' This appeal under section 22-D of I.R.O. Is directed against the order of the learned Single Member, dated 27-9-1999 whereby he referred the respondent's petition pending before him to Labour Court NO.3 "for disposal in accordance with law".
2. Facts relevant for the disposal of this appeal, briefly stated, are that the respondent brought a petition under section 22-A(8)(g) of I.R.O. Before the Lahore Bench of this Commission to challenge the order of his termination, dated 6-1-1999 alleging that his services had been terminated by a verbal order, dated 6-1-1999 which was violative of law. The petition was contested by the present appellant on the ground, inter alia, that no case of unfair labour practice was made out by the respondent and as such his petition was liable to be dismissed. The learned Single Member after going through the pleadings of the parties and material placed on the record and after hearing the learned Counsel for the parties took the view that "irregularities and illegalities have been committed in terminating the petitioner and from service. It is a fit case for Labour Court to try and adjudicate (sic) upon the same". The learned Member, therefore, purporting to act under section 22-A(10)(c) of I.R.O. Referred the case to Labour Court No,3 for disposal vide order, dated 27-9-1999 impugned in this appeal.
3. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the impugned order as also the petition filed by the respondent before the learned Single Member. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that only a case of unfair Labour practice could be referred to the Labour Court for disposal under the aforementioned pmvision invoked by the learned Member.
Learned counsel has argued that the allegations made in the petition filed by the respondent do not disclose the commission of any unfair labour practice nor has the learned Member found in the impugned order that it was a case of unfair labour practice and as such the case could not be referred to the Labour Court under subsection 10(c) of section 22-A of I.R.O. In the submission of the learned counsel, on the allegations made by the respondent in his petition and in view of the findings recorded by the learned Single Member in his impugned order, the case at best could have been returned to the respondent for filing it before the Labour Court.
4. We find considerable force in the contention of the learned counsel that only a case of unfair labour practice can be referred by this Commission to the Labour Court. Reference in this behalf may pertinently be made to the provision contained in subsection (10) of section 22-A which is reproduced hereunder:-- "(10)For the purpose of dealing with a case of unfair labour practice of which the Commission is seized, the Commission may-
(a) proceed directly with the Case, or
(b) ask the Registrar within whose jurisdiction the case has occurred or is likely to occur to enquire into it and submit a report, or
(c) refer the case to a (* * *) Labour Court within whose jurisdiction the case has occurred or is likely to occur either for report or for disposal."
5. It is manifest from the very opening words of subsection (10) that it is only a case of unfair Labour Practice of which the Commission is seized which it can refer to the Labour Court within whose jurisdiction such a case has occurred or is likely to occur as provided in clause (c). In our view, before exercising the power under clause (c) of subsection (10), the learned. Member ought to have satisfied himself, at least prima facie, that the case which he was referring to the Labour Court was one of unfair labour practice. This is particularly so, in view of the objection raised by the appellant that the case did not involve any unfair labour practice. The learned Member does not appear to have adverted to much less applied his mind to this aspect of the matter. On the contrary, it appears that the learned Member having found that irregularities and illegalities were committed by the appellant in terminating the services of the respondent took the view that it was a fit case for the Labour Court to try and adjudicate upon. Learned counsel for the appellant is, therefore, right in contending that in view of the said findings in the impugned order, the learned Member ought to have returned the petition to the respondent for instituting it before the Labour Court.
6. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we consider it appropriate to remand this case to the learned Single Member for passing a fresh order after considering as to whether or not the case before him is one of unfair labour practice. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the impugned order and remand the case to the learned Member for passing fresh orders in the light of the observations aforementioned. Needless to observe that as a necessary consequence of this order, the case pending before the Labour Court will be deemed to be still pending before the learned Member.