' MUHAMMAD YUNUS SURAKHVI, J.---This appeal, by way of leave of the Court, is directed against the order passed by the High Court on 3-6-2000, whereby the appeal filed by the appellants herein was dismissed.
2. The necessary facts, giving rise to the present appeal, are that Additional District Judge, Muzaffarabad passed two orders on February 9th and 29th of 2000 in execution proceedings between the parties pending before him. An appeal was filed in the High Court to challenge the aforesaid orders'. When the case came up for hearing before a learned Judge in the High Court an objection was raised by the learned counsel for respondents about the maintainability of the appeal. It was stated that in the Government order by which approval was accorded to challenge the orders of learned Additional District Judge sanction was granted to file writ petition in the High Court against the aforesaid orders but instead of filing a writ petition an appeal had been filed in the High Court. It was therefore, contended that the appeal having been filed without proper authority was liable to be dismissed. The objection found favour with the learned Judge in the High Court who dismissed the appeal without going into merits of the case. The Government as well as the Chief Conservator of Forests has filed the present appeal.
3. In support of appeal it was vehementary contended by Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan, the learned counsel for the appellants, that the High Court has adopted a narrow approach which is not consistent with the safe administration of justice. The learned counsel contended that from the sanction accorded by the Government it was clearly intended to challenge the orders passed by the learned Additional District Judge before the High Court and that merely misdescription of remedy was not fatal. The learned counsel in support of his contentions relied upon rules 17 and 29 of Law Department Manual, 1984 and contended that for getting the approval of sanction by the Government, the Government has to be moved under rule 17 of the Manual and the Government accords its sanction as provided under rule 29 of the said Manual wherein the word "writ" has not been used but simply "suit" has been used and "suit" has further been defined under rule 23 which includes an appeal and an application for revision or review of execution of decree and any civil Judicial proceedings. Thus, according to the learned counsel for the appellants, the High Court committed an illegality by strictly construing the word "writ" as misdescribed in the Government sanction.
4. Controverting the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the appellants, Sh. Abdul Aziz, the learned counsel for respondents, contended that in accordance with rule 29 of the Law Department Manual, 1984, no suit on behalf of State or public officer as such shall be instituted without the sanction of the Government. Thus the appeal was tiled by the appellants without any sanction by the Government, as such the same was liable to be dismissed. The learned counsel contended that the appeal before the High Court was even otherwise not competent.
5. After hearing the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, it may be stated that the High Court dismissed the appeal of the appellants on the technical ground that the sanction of Government was accorded to tile the writ, petition against the order of Additional District Judge, Muzaffarabad but they have filed the appeal which entailed dismissal on this sole ground. In the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Law Department Manual, 1984 (hereinafter to be referred as Law Manual), nowhere the word "writ petition" has been used. It has rightly been pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants that under rule 17 of the Law Manual a proposal is to be submitted to the Government for the institution of an appeal or revision and rule 23 of the said Law Manual reads as follows:--- "23. Definitions.---In these rules the expression,---
(i) "Suit" means a suit by or against or affecting the State or a public officer . In his official capacity, or one which is brought or defended by a public officer at the public expense, and includes an appeal and applications for revision or review of execution of decree and any civil judicial proceedings in which the State or a public officer in his official capacity is a party or has any interest."
' The above definition of the word "suit" even includes an application for execution of decree.
Therefore, the High Court by strictly construing the words "writ petition" which were misdescribed in the Government sanction dismissed the appeal filed by the appellants; such a narrow construction should not have been made by the High Court. At the most it was an irregularity which was curable.
6. The contention raised by Sh. Abdul Aziz, the learned counsel for respondents, that even the appeal did not lie against the orders of Additional District Judge needs no consideration at this stage as the same has not been resolved by the High Court. This plea if at all the learned counsel for respondents wants to raise, he can raise the same before the High Court.
7. For the afore stated reasons, by accepting the appeal we set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court and remand the case to the High Court with a direction that it shall decide the appeal afresh according to law.