' Respondent Muhammad Abbas minor filed a suit for permanent injunction through his mother contending therein that he is owner of the land subject-matter of this petition, that the said land was gifted to him by his late father in terms of registered deeds dated 7-5-1996 and 3-6-1996, that his father was in possession of the suit-property till he died i,e, 2-2-1997 and used to cultivate the same through Messrs Mumtaz and Lal Shah, that the petitioners-defendants who are brothers and nephews of respondent's late father wanted to interfere in respondent's possession and that they be restrained from doing that. In the written statement filed the claim of the respondent-plaintiff was controverted. Alongwith the suit an application under Order XXXIX, Rule 1, C.P.C. Was moved.
The learned trial Court vide its order, dated 26-6-1999, dismissed the same on the ground that the possession of the suit land did not appear to have been transferred to the respondent-plaintiff in terms of the registered "Tamleek" dated 7-5-1996, and 3-6-1996, that the Khasra Girdawari reflected joint possession of Mst. Allah Wasai and Muhammad Amin, grandmother of plaintiff and father respectively, that since latter's death the suit land was in possession of Mst. Allah Wasai and no case for temporary injunction was made out. The learned Additional District Judge in appeal, however, set aside the afore-referred order and held that in view of para.3 of the written reply of petitioner-defendant before the trial Court the possession of Muhammad Amin, father of respondent Abbas stood admitted, that the recital of registered gift-deeds executed by Allah Wasai in favour of the deceased father of respondent reflected that the possession had been delivered to the said Muhammad Amin, that the entries in Khasra Girdawari were also in his favour and after his death w,e,f, Kharif 1996 to 1998 the local rates were being paid by respondent Muhammad Abbas, that the petitioners-defendants had violated the order of Additional District Judge, dated 3-7-1999 wherein he had specifically directed the petitioner-defendants not to interfere in physical possession of the respondent-plaintiff and that the respondent-minor after the death of his father was being wronged. In the afore-referred circumstances the learned Additional District Judge vide the impugned order, dated 11-5-2000, directed that the possession of the suit- land be immediately restored to the respondent-plaintiff and till then the properties of the petitioner-defendants in appeal shall remain attached.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioners in support of this petition made following submissions:--
(i) That the suit filed by the respondent for permanent injunction is incompetent as respondent- plaintiff was in fact seeking a declaration to become owner of the suit-land and a suit for declaration should have been filed. Reliance is placed on 1993 CLC 1327 and PLD 1988 Kar. 433;
(ii) That in absence of prayer for possession in the main suit no direction could have been given by the learned Appellate Court to hand over possession to the respondent-plaintiff. Reliance was placed on 1988 SCM R 1696;
(iii) That the impugned order of the learned Additional District Judge reflects malice in law inasmuch as the properties of the petitionersdefendnats have been directed to be attached which is not tenable in law;
(iv) That Mst. Allah Wasai, the grandmother of respondent had herself filed declaratory suit challenging the alleged gift-deed made by her in favour of respondent's father Muhammad Amin deceased, therefore respondent had no prima facie case;
(v) That the learned appellate Court has wrongly held respondent-plaintiff to be in possession of the suit-land; firstly because of entries made in Khasra Girdawari are not conclusive proof with regard to possession; secondly the respondent-plaintiff had himself asked for appointment of commission for spot inquiry with regard to the possession but subsequently he withdrew the application which indicated that lie was not in physical possession of the same.
3. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, defended the impugned order. His precise submissions were as under:--
(i) That the civil revision is incompetent as petitioner has not annexed all the documents annexed with the suit as also with memorandum of appeal before the Additional District Judge;
(ii) That the respondent-plaintiff had annexed copies of the registered Tamleek deeds, dated 4-4- 1996 and 9-4-1996 to show that Mst. Allah Wasai grandmother of the respondent had gifted the suit-land to respondent's father on 4-4-1996 (200 Kanals) and on 9-4-1996 (196 Kana and 4 Marlas). This very land was later on gifted by the respondent's father to the respondent;
(iii) That the father (Muhammad Amin) died on 3-2-1997 and within a month of his death a suit was got filed allegedly on behalf of Mst. Allah Wasai challenging the aforereferred gift deeds. That respondent's father Muhammad Amin had gifted the land through registered deeds, dated 7-5- 1996 and 3-6-1996 and on one of the deeds Haji Manzoor Ahmad petitioner-defendant (real brother of Muhammad Amin .And son of Mst. Allah Wasai) is a marginal witness, that respondent- plaintiff's father was in possession which is evident from para.3 of the written statement filed by petitioner-defendant as also from the entries made in Jamabandi and Khasra Girdawari. During the pendency of the suit the thumb-impression on the registered deeds and the admitted thumb- impressions of said Mst. Allah Wasai were sent to Handwriting Expert and the report was to the effect that the thumb-impressions were identical.
(iii) That the objection to the maintainability of the suit is not tenable as in terms of section 54 of the Specific Relief Act respondent-plaintiff could filed suit for permanent injunction as he apprehended danger to his possession.
(iv) That vide order, dated 3-9-1979 the learned Additional District Judge had directed the petitioners-defendants not to take forcible possession of the suit-land but they violated the order and the direction for restoration of possession to respondent-plaintiff was perfectly justified. He added that in terms of the final order passed by the learned Additional District Judge possession was delivered by the Deputy Commissioner to the respondent-plaintiff but by misrepresentation before this Court in the instant civil revision the petitioner procured order, dated 18-5-2000, in terms of which, the impugned order was suspended.
4. Heard.
5. The question of the form of suit is an issue before the trial Court and I would not in these proceedings give a conclusive finding which may prejudice the case of either side. However, prima facie, since the respondent-plaintiff apprehended danger to his possession of the suit-land of which as per the registered deeds and Revenue Record he is the owner, a suit for permanent injunction was tenable. This is in line with the law laid down in Mst. Sahar Begum v. Salahuddin 1991 M LD 1594 (Karachi) wherein at page 1596 it was held as under:-- "Correspondingly, what is equally clear is that if a person claims to be in peaceful possession, based on a semblance of title or even a mere lawful justification such a person can claim permanent injunction to protect his possession from being endangered except in due course of law. In such situations such a suit for such relief would be maintainable, the proceedings being governed by section 54 of the Specific Relief Act and controlled by section 56 of that statute. If this be so, the appellant/plaintiff cannot be non-suited by rejection of the plaint, at least on her own averments, even if any bar applied to the other reliefs sought therein."
6. Unlike the case of respondent-plaintiff who is recorded as owner of the suit land as per the registered deeds and entries made in Revenue Record, in the precedent case law, to which, reference has been made by petitioner's learned counsel documentary proof of ownership in favour of the plaintiff was lacking. In 1993 CLC 1327 the plaintiff-petitioner as per the Revenue Record was not the exclusive owner. In PLD 1988 Kar. 433 plaintiff had filed suit for permanent injunction against the defendant restraining her from demolishing, altering or renovating or re- constructing the building in the suit and also restraining her from selling, negotiating, transferring or alienating in any part of the property in dispute. He was neither in possession of the suit property nor there was any document in his favour on which presumption of truth could be attached. It was in those circumstances that the learned trial Court invoking Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. Rejected the plaint. The learned appellate Court set aside the order which was annulled in revision before the Karachi High Court and trial Court's order for .The rejection of plaint was restored and it was observed, "From the plain reading of the plaint it would appear that the title was in dispute and the possession of the case property was with the applicant."
' Thus, the case-law referred to above is of no avail to the petitioner.
7. The question of possession is crucial. Respondent-plaintiff in para.3 of the plaint had specifically taken up the plea that his father was in possession of the suit-land; that he died on 3-2-1997 and thereafter the land was in his cultivating possession through tenants. In reply to this para. The petitioners-defendants admitted that respondent-plaintiff's father remained in possession of the suit-land as son of Mst. Allah Wasai used to cultivate the land on her behalf but the remaining part of the paragraph pertaining to the land being cultivated by Mumtaz Khan and Lal Shah was controverted. It was averred that defendants Nos.4 and 5, namely, Allah Dad and Rana Muhammad Nawaz being servants of Mst. Allah Wasai were cultivating the land. However, admittedly in Revenue Record i,e, Jamabandi and Khasra Girdawari respondent-plaintiff's father was in cultivating possession and from Kharif, 1996 onwards there was documentary evidence to indicate that plaintiff had been paying the water rate of the suit-land. It was in these circumstances that while admitting the appeal to regular hearing on 3-7-1999 the learned appellate Court directed the petitioner-defendants not to take forcible possession from the plaintiff. The order reads as under:-- "Arguments heard and record made available has been perused.
' Photocopy of Khasra Girdawari attached with the memorandum of appeal speaks that father of the appellant was in possession of this land and the same is not so for changed. Naturally the possession is to go to the legal heirs of the last occupant who apparently is Muhammad Amin.
Muhammad Abbas is claimant of the disputed property as owner and claims possession. So, in the said circumstances respondents are restrained from taking possession forcibly till 4-9-1999."
8. On the next date learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff filed a contempt application that notwithstanding the order, dated 3-7-1999 the respondent-plaintiff was forcibly dispossessed.
Thereafter, the case was adjourned for about 15 times till the passage of the impugned order mostly on account of the adjournments sought by learned counsel for petitioner-defendants (from 3-7-1999 to 11-5-2000). During this period the tentative finding qua the respondent-plaintiff being in possession of the suit-land was never challenged by the petitioner-defendant and unless they had specifically challenged the order, dated 3-7-1999, its compliance was mandatory and disobedience would amount to contempt. This is in line with judgment of a Division Bench of this Court reported in PLD 1975 Lah. Page 126 wherein at page 131 it was held as under:-- "An injunction is a most solemn and authoritative form of order made by the Court expressly enjoining a party either to do a particular act, in which case the injunction is known as a mandatory injunction, or to refrain from doing a particular act, in which case the injunction is known as a prohibitory injunction. When an injunction order has been is used, it must be obeyed, and the only remedy of the aggrieved party is to come up in appeal to a superior Court to have the order vacated. So long as the order stands and its operation has not been suspended by another Court or by the Court which passed the order, it will not be tolerated that any person should disobey that order. It is so because the administration of justice can only be effective if it has the means to enforce Court orders and to punish acts tending to impair public confidence in the authority or integrity of the Judges who administer the course of justice. In Spokes v. Banbury Board of Health (1865) LR 1 Eq. 42, Wood, V-C., said that 'the simple and only view is that an order must be obeyed, that those who wish to get rid of that order must do so by the proper course, an appeal. So long as it exists, the order must be obeyed, and obeyed to letter, ...'. Again in Knight v. Clifton (1971) 2 All. ER 378 at p.393 (C.A.), Sachs, L.J. Observed that ' when an injunction prohibits an act, that prohibition is absolute, and is not to be related to intent unless otherwise stated on the fact of the order...' In Eastern Trust Co. v. Mckenzie Mann & Co. Ltd. (1915) AC 750 (PC), Sir George Farwell observed that it should perhaps be added that an interim or interlocutory injunction has the same force as a final order, and that the same principles of obedience apply. It is thus, settled that a person cannot disregard an order or an injunction of a Court, and if he, in fact, disobeys it, he does so at his peril."
9. In reply to the application for contempt filed against the petitioner-defendants it was averred that the mother of respondent-plaintiff minor had given an application to the Chief Secretary for delivery of possession, the Deputy Commissioner, Lodhran on 11-1-2000 directed restoration of possession to the respondent-plaintiff which was challenged in Writ Petition No,543 of 2000. The said order was set aside. It was further averred that mother of the respondent-plaintiff was divorced by Muhammad Amin on 12-1-1984 orally and that the suit-property was neither in possession of respondent-plaintiff nor of the so-called lessees and that no order of the Court had been violated to warrant any action under the Contempt of Court's Act.
10. The order passed in Writ Petition No,543 of 2000, to which, reference was made by the petitioner-defendants in answer to contempt application before the Additional District Judge is no defence of the violation of the order, dated 3-7-1999, passed by the learned Additional District Judge rather this order in the Constitutional petition graphically portray's the plight of the respondent/plaintiff who was trying to knock at the door of every State functionary to have its possession restored. (copy of the said order is at page 199 of the civil revision). The facts in brief are that the respondent-plaintiff made an application to Chief Secretary, Punjab, for restoration of the possession, the latter referred the said application to District Collector/Deputy Commissioner, Lodhran. The latter vide letter, dated 11-2-2000, informed the Chief Secretary that he proposed to restore the possession of the suit-land to the respondent-plaintiff in accordance with the order dated 3-7-1999 of the Additional District Judge, and the vires of the said letter were challenged in Constitutional petition. This petition was disposed of in following terms:-- "Parties have been heard at preadmission stage. The pendency of an application for violation of the Court order, dated 3-7-1999 is not denied by the respondents. I am also informed that a criminal case already stands registered against the present petitioners as regards the alleged forcible occupation of the suit-land by the petitioners during the pendency of the petition is concerned Learned counsel for the respondents in the changed situation does not deny that either Deputy Commissioner, Lodhran or for that matter any other executive authority could not allow a relief against the petitioners which was already a subject-matter of proceedings before the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Lodhran. As far the registration of the 'criminal case is concerned the law will have its Court as the same already stands registered. However, the respondent No,1 Deputy Commissioner, Lodhran cannot be permitted to side with any of the parties before the learned District Judge, Lodhran.
' Therefore, this petition is disposed of with the observations that respondent No,1 District Collector/ Deputy Commissioner, Lodhran will not initiate any process to execute its proposal No,2 in the aforesaid letter qua restoration of possession of the suit-land to the respondent No,2."
' Corning to the question of paternity raised by the petitioner-defendants in reply to the contempt application filed before the Additional District Judge as also the question of the alleged oral divorce to mother of respondent-plaintiff by the latter's father, this Court would not like to comment except that in the written statement filed by the petitioner-defendants this issue was never raised. In para. Two of the written statement it was admitted that Allah Wasai is maternal grandmother of the plaintiff. Notwithstanding this admission they filed a separate suit after three years of the attestation of mutation of inheritance (qua land other than the suit) in favour of plaintiff and two years of the filing of the instant suit seeking a declaration that respondent-plaintiff is not son of Muhammad Amin. The objective behind filing of the said suit is too obvious to call for any comment. It must have sent shock waves in respondent's young mind. It must have been a serious blow to the age of innocence that respondent is passing there. No wonder he placed on record his photographs alongwith his late father and mother in proof of his legitimacy. (C.M. No,1172 of 2000). These photographs may not be relevant to decide the question of possession but these are pointer to the level of confrontation the plaintiff has to face and live with.
12. The suit on behalf of Mst. Allah Wasai challenging the mutation of gift (the land which he gifted to respondent-minor) in favour of respondent's father was filed after the death of Muhammad Amin. It is not denied that during pendency of the said suit specimen of her thumb-impression on the registered deeds in favour of respondent's father Muhammad Amin were sent to Handwriting Expert alongwith her admitted thumb-impressions and the report received is positive. (Mst. Allah Wasai meanwhile has died).
13. In their reply to the contempt application qua the question of possession they took up a plea which is in complete derogation to their stand in the written statement. For instance in para. 8 of the written reply while denying the allegation of forcible possession it was stated in paras.7 and 8 as under:- ' The afore-referred persons were not named in the written statement to be in possession of the suit-land. The plea taken in reply to the contempt application was, therefore, an afterthought.
These persons do not figure anywhere in Khasra Girdawari. These inconsistent pleas and the accusations levelled with regard to the paternity could not offset, the effect of the documentary evidence i,e, recitals in registered deeds, the entries in Revenue Record, the receipts of payment of water rate by plaintiff and their own written statement before trial Court to prove that plaintiff was in possession of suit-land through lessees. The attempts by petitioners to procure affidavits of some persons of the area to the contrary, cannot be accredited with truth at this stage as respondent is a minor and her mother besides being Paradanashin lady came from different family. The odds are heavy for a woman and a boy of respondent's age in this male dominated society.
15. So for as the argument with regard to the attachment of the property of the petitioner- defendants is concerned the same is devoid of force as the order has been passed in face of petitioner's disobedience to the order, dated 3-7-1979, vide which it was directed that respondent- plaintiff shall not be forcibly dispossessed. Order XXXIX, rule 2(3), C.P.C. Mandates as under:-- "(3) In case of disobedience, or of breach of any such terms, the Court granting an injunction may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached, and may also order such person to be detained, and may also order such person to be detained in the prison for a term not exceeding six months unless in the meantime the Court directs his release."
The afore-referred resume of facts was sufficient for the learned appellate Court to come to the conclusion that the respondent-plaintiff had been forcibly dispossessed in utter contempt to the order passed by the said Court. The argument that the learned trial Court should have framed issues, recorded evidence before giving any finding on question of forcible possession is not tenable as no special procedure is laid down for contempt proceedings. This is in line with the judgment of the august Supreme Court reported in Ch. Zahur Ilahi, M.N.A. v. Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and 2 others PLD 1975 SC 383 wherein at page 394 it was held as under:-- "We cannot, in the first place, agree with him that the nature of a proceeding for committal for contempt of Court partakes necessarily of the nature of a criminal proceedings as this Court has already had occasion to consider this aspect of the matter and to take a contrary view in the case of Saadat Khialy v. State PLD 1962 SC 457. It will be enough to point out that this Court has held that contempt of Court proceedings ' where sui generis in nature partaking of some of the elements of both civil and criminal proceedings but really constituting neither, that there was no fixed formula for contempt proceedings and that technical accuracies were not required, nor were we bound by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure or by the technicalities of ordinary criminal proceedings; but, nevertheless, being Courts of Justice, we would normally follow the fundamental rules for the ascertainment of the truth by giving the fullest opportunity to the person accused of defending himself and of putting forward his case with as much, if not, more fairness than we would in an ordinary trial before us."
16. For what has been discussed above, I do not see any illegality or material irregularity to warrant interference in revision. This petition having no merit is, therefore, dismissed.