The dispute In this case is about a shop situated in Main Bazar, Jhelum. Described more fully in a petition for ejectment which was filed on 14-11-1966 by Mistry Taj Din (landlord) against his tenants, namely, (1) Haji Fasal Husaain and (2) Mohammad Shafi sons of Imam Din (hereinafter called the tenants). Haji Fazal Hussain has died during the pendency of this appeal and is now represented by his legal representatives as detailed in Civil Miscellaneous No. 960-C/1977. The landlord sought eviction of his tenants on the grounds that the shop was bona fide required by him for his personal use and that he intended to demolish the shop and reconstruct the same. The pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues :
(1) Whether the shop in dispute is bona fide required by the petitioner for his personal use ;
(2) Whether the petitioner intends to demolish the shop to question and reconstruct the same for which he had obtained the permission of the local body.
(3) Relief.
2. The relevant evidence which was led in this case from the side of the landlord was P. W. 4 Mohammad Yousaf. P. W. 5 Mohammad Ayub, P. W. 6 Hassan Mohammad and P. W. 7 Taj Din (landlord). The tenants led evidence in the form of R. W. 1 Haji Mohammad Nawaz ; R. W. 2 Asia Ahmed and R. W. 3 Fazal Hussain. The landlord also produced Exh. A/13 sanction of the Local Municipal Committee for construction which was to be made on the site after demolition of the earlier superstructure. Exh. A/12 is the actual plan. After discussing the relevant evidence, the learned Rent Controller, by means of his judgment and order dated 24-7-1976, decided all the issues in favour of the landlord and directed the eviction of the tenants. He, however, gave two months' time to the tenants to vacate the shop.
3. The tenants filed an appeal, but without any success as the same was dismissed by the learned District Judge. Jhelum, by means of his judgment and order dated 30-5-1977. The learned District Judge affirmed the findings of the learned Rent Controller on all the issues. However, he gave four months time to the tenants to vacate the premises. The tenants have come up in his second appeal to this Court.
4. Learned counsel for the parties have taken me through the evidence and the record which was read in their presence in Court. Learned counsel for the appellants-tenants tried to argue that in the Instant case what was pleaded in the ejectment application was that the landlord needs the shop for his personal use, inasmuch as, he was a karobari person and required the shop in that connection. However, in the evidence he deposed that his son Hassan Mohammad lived with him and was running a small shop and that the landlord gave monthly expenses to him. P. W. 6 said that they would like to do their' business of cloth merchant in the disputed premises. Learned counsel for the tenants-appellants submitted that the evidence led is different from the plea taken, with the result that according to him the desire to set up a shop for Hassan Mohammad was not a specific need of the landlord himself and !n any case it was different from the plea taken in the ejectment application. For this purpose he referred to Aloes Assts v. Ahmed Bakhsh (PLD 1976 Lah.
1303), wherein it was held that the requirement of a shop for the use of children could not be a requirement of the shop for the use of landlord. In my opinion, the present use is distinguishable from the aforesaid precedent, inasmuch as, here it has been established that Hassan Mohammad still lives with his father and did business fn a small shop but he was being given the expenses by the father. In this way the need of the father in the form of a family need could be sufficient to fall within the provisions of law relevant. See Mohammad Iqdal v. Masud Ahmed and another (1975SCMR517) and Abdul Salam Akhtar v. Dr. Najam Pervaiz (1976SCMR52). There is a concurrent finding of the Courts below on the subject and no reason has been pointed out to me to upset the same. The question is essentially of fad depending on appreciation of evidence and it cannot be said that the view taken by the Courts below could not at all be taken from the evidence on record.
I hold accordingly.
5. As mentioned earlier there is still another ground on which the eviction of the tenants has been ordered and that is that the landlord required the shop, because, he intended to demolish the same and reconstruct it. For that purpose he has obtained the permission of the local body concerned in the form of Exh. A/13 and the sanctioned plan Exh. A/12, Mere is no rebuttal to this documentary evidence and the findings o! He two Courts below on this issue cannot be taken exception to. Learned counsel for the tenants-appellants had nothing to say on the subject except that the plea of reconstruction should be considered to have been seriously affected because it was mixed up with the plea of personal requirement, with the result that if the ground of personal requirement falls this ground should also fall. This is not the law on the subject, inasmuch as, both are separate and independent grounds. Even otherwise I have already maintained the finding on the requirement of the landlord on issue No. 1, as above reproduced and in the context the argument advanced does not arise. In the instant case the intention to demolish the shop and construct the same stands independently established on record and constitutes a good ground by itself for ordering the eviction of the tenants. I hold accordingly. Learned counsel for the tenants argued that the landlord will not reconstruct the shop. The plea has no substance and as held in Messrs Amir Din Allah Ditta v. Seth Adam/I Abdullah and others (1969 SCMR 131), the law on the subject in this respect already contains adequate safeguards. Similarly in Mohammad Gul v. K. B.
Mian Feroze Shah (PLD 1964 Pesh. 11), it was held that the intention to demolish and reconstruct the premises does not necessarily depend upon the dilapidated condition of the premises, because it is an independent concept by itself. Such a finding according to the aforesaid precedent cannot be disturbed in a second appeal. I respectfully agree with the aforesaid enunciation of law on the subject.
6. No other point was argued before me.
7. The result is that this appeal has no merit and is dismissed with costs throughout. As the tenants have already availed of sufficient time, they should vecate the premises forthwith.