declaration of their title to certain lands and recovery of khas possession thereof on the allegation that the petitioner who is the defendant No. 1 in the suit, in collusion with one Farok Ahmed, trespassed into the lands and has been in wrongful possession of the same.
2. It is alleged in the plaint of the said suit that prior to the institution of that suit, the said Farok Ahmed auction-purchased the suit lands in a certificate sale, but the certificate sale, was set aside as the result of other Suit No. 165 of 1959 brought by 89 of 1960 the present opposite-party No. 1 and the decree setting aside the sale was maintained by the Court of appeal and also by the High Court.
3. It appears from the trial Court's record that the present petitioner as the defendant No. 1 in Title Suit No. 67 of 1966 took a number of adjournments for filing a written statement, but, instead of filing a written statement, he made an application on 14-1-1967 for rejecting the plaint on the ground of the plaintiff's instituting the suit without having obtained the permission of the Board of Revenue under section 6 of the East Pakistan Disturbed Persons (Rehabilitation) Ordinance, 1964 (East Pakistan, Ordinance No. 1 of 1964). After hearing the lawyers of both the parties, the trial Court, by its Order No. 10, dated 28-1-67, rejected the petition on the ground that the plaintiffs themselves being members of a minority community and the suit brought by them being on- for protection of their own interest, the suit is not hit by section 6 of the said Ordinance. The petitioner then made a revisional application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, alleging that prior permission of the Board of Revenue not having been obtained the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in entertaining the suit. The Rule issued on this application which is now under consideration is opposed by the opposite-parties, i.e. The plaintiffs of Title Suit No. 67 of 1966.
4. Section 6 of the East Pakistan Disturbed Persons (Rehabilita--petition) Ordinance, 1964 (hereinafter called the Rehabilitation Ordinance), as amended by the East Pakistan Ordinance Nos. 6 and 10 of 1964, runs thus :- "(1) Save as provided in sections 3 and 5, no action taken, no decision made and no order passed under this Ordinance shall be called in question by any suit or proceedings in any Court or tribunal.
(2) No Court shall entertain any suit for the specific performance of any contract relating to the transfer of immovable property belonging to a member of the minority community or for declaration of title or enforcement of mortgage security in relation to such property, except with the prior permission, granted after such inquiry as is considered necessary by the Board of Revenue ; and no such suit pending on the date of commencement of this Ordinance shall be proceeded with except with such permission.
(3) No immovable property belonging to a member of a minority community shall be sold in execution of any decree of civil Court or of any certificate signed under the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913 except with the prior permission of the Board of Revenue."
5. It appears from an analysis of subsection (2) of section 6 that a qualified and limited bar has been imposed on Court's jurisdiction. The bar is that no Court shall, except with the prior permission of the Board of Revenue, entertain the following three classes of suits, namely :-
(i) A suit for specific performance of a contract relating to the transfer of immovable property belonging to a member of a minority community ;
(ii) A suit for declaration of title to immovable property belonging to a member of a minority community ; and
(iii) A suit for enforcement of mortgage security in relation to immovable prop.-rty belonging to a member of a minority community.
6. Obviously, all the three above classes of suits must be in respect of immovable property belonging to a member of a minority community. Again, a suit coming under item (i) or item (iii) above, by its very nature, must be a suit by someone against a member of a minority community to whom the immovable property concerned (i.e. The subject-matter of the suit) belongs. There is no scope for controversy that a suit contemplated in the first or the third item must be a suit against a member of a minority community. But a controversy has arisen as to whether item (ii) above contemplates a suit only against a member of minority community or whether it contemplates a suit both by or against a member of a minority community.
7. Mr. Abu Saleque, the learned Advocate for the petitioner submits that the expression "any suit . . . . .
8. For declaration of title" occurring in subsection (2) of section 6 of the Rehabilitation Ordinance should be given its plain, natural and grammatical meaning according to the primary rule of statutory constructions and that the said expression being unqualified and in general terms, should be construed as meaning every suit for declaration of title whether such suit is by or against a member of a minority community. In support of his contention, the learned Advocate has cited the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Government of Pakistan v. Syed Akhalaque Hussain (PLD 1965 SC 527). Mr. B. C. Panday, the learned Advocate for the opposite-parties, on the other hand, submits that subsection (2) of section 6 of the Ordinance con--templates only a suit for declaration of title against a member of a minority community, but not a suit for title brought by a member of a minority community. According to Mr. Panday, the expression "any suit------for declaration of title" occurring in the said subsection, though unqualified and couched in general terms should be construed having regard to the context in which it has been used. His further submission is that if the said expression is construed as meaning also a suit for title by a member of a minority community, then, such construction will be against the apparent purpose of the Ordinance which is one for the protection of immovable properties of the minority communities.
9. To protect one's title to land by a suit in a Civil Court is an incident of ownership of land. The right of a person to relief in a civil Court is a natural right, and he can bring a suit for redress so long as he can show a cause of action for the same. In fact, the right of a person to sue has been statutorily recognised in section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Hence, if a B statute encroaches upon the jurisdiction of Courts or affects an incident of ownership of land, such statute should be put to a strict interpretation. It, therefore, follows that if a statute purports to exclude or restrict the ordinary jurisdiction of Civil Courts, it must do so by express terms or by the use of such terms as could necessarily lead to the inference of such exclusion or restriction. In support of this view, we may cite the Privy Council decision in the case of Secretary of State v. Mask & Co. (AIR 1940 P C 105). In this connection, a reference may also be made to the case of The Attorney-General of Canada v. Hallet Carey Ltd. (PLD 1952 P C 29), decided by the Privy Council.
10. As already stated, subsection (2) of section 6 of the Rehabilitation Ordinance provides, among others, that no Court shall, except with prior permission of the Board of Revenue, entertain any suit for declaration of title to immovable property belonging to a member of a minority community.
11. This subsection does not expressly state that a suit for declaration of title shall be a suit brought by or against a member of a minority community. Nor does this follow from this subsection by necessary implication. When the subject-matter of such a suit shall be invariably an immovable property belonging to a member of g minority community, the implication is rather that the suit shall be one brought against a member of a minority community and not a suit brought by him. At an rate, the expression "any suit . . . . . For declaration of title" occurring in subsection (2) of section 6, in the absence of an explanation thereof, is not free from ambiguity and is susceptible of more than one interpretation. Accordingly, it is necessary to discover the legislative intent by applying the recognised rules of interpretation of statutes.
12. A well-known rule of interpretation which also lays stress on the context, is the maxim 'noscitur a socfis'. According to this maxim a word is known by the company it keeps. What is o true of a word is also true of a phrase or clause in a sentence., The Rule is stated in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (9 Edition, page 332) in. These words :- "then two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together noscitur a sociis they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take, as it were, their colour from each other, that is, the more general is restricted to a sense analogous to the less general."
13. "The best mode of ascertaining the meaning affixed to any word or sentence by a deliberative body is by comparing it with the words and sentences with which it stands connected, and a constitutional provision or a phrase in a constitutional provision must be read in connection with the context. Noscitur a sociis is the rule of construction applied to all written instruments."
14. Subsection (1) of section 6 of the Ordinance provides that an action taken, decision made and an order passed thereunder shall not be called in question by any suit or proceedings in a Court or tribunal except as provided in sections 3 and j. The provisions of sections 3 and 5 of the Ordinance are attracted in cases affecting immovable property of a member of a minority community. When subsection (2) of section 6 relating to a suit for declaration of title is construed in the context of subsection (1) thereof, it becomes apparent that such suit is intended to be one which may affect immovable property of a member of a minority community. Hence, it follows that such a suit shall be P against and not by a member of a minority community.
15. The sole object of the Ordinance, as it clearly appears from its various provisions, is to protect immovable properties of the minority communities. If the expression in question "any suit . . . . . For declaration of title" is given its ordinary grammatical meaning, the same will obviously lead to ath manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the Ordinance. It is a canon of interpretation that when a literal construction of a statutory provision is repugnant to the purpose of the statute or is unreasonable, or when more than one interpretation is possible, c an attempt should be made to discover the true legislative intent by considering the relevant provision in the context of the whole statute, and that construction should be preferred which is in accord with, or carries into effect, the object of the statute. This rule of interpretation is in accord with the views of eminent jurists and finds support from many a decision of superior Courts. Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (9th Edition at page 63) states "While expressing truly enough all that the Legislature intended, they frequently express more, in their literal meaning and natural force ; and it is necessary to give them the meaning which best suits the scope and object of the statute without extending to ground foreign to the intention. It is, therefore, a canon of interpretation that all words, if they be general and not express and precise, are to be restricted to the fitness of the matter. They are to be construed as particular if the intention be particular that is, they must be understood as used with reference to the subject-matter in the mind of the Legislature, and limited to it."
16. The view stated in Craies' Treaties on Statute Law (4th Edition at page 95) is as follows "The key to the opening of every law is the reason and spirit of the law ; it is the animus imponentis, the intention of the law-maker expressed in the law itself, taken as a whole. Hence, to arrive at the true meaning of any particular phrase in a statute, the particular phrase is not to be viewed detached from its context in the statute ; it is to be viewed in connection with its whole context, meaning by this as well the title and preamble as the purview or enacting part of the statute."
17. "Though a Court of Law has nothing .To do with the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a statutory provision, the reasonableness or otherwise of the interpretation is relevant to interpret what the Legislature has said, and in determining either the general object of the Legislature or the meaning of its language in any particular passage it is obvious that the intention which appears to be most in accord with convenience, reason, justice and legal principles, should in all cases of doubtful significance, be presumed to be true one."
18. "It is true that it is also possible to take the view that the amendments that can be made under these general words can be only of the nature indicated in those clauses, but when more than one interpretation is possible, that construction should be preferred which carries into effect the object of the statute."
19. "All rules of interpretation have been devised as aids to the discovery of the legislative intent behind an enactment. Where the words are plain and unambiguous that intent can be best judged by giving full effect to the ordinary grammatical meaning of those words. But when this is not the case, an attempt should be made to discover the true intent by considering the relevant provision in the context of the whole Act in which it appears and by having regard to the circumstances in which the enactment came to be passed."
20. "Where the language of the statute in its meaning and grammatical constructions, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence."
21. Lastly, to the case of Commissioner of Income-tax, East Pakistan v. Hossen Aasum Dada (PLD 1961 SC 375) at page 379, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed :- "If we may say so with respect, we find ourselves unable to agree that the intention of the Legislature is to be gathered from the words only of a particular section falling to be interpreted.
22. We would have thought that the conventional method of ascertaining the intention of the Legislature after reading the statute as a whole was more likely to lead to the discovery of its true intent and is always a safer rule to follow."
23. Bearing these principles of interpretation of statutes in mind, let us examine the relevant provisions of the Ordinance with a view to discovering if a suit for declaration of title contemplated in subsection (2) of section 6 of the of the ordinance is also intended tot be a suit by a member of a minority community. The purpose of the Ordinance, as its preamble expressly stales is to provide for the speedy rehabilitation of persons affected by the civil disturbance in East Pakistan in January 1964, and for the protection of the Unmovable properties of the minority communities. Section Z provides for restoration of possession of immovable property of a person who had to leave the same on account of or fear of the civil disturbance in January 1964. Section 4 forbids transfer of immovable property belonging to a member of a minority community except with the prior permission of the competent authority. Subsection (4) of section 4 provides that the competent authority shall refuse K permission if the proposed transfer has been agreed upon due to coercion, threat and intimidation, etc. Section 5 empowers the District Judge to cancel a registered instrument apparently relating to immovable property of a member of a minority community if it was obtained by coercion, threat, intimidation, undue influence, misrepresentation or fraud, within the period between the 1st January 1964 and the commencement of the Ordinance on the 30th June 1964. All these provisions of the Ordinance are obviously intended for the benefit of members of the minority communities. Construing subsection (2) of section 6 in this context, it should be taken that the restriction put on the Court's jurisdiction by the said subsection is also for the benefit of the members of the minority communities and is not intended to create an impediment in the way of a member of a minority community to protect his immovable property by having recourse to a suit. This interpretation is in accord with the object of the Ordinance, but any interpretation to the contrary will be repugnant to its purpose, which however must not have been intended by the Legislature. We are, therefore, of the view that the trial Court correctly held that section 6 of the Ordinance does not hit a suit for declaration of title brought by a member of a minority community.
24. MAKSUM-UL-HAKIM, J.----I agree.