SAIDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.---We propose to dispose of the abovementioned petitions for leave to appeal by a common order as the points of law and-facts involved in these petitions are identical.
2. The respondents in the above petitions are the legal heirs of the victims who died as a result of a crash of an aircraft on 6-7-1988. The respondents instituted civil suit before the High Court for recovery of compensation under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. The suits were contested by the Federal Government and various preliminary objections were raised regarding maintainability of the suits. The suits filed by the respondents were decreed as follows:-- Suit No, Compensation/ damages awarded Suit No,729 of 1988 Rs,2,36,200 Suit No,730 of 1988 Rs,6,11,000 Suit No,731 of 1988 Rs,10,95,000 Suit No,732 of 1988 Rs,6,10,600 Suit No,733 of 1988 Rs,9,78,840 Suit No,734 of 1988 Rs,9,55,000 The amount of compensation was awarded by the learned Judge in Chamber taking into account the normal expectancy of the life and future prospects of earnings of the deceased in each case.
The judgments and decrees passed by the learned Single Judge in the suits were challenged in High Court Appeals Nos.129 to 134 of 1996 before a learned Division Bench of the High Court of Sindh.
The learned Division Bench after examining the contentions raised by the petitioner in the light of the case law upheld the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Single Judge in each of the above suits. Government of Pakistan is now seeking leave to appeal against the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Division Bench of the High Court in H.C.As. Nos.129 to 134 of 1996, in the abovementioned petitions.
3. We have heard Mr. Mubarak Hussain Siddiqui, learned Deputy Attorney-General for the petitioner and the caveators/respondents who are appearing in person. The learned counsel for the petitioner has repeated the contentions which were raised before the learned Division Bench of the High Court of Sindh and which were repelled after due consideration. We are, therefore, not inclined to interfere with the judgment of the learned Division Bench of the High Court in so far as it relates to the merits of the case. The learned Deputy Attorney-General has, however, contended that the learned Judge in Chamber as well as the learned Division Bench have awarded interest at the rate of 14% per annum from the date of the filing of the suit till the amounts are paid which was contrary to the decision of this Court in the case of Pakistan Railway v. Abdul Haqique (1991 SCM R 657).
4. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner to this extent is not without force. In the abovecited case this Court while maintaining the amount of compensation awarded in an accident case held that as the liability of the Pakistan Railway was vicarious in nature, the interest on the amount of compensation/damages awarded by the Court should have been calculated from the date of decree and not from the date of filing of the suit. The precise observation of this Court is as follows:- "The only other contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant was that the High Court should have awarded interest to the parents of Naseeb Khan from the date of the decree and not from the date of institution of the suit. There is a merit in this contention. As the liability of the appellant is of vicarious nature it is only fair that the interest should have been allowed from the date when the amount of compensations was for the first time quantified and not from the date when the suit was brought. With this modification the appeal is dismissed with costs."
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on the case of Karachi Transport Corporation v. Latif-ur-Rehman (1993 SCM R 1149) to contend that the quantum of damages were not properly assessed by the learned Single Judge and the same error was repeated by the learned Division Bench when it confirmed the judgment of the learned Judge in Chamber. The case cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in our view, is of no help to the petitioner, rather it goes against him. The following observations appearing in Karachi Transport Corporation's case (supra) lays down the scope of interference by the Appellate Court with the assessment of damages in a fatal accident case:- "The legal position, which emerges from the above treatises on the law of damages and the case- law referred to hereinabove is that an Appellate Court cannot interfere with a decision of a trial Court on the question of quantum of damages arbitrarily and without good reasons. Generally interference is made by an Appellate Court with the quantum of damages if a trial Court has acted on a wrong principle of law or if it has taken into consideration certain elements, which it should not have considered or if it has not considered certain elements, which it should have considered or if it has failed to deduct certain items deductible, resulting into hopelessly incorrect estimation of the amount of damages i.e,, it is either grossly excessive or insufficient. In such eventuality, an Appellate Court is entitled to and in fact is bound to interfere with the finding of the Court or Courts below on the quantum, of damages and to make its own assessment. However, the above rule is subject to . Qualification that an Appellate Court will not interfere with quantum of damages if it is of the view that the same is reasonable and proper though founded on wrong basis.
We may also observe that a Government Department/functionary is not expected to raise frivolous pleas in an action brought by a citizen for recovery of his lawful claim, with the object to deny it or to prolong litigation in respect thereof. Such a practice is to be deprecated in the strongest terms.
The officials responsible for the same should be made accountable for their above uncalled for and unjustified approach, particularly in the cases arising out of fatal accidents, the approach of the Government Departments/functionaries should be human and pragmatic, all efforts should be directed to ensure that an aggrieved person gets his reasonable, admissible claim promptly, without loss of any time."
6. In view of the above-stated legal position, we convert these petitions into appeals and partly allow them by modifying the judgment of the learned High Court to the extent that the amount of interest awarded in the case shall be calculated from the date of decree till the amounts are paid.
7. Before parting with the case we may observe that these cases are going on in the Courts since 1988 and no compensation has so far been paid to the legal heirs of the victims most of whom are minors we, therefore, expect that the Government will not wait for the respondents/plaintiffs to go for execution of the decrees against it and would promptly pay the amounts under the decree in Court for payment to the legal heirs of the deceased. We are also of the view that as soon as the amounts of compensation are deposited by the Government with the High Court for payment to the legal heirs of the deceased the share of the major legal heirs be paid immediately to them while the share belonging to the minors in each case will be invested in Special Savings Certificates in the names of the minors by the Nazir of the High Court to be paid to them on attaining majority while the interest accruing on such investment may be allowed to be withdrawn from time to time by the natural/appointed guardians towards the maintenance of the minors.
8. The appeals stand disposed of in the terms stated above. There will, however, be no order as to costs.