Shop No. 3-14/67, Liquat Bazar Quetta, has two portions, partitioned by wooden wall. This shop originally was an Evacuee Property and transferred by the Settlement authorities in favour of tile two respondents, each of them getting one portion independently. Appellant Haji Abdul Baqi and Mahfoos Khan are the tenants respectively of respondents Muzaffar A.I Khan and Shah Din.
2. In 1959 Musaffar A.I brought an application for eviction of appellant Abdul Baqi (Application No. 172 of :969). Under the provisions of tile West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter called the Ordinance), the grounds taken in that application were bona fide personal requirements and re-construction after demolition of the shop in dispute. While this application was pending a second application was moved by respondent Muzaffar Ad on the ground of default in the payment of rent. The learned Rent Controller rdected these applications on 30th April, 1973 and 18th August, 1973, respectively. While the second order of Rent Controller dated 18th August, 1977 was not challenged the first one was; but in appeal the learned District Judge ride his order dated 11th October, 1973 affirmed the findings of the Rent Controller.
3. Respondent Shah Din also filed an application for eviction of his tenant, namely Mahfooz Khan on the ground of bona fide personal requirement of the premises and for non-payment of rent. The learned Rent Controller rejected this application on 24th November, 1970. First Appeal against such rejection was dismissed on 10th March 1971, and the second was dismissed to limine by the High Court ors 24th May, 1971.
4. On 30th October, 1974 the two landlords (the respondents before this Court) brought a joint application on the ground that they would demolish the present structure and reconstruct a Double Storey building in its place. They wanted to occupy the first floor of the proposed building, while the ground floor consisting of shops, was to be offered to the present tenants/ appellants.
5. Written statement was filed on behalf of the appellants on 1st March, 1975. A preliminary objection was taken that the application was barred under tape provisions of section 14 of the Ordinance and was therefore liable to be summarily rejected. The learned Rent Controller framed a preliminary issue on this point and came to the conclusion that the plea of reconstruc--petition was not accepted in the previous proceedings and that applicant No. 1 (respondent No. 1 before this Court) could not improve his position by join--ing respondent No. 2, with him. The learned Rent Controller therefore found the issue in the affirmative. The result was that the application was dismissed on 30th June, 1975 with cost.
6. On appeal the learned District Judge by his order dated 13th February, 1976 reversed such finding of the learned Rent Controller and remanded the case for inquiry after proper hearing being given to the parties. This second appeal is directed against such decision of the learned District Judge.
7. The first objection taken against the impugned order is that it is not a speaking order. In this connection I may quote the operative part of the impugned order which reads as follows :---- "I have considered all aspects of the case. I have read the order passed by the Controller in the previous proceedings and in this case. The learned Controller in all fairness should have given proper hearing to the parties before the matter was disposed off. He could not sum--marily dismiss the application only due to the objection raised by the respondents."
It does not indicate as to how the learned District Judge arrived at the conclusions, which he did.
Judicial pronouncements, in order to show that they are not whimsical or fanciful have always to give reasons for the conclusions arrived at. In other words such order should be as held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mollah Ejahar A.I v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 1870 SC 173) speaking orders. The order impugned before me lacks that quality. But, it may be pointed, that this fact by itself is not a sufficient ground for disturbing such order.
8. Second objection taken by Ihsan-ul-Huq the learned counsel for the appellant, is that the order of the learned Rent Controller being an order under section 14 of the Ordinance, was not appealable in terms of sec--petition 15(1) of the Ordinance. This is because section 15 of the Ordinance makes only those orders appealable which are passed under section 4, sec--petition 10, section 12 and section 13 of the Ordinance. Mr. Ihsan contends that the order of the learned Rent Controller did not fall under any of these four sections, therefore the appeal before the learned District Judge was not maintainable.
9. Section 4 of the Ordinance provides for the determination of fair rent. The Controller can do so either on the application of a tenant or a landlord. Under section 10 the landlord is forbidden from interfering with the amenities enjoyed by a tenant. In the case of contravention of this provisions the tenant is to approach the Rent Controller, who after inquiry, can direct the restoration of such amenities if he comes to the conclusion that such interference has taken place. In case a landlord fails to carry out necessary repairs of the rented premises the tenant can, under section 12 approach the Rent Controller, who would be competent to direct the tenant to carry out such repairs and deduct its cost from the rent payable to the landlord. Section 13 deals with the grounds on which an eviction of the tenant can take place.
10. Unlike these four sections, section 14 does not confer any right either on a tenant or the landlord nor does it provide any remedy if any rights are impinged. This section simply lays down a principle of law which is to be followed in the determination of applications under any of the above referred to four sections. Section 14 of the Ordinance is at par with Sec--petition 11 of the C. P. C., which embodies the principle of res judicata. If an application is rejected as barred by the principle of res judicata, it does not mean that such rejection takes place under suction 14; nor can it be argued that because section 15(1) of the Ordinance does not provide an appeal against an order passed in pursuance of section 14, therefore it is not appealable. The rejection of an application, in pursuance of the principle laid down in section 14 of the Ordinance does not make such order of rejec-- petition to be an order under section 14. An application made for determination of fair rent, or restoration of amenities enjoyed by a tenant, or for permis--sion to the tenant to carry out repairs to the rented building out of the rent payable to the landlord, or for eviction of a tenant on any of the grounds enumerated in section 13, if found to be barred by the principle laid down in section 14, would still remain an application under the section, referred to above, as the case may be, and would therefore be appealable under section 15(1) of the Ordinance. In this connection I may refer to Muhammad Hassan v. Mohammad Bashir (PLD 1974 Lah. 446). In that case a challenge was made by the respondent to the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant, and the Rent Controller found that such relationship did not exist. On appeal the finding was reversed, and in second appeal the contention raised was that after the Rent Controller held that the relationship of landlord and tenant did not exist between the parties, jurisdiction under section 13 of the Ordinance could not be assumed and that being so the determination of this issue was not a decision under section 13 and, therefore, appeal against the same under section 15 was not competent before the District Judge. This contention was repelled and the following observations made by Sardar Muhammad Iqbal, C. J. As he then was, can be quoted with advantage ;- "The decision that the relationship of landlord and tenant did not exist between the parties was given when the Rent Controller has seisin of the matter under section 13. The employment of the words and letters "under section 13" in section 15 was not in the restricted sense to cover only an order passed by a Rent Controller in a case where the relationship of landlord and tenant is admitted or proved. They are to be read in the context in which the same were used and have to be understood in full comprehension to mean any order passed in respect of an action which is initiated or purported to have been taken under section 13, or an order passed in the course of proceedings under section 13, or an order which is passed in the proceedings of which the Rent Controller could not take cognizance 'hot for the provisions in section 13. Any other interpretation would lead to uncertainty and may frustrate the very intention of the Legislature that the disputes between the landlords and tenants should be decided expeditiously and the procedure adopted in resolving them should be simplified.".
11. In another crave of Karachi High Court, reported as Mohammad Umar v. Dr. Amlna Ashraf (PLD 1977 Ker. 305) the question before a single Judge of Sind High Court was if an order of rejection of an application for substitution by anew landlord is appealable. It was held that such order was not an interlocutory order not did the order determine a matter merely incidental or collateral to the dispute between the parties. The consequence of the order is that the landlord's application under section 13 stands rejected. It was accordingly held that such order was appealable. An order rejecting an application for eviction under section 13, for reasons of res judicata is so rejected, for the purposes of appeal, by an order under section 13, of the Ordinance, because as observed in Muhammad Umar's case it is a rejection of an application under that section. Such rejection is, there--fore, always appealable under section 15(1) of the Ordinance. This appeal is therefore competent.
12. This leads me to the question if provisions of section 14 of the Ordinance are attracted in the present case. I am constrained to observe that neither the learned Rent Controller nor the First Appellate Authority have tried to bring out the facts of the earlier proceedings. In the first application filed by respondent Muzaffar A.I Khan one of the grounds, no doubt, was re- construction after demolition of his portion of the shop. Learned Rent Controller as well as the learned District Judge in their orders dated 30th April, 1973 and 11th October, 1973 respectively, came to the conclusion that it was not possible to demolish only one of the two portions of the shop, which admittedly was constructed as a single structure. The learned District Judge also came to the conclusion that owner of the other shop, i.e. Present respondent Shah Din, had not agreed to the demolition of his portion. The following observations made in the judgment of the learned District Judge, dated 11th October, 1973 would be relevant ;---- "The respondent examined RW/1 a retired Executive Engineer who has stated that as there is a common roof of two shops, therefore the reconstruction could not be made unless both the shops are demolished. RW. 2 the owner of the adjacent shop has stated that the shop in question and that of the witness have a common roof. He has not given any permission to appellant for reconstruction because if the shop of the appellant is demolished, his shop would also be demolished."