1. This civil revision is directed against the order dated 30-9-1999 passed by learned 1st Additional District Judge, Sukkur, whereby he maintained the order passed by 1st Senior Civil Judge, Sukkur, refusing to grant injunction to petitioner in 1st Class Suit No.96 of 1996 filed by the petitioner.
2. The petitioner filed a suit for specific performance, cancellation of entry mutation and permanent injunction, against the respondents in respect of land bearing S. Nos.42/1.6 acres and 403/1/1 acres in Deh Farsh Tapo Arain Taluka Sukkur.
3. The petitioner claimed that he purchased the abovementioned property from respondents Nos. 1 to 11 for the consideration of Rs.15,000 through an agreement dated 3-5-1994. Land was purchased through respondent No. 11, the attorney for respondents 1 to 10. The land is stated to be in possession of the applicant for the last 20 years as he was cultivating it as Hari.
4. The respondents tiled written statements wherein they stated that they were the owners of the land. The plaintiff/petitioner was previously Hari of the land but he was no more the Hari of the disputed land. The possession was given to them by the Tenancy Tribunal on 7-11-1997. The said order was never challenged by the petitioner.
5. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that he is owner of the land by virtue of sale agreement dated 16-5-1994 and he is in physical cultivating possession of the land. The petitioner had made out a strong prima facie case for the grant of injunction which has been wrongly refused by the two Courts below. It is submitted that the petitioner would suffer irreparable loss, if the injunction as prayed is not granted. He further stated that balance of convenience lies in favour of petitioner as he is in possession of the land. Reliance is placed upon the case of Mian Muhammad Latif v. Province of West Pakistan through the Deputy Commissioner Khairpur and another (PLD 1970 SC 180).
6. Mr. A.M. Mobeen Khan, the learned counsel for the respondents has argued that the petitioner had faced the tenancy application before the Tenancy Tribunal wherein the written statement was filed by him but he did not raise any plea that he was owner of the disputed-land. He did not disclose before the Tribunal that any sale agreement was executed by the attorney in his favour and it was available with him. It is further contended that the petitioner had moved an application before the Deputy Commissioner Sukkur against the respondents on 31-7-1995 wherein the petitioner had urged that he was Hari of land since long and that the respondents were ejecting him from the disputed land without due course of, law. The petitioner further stated in his application that the land in question was allotted to Mst. Janat Begum in claim and that she was intending to sale the survey numbers to one Mir Muhammad son of Chand. He has spent a huge amount for the development of the land and he is prepared to purchase the said survey numbers from the claimant Mst. Janat Begum had the first right over the disputed land. This application was decided against .The applicant Ghous Bux on 19-10-1995, Subsequently the abovementioned tenancy application was contested by the parties before the Tenancy Tribunal but it appears that the petitioner did not raise any plea which could show that there was any sale agreement in, his favour by the attorney of respondents.
7. On my, query, the learned counsel for the applicant has not controverted the aforesaid. Facts. The point of sale agreement was not agitated by the petitioner either before the Tenancy Tribunal or Deputy Commissioner Sukkur, though it was available to him at that time. To me, it is crystal clear that the plea of sale agreement is afterthought as Tenancy Tribunal had given its decision on 7-11- 1996 whereas the suit was tiled by the petitioner on the same day and the alleged agreement is said to have been executed on 16-5-1994.
8. Further, there can be no two opinions, on the legal proposition that Court can reject the plaint suo moto at any stage of the proceedings, even by 8 Appellate Court or revisional Court.
9. On meaningful and/or formal reading, if it is found the suit is meritless and ultimately not possible to grant relief sought or not fruitful result thereof is expected to come out then the provisions of Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C. Would come into play. The reference can be made to the cases of Mian Muhammad Akram and others v. Muhammad Shafi (1989 CLC 15) and Diamond Rubber Mills v.
10. Pakistan Television Corporation Ltd. And 2 others (1989 CLC 1989). In the latter case his lordship has held as under: "That such subsequent events are to be taken note of is well--established. The principle is that while a suit-is to be dealt with at all its stages, on the cause of action as it exists at the date of its commencement yet a Court, both at primary and appellate stages, may take notice of intervening events and afford relief on the basis of altered conditions. Thus, if on a meaningful--nor formal-- reading of the plaint it is found to be meritless, as not disclosing a cause of action or a clear cut relief, duly based, the power under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C., would be clearly attracted."
11. The Court can even reject the plaint under its inherent power, if the matter does not come within the scope of Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C. The p provision is not exhaustive and the Court can reject the plaint where it finds that the suit is impliedly barred by law. As the law is dynamic and it always keeps on devoloping. The reference can be made to a case of Burmah Eastern Ltd. v. Burmah Eastern Employees Union and others reported in PLD 1967 Dacca P.190). It is the land-mark decision on the point, which is subsequently affirmed by the chain of authorities.
12. Their Lordships have observed as under: "The first question that strikes one is that although under Order VII, Rule 11, of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is the duty of the Court to reject the plaint if, on a perusal thereof, it appears that the suit is incompetent, the parties to the suit are at liberty to draw Court's attention to the same by way of an application. The Court can, and, in most cases, does hear lawyers on the points involved in the application. In fact, this is what has happened in the present case.
13. The principles involved are two-fold: In the first place, it contemplates that a still-born suit should be properly buried, at its inception, so that no further time is consumed on a fruitless litigation.
14. Secondly, it gives plaintiff a chance to retrace his steps, at the earliest possible moment, so that, if permissible under law, he may find a properly constituted case.
15. Order VII, Rule 11, of the Code,' as quoted above, enumerates certain categories under which the Court is called upon to reject a plaint, but, it is obvious that they are not exhaustive. It appears from the language of Rule 11 of Order VII that it requires that an incompetent suit should be laid at rest at the earliest moment so that no further time is wasted over what is bound to collapse as not being permitted by law.
16. A suit may be specifically barred by law and, in such an event, the matter would come under the express terms of clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII of the Code. But, even in a case where a suit is not permitted by necessary implication of law in the sense that positive prohibition can be spelt out of legal provisions, the Court has an inherent jurisdiction to reject the plaint. This realy amounts to saying that Order VII, Rule 11, is not exhaustive."
17. The plaint can be rejected, if the suit is hit by law of estoppel. In the present suit, although it is not expressly stated that during earlier round of E litigation before legal forum i.e. Tenancy Tribunal or Deputy Commissioner, he claimed to be the purchaser of property and he ever occupied the land as owner on the basis of alleged agreement. The learned Advocate admits this fact before me during arguments. The admitted facts, though not expressly stated in the plaint can be considered while determining the question of rejection of plaint. When the plaintiff did not claim to be the owner of F. Property on the basis of agreement in earlier round of litigation, then the principle of estoppel operates against him in subsequent litigation.
18. The petitioner has dragged the other party up to this Court in the order on interlocutory application after holding full round of litigation before the Tenancy Tribunal and Deputy Commissioner. He should not be permitted to drag them again for indefinite period in a suit which is apparently hit by principle of estoppel.
19. Consequently the revision fails and the plaint tiled by petitioner is hereby rejected under Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C. Alongwith listed application with no order as to costs.