ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN, J.- This appeal as of right under section 10(2) of the Contempt of Court Act.
1976, impugns the legality of the order of a learned Division Bench of the High Court delivered on 28.6.2000, whereby, the first appeal preferred by the appellant against the order of a learned single Judge dated 8.12.1993. Was dismissed and consequently, the conviction of the appellant under section of the Contempt of Court Act, 1976 read with Article 204 of the Constitution and the sentence of six months simple imprisonment and fine of Rs. 5000/-, thereunder, were maintained.
2. Factual aspect of the matter which resulted into filing of this appeal is that the appellant was serving as Civil Judge 1st Class in Punjab and at the relevant time was posted as OSD-11 (Welfare)
Lahore High Court. Mr. Muhammad Amir Malik a learned Judge of the High Court while acting as authorised officer under the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975 on 25.11.1991, issued the following charge-sheet to the appellant:- A. "You have been guilty of misconduct, because,
(i) You misbehaved with the members of the Bar while posted as Civil Judge, Rawalpindi and as a result of the complaints you had to be transferred.
(ii) Your behaviour with the members of the Bar while posted as Civil Judge Nankana Sahib was also not proper. You even indulged in victimization of the members of the Bar when they made complaints against you and you had to be transferred therefrom by the High Court on complaints.
(iii) Your conduct towards the members of the Bar while posted at Pasrur was also not proper, so- much-so that they had to threaten boycott of your Court and ultimately you had to be transferred on complaints and report of the District and Sessions Judge.
(iv) You were not having cordial and normal relations with your colleague Civil Judge at Nankana Sahib.
(v) You were habitual late-comer to your Court while posted as Civil Judge, Nankana Sahib, Bhakkar and Pasrur and were also not punctual at Nankana Sahib and Pasrur.
(vi) You used to leave your station of posting (Nankana Sahib) without permission for Lahore^and used to reach the Court late.
(vii) You even failed to attend your Court (at Pasrur), particularly on Saturdays as you used to reach Pasrur very late in the afternoon (on Saturdays).
AND B. You are inefficient and habitual shirker of judicial duties, inasmuch as;
(i) At Nankana Sahib you were doing very little Court work, earned units by disposing of matters coming before you on technicalities and avoided writing judgments. You are indulged in adjournment of cases on imaginary and flimsy grounds.
(ii) At Bhakkar you did not seriously attend to judicial work.
(iii) At Bhakkar you even submitted fictitious statements of contested cases to the High Court.
(iv) The application of Muhammad Ramzan, Advocate Bhakkar for the return of the pre-emption money in case re: Raj Mir Khan, etc. Vs. Muhammad Nawaz, etc. a suit for preemption was kept pending unnecessarily for more than six months.
(v) . At Pasrur you were not doing Court work regularly even while sitting in Court, used to while away the time and due to your leaving the station and coming late from Lahore, the judicial work suffered.
2. By reason of the above you appear to the inefficient/ceased to be efficient and guilty of misconduct within the purview of Rule 3 (a and b) of the Punjab -Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975 calling for imposition of a major penalty including dismissal from service."
3. The appellant was required to put in written defence within 14 days before Mr. Sabah Mohyuddin, Additional Sessions Judge. Lahore, who was appointed an inquiry officer. The appellant filed an application Criminal Original No. 56 of 1992, in the High Court under section of the Contempt of Court Act, 1976 read with Article 204 of the Constitution for initiating of contempt of Court proceedings against those arrayed as respondents Nos. 1 to 5 in the application who included the then Chief Justice as respondent No. 1, Mr. Justice Muhammad Amir Malik, Judge Lahore High Court who was acting as authorised officer in the inquiry, the then Registrar and Deputy Registrar of the High Court and the inquiry officer appointed in the above inquiry against the appellant as respondents Nos. 2 to 5 respectively. A learned Judge in the High Court by order dated 19.9.1992, dismissed the said contempt application and observed:-- "The averments made in the application prima facie constitute grave contempt of this Court therefore I proceed to issue notice to the petitioner to show cause why he should not be proceeded against for having committed contempt of this Court as defined in section 3, Act No. LXIV of 1976 and Article 204 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. He shall file reply by 23.9.1992."
It appears from the order of the learned single Judge of the High Court announced on 8.12.1993 that the appellant adopted delaying tactics in filing the reply. However, it is interesting to note that during the contempt proceedings before the learned Judge of the High Court the recording of the statement of the appellant consumed 10 days and then the cross-examination took four days.
Thus in all it took 14 days to record his statement. This statement is spread over 59 pages of paper book as it starts from page 134 and ends at 193. In the beginning of this statement the appellant made mention of his academic career and achievement in literature to show that he was widely respected on this count. He then stated that having secured first position in competitive examination of Civil Judges he was appointed as Civil Judge in 1978 and in that capacity he referred to his satisfactory and laudable performance. He stated that his mis-fortune started "when Mr. Abdul Hafiz Cheema was appointed Registrar of the Lahore High Court". The reason he gave in this respect is "simply on the ground that I am follower of 'Fiqah-e-Jaffaria' [(URDU TEXT)] and he flatly told Mr. Yaqoob Butt that he was not prepared to appoint a 'Sheya' [(URDU TEXT)] in his office"..
A major portion of his statement is devoted to various events/adverse actions which were initiated by the Registrar on the basis of sectarian malice and bias. The main grievance of the appellant reflected in the said statement was that the Registrar unnecessarily harassed him and initiated inquiry against him on the charges which had earlier been probed in by the previous Honourable Chief Justices and which had been found as un-substantiated and frivolous. However, it was complained that the said Registrar opened the earlier decided charges for fresh inquiry merely because he belonged to a different sect of Muslim than the Registrar. He* also referred to various judicial officers who in order to achieve un-due favour from the Registrar and to please him were instrumental in harassing him at the behest of the Registrar. The reasons resulted in the annoyance of Mr. Justice Khalil-ur-Rehman Khan at the time when he was Member Election Commission and the appellant acted as Returning Officer in Election 1990 were also highlighted. He also explained the reason which led to the annoyance of Mr. Justice Sardar Muhammad Dogar. He also explained the various events/misconduct which compelled him to file References before the Supreme Judicial. Council against the then Chief Justice Mian Mehboob Ahmed. He also stated about his refusal to fulfil certain illegal demands which made some Judges angry with him. After explaining the background which according to him annoyed the Registrar, the to learned Judges and the Hon.
Chief Justice named above, he explained the collusive and motivated nature of the charges against him in this manner:-- "On 25.11.1991, I was-served with a charge-sheet issued by Mr. Abdul Hafiz Cheema, the then Registrar. Prior to that I had not been asked for any explanation. The charge-sheet was based on working papers which had practically been filed, and it consisted mostly of the material which the present Chief Justice as well as the previous Chief Justices had finally disposed of. Mr. Cheema, the then Registrar in connivance with Deputy Registrar Mr. Manzoor Hussain had engineered the charge-sheet while keeping the Hon'ble Judges in dark about the fact that the matters had already been decided and disposed of, and thereby he committed contempt."
In the end he enumerated the reasons which prompted him to move the contempt application i.e. Criminal original No. 56 of 1992 which are to this effect:- "When my applications, moved before the Hon'ble Chief Justice with regard to the inquiry on the allegations which had already been decided and disposed of, wherein I had also highlighted that my similar applications were not entertained by the inquiry officer and the authorised officer, failed, thereafter I had no choice but to file the .Contempt application, bearing No. 56/1992."
It was also explained in the statement that he had tiled Cr. Original No. 56/1992 in good faith and with bona fide intention for the redress of his grievance in accordance with law.
4. It would be proper at this stage to refer to the contents of Cr. Original No. 56/1992 which is the basis of the present proceedings as the stand of both the sides is conflicting in this respect, because according to appellant the allegations made therein do not constitute contempt while the plea of the respondents is that the contents of most of the Paras contain allegations which scandalized the learned Chief Justice and the to other learned Judges mentioned therein in relation to their office. In the first Para of this application after giving the year in which the appellant qualified the PCS Examination for judicial service he mentions about the earning of good report till 1991 but this report of 1991 was allegedly not counter-signed by Mr. Justice Malik Muhammad Qayyum as he was directed by the learned Chief Justice that it should be kept pending because the to senior Judges of the High Court: namely, Mr. Justice Sardar Muhammad Dogar and Mr. Justice Khalil-ur-Rehman Khan were annoyed with the appellant. This averment clearly imputes motive to the learned Chief Justice and lowers the dignity of the Court and tantamounts to impair public confidence in the impartiality of the learned Judges. These allegations would definitely have the effect in public mind that the learned Chief Justice was motivated by extraneous consideration and would also defame the other to learned Judges that they had gone to the extent to deny to the appellant that which was legally his due and that all the three learned Judges least bothered about the merits. The question that arises is as to how would public at large repose confidence in the administration of justice through Judges who in order to vindicate their on vendetta can go to the extent of depriving a person of his lawful right. In Para 6 of the application it is alleged that the to learned Judges of the High Court named therein were annoyed with him as he had approached the President of Pakistan through the Chief Justice of Pakistan and made references against them on account of their."
The reason given for the resentment of the to I earned "Judges was: - [(URDU TEXT)] The stand of the appellant is that the annoyance of the learned to Judges further strengthened the inimical attitude of the Registrar towards him. It is to he noted that it has not been clarified as to how the learned Judges wanted him to divert from the straight path which he had adopted. It is clear that the - charges tends to shake public confidence in the administration of justice as they would think that the Judges for their on ends forced others to detract from the right path. It is stated in Para 9 that the situation against the. Appellant became painful when with the annoyance of the Registrar and the to learned Judges, learned Chief Justice also became hostile against the appellant. As the latter wanted to purchase machines etc. From to specified named companies by-passing the rules and regulations with which the appellant did not agree. It was alleged that the learned Chief Justice was further annoyed when in connection with purchase of machinery etc. The appellant avoided to meet a certain named Advocate who was related to the Chief Justice. It was in this context averred that the appellant had sent Reference to the President of Pakistan against the Chief Justice for his [(URDU TEXT)] misconduct. It was clarified in Para 10 that the grievance/resentment of the said four named persons resulted in issuance of-the charge-sheet inspite of the fact that all the allegations and charges were those which had been already decided and from which the appellant had been exonerated. It was revealed in Para 14 of the application that when the various mis-deed of the Chief Justice became talk of the day then as responsible citizen of the country and a faithful servant of the State he filed References for his accountability before the competent authority. This situation was highlighted in this manner:- [(URDU TEXT)]
6. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that there existed legal justification for filing the contempt application because this was the only course through which the appellant could redress his grievance in respect of the charges which had already been decided by competent authority and which had become past and closed transaction. It was clarified in this respect that the appellant wanted to bring on record the complaints/objections to prove that no inquiry could be conducted in the matter which stood finally determined by competent authority as inspite of his efforts these complaint/objections were not taken into consideration. In this context the learned counsel referred to pages 104, 140, 160, 162, 168 and 192 of the paper book to support his arguments. The voicing and expressing of grievance in the manner as done in the application is not understandable. If at all the appellant felt that the charges to be probed into in the inquiry against him were those which had already been inquired into and he had been exonerated therefrom then he could file an application in writing before the inquiry officer explaining this position and he could have also filed certified copies of the Corder absolving him of the charges. However, it is interesting to note that there is nothing on record to indicate that he adopted this course. In this context learned single Judge in his order dated 19.9.1992. Has observed:-- "The main stay of the petitioner was that most of the allegations had been earlier decided in favour of the petitioner and the same could not be reopened. The petitioner neither in the application nor before the Court pointed out any of the allegations mentioned in the charge-sheet which had been decided earlier. Assuming, for the sake of argument,: even if that be so, the said decision, if any, was taken on administrative side which cannot debar the concerned authorities from taking ' judicial action against an officer allegedly responsible of misconduct. Even otherwise, a perusal of the charge-sheet (Annexure-30) indicates that in most of the matters some action was taken against the petitioner and who had worked as Civil Judge at those stations. Complaints had been received. On the basis of such complaints, according to the charge-sheet, the petitioner was transferred, therefore, the assertion of the petitioner that no action was -taken against him and the allegations, after hearing the petitioner, were filed is incorrect."
The observations of the learned Appellate Bench of the High Court about this argument are asunder:-- "It has boggled our mind throughout the hearing of the case to what was the need of voicing his grievance, through contempt application, being a judicial officer he knew it very well that his salvation lay in firmly contesting the charges and dis-proving them before the. Enquiry Officer, in case the finding went against him there was an appeal available to him. Even if he felt choked by the so-called sectarian prejudice and bias entertained by the then Registrar of the Court, who, according to the appellant, influenced the Enquiry Officer, the grievances could have been voiced through a Constitutional petition without their being any need to throw invectives at the Chief Justice and the Judges of this Court. We are satisfied that this mode was adopted to satiate ill- founded belief entertained mind which was no-more and no-less to bring in disrepute the institution of judiciary, of which he was a part and parcel."
It was next argued that the learned single Judge who tried the appellant for contempt when requested through an application to furnish him the detail of the contempt the appellant had committee failed to give satisfactory reply. The relevant portion of the order dated 26.11.1992, which was passed on the said application is reproduced:- "After hearing the learned counsel and going through the judgments cited at the bar, it is observed that the application bearing Crl. Org. No. 56 of 1992 as a whole constitutes contempt with special reference to paras 1. 6. 9. 10, 12, 13, 14 and 15. With these observations, the C.M. Is disposed of."
The contents of the said Paras have been highlighted and explained in certain earlier portion of the judgment and it has been held that these do constitute contempt of Court. The learned counsel in this context once again repeated that in absence of any details about the contempt in the show- cause notice there was no basis for initiating contempt proceedings. The basis of the contempt is the Criminal Original No. 56 of 1992, and the contents of this application constitute contempt and the same was stated in the show-cause notice and were subsequently found to be derogatory and scandalous. This argument is. Therefore, without any merit, it was further argued that the right of the accused to lead defence in these proceedings could not be taken away but the appellant was denied this right. It is to be clarified in this respect that the appellant had produced list of 75 witnesses whom he wanted to produce in defence before the learned Judge who tried him on original side. The learned Judge directed the appellant to give a gist of evidence of the defence witnesses which he intended to summon in defence. The request of summoning defence witnesses was declined as according to learned Judge it could not possibly advance the case of the respondent nor the evidence sought to be led was relevant in the present proceedings. It was observed in this regard:-- "Court did not feel it necessary to record any evidence because the sole question for determination was if the contents of Crl. Original No. 56/92 alongwith annexures constituted Contempt or not. The respondent not only contended that his petition did not constitute contempt but also took the plea of truth and wanted to prove certain things which were neither subject-matter of application tiled by him nor were relevant."
It is to be noted that the application for summoning the defence witnesses was dismissed through a detailed order passed on 18.4.1993. It was observed in the said order:- "A perusal of the list would show that the respondent wants this' Court to summon 75 witnesses in his defence, which includes six Judges of this Court, out of which three are former Chief Justice of this Court. Respondent also wants this Court to summon the Editor, the Reporter of the Daily Frontier Post. He wants the entire record of the Sub-Registrar, Lahore, regarding the sale-deeds made in favour of the family members of the Chief Justice of this Court. He wants a number of Civil Judges to be produced in his defence. Alter going through the list of defence witnesses produced by the respondent, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that it is filed with a view to delay the proceedings, as none of the witnesses is relevant to the question in issue."
The learned Division Bench in appeal also considered this aspect of the case and agreed with the finding of the learned single Judge that the application was vexatious and was meant to prolong the proceedings and was motivated to further scandalize and defame the learned Judges. The crucial and decisive question in these proceedings is as to whether the contents of Cr. Original No. 56 of 1992, amounts to contempt of Court or not. According to learned Judge who tried the appellant it did constitute contempt but according to the appellant the contents of the application even remotely did not amount to contempt of Court. The learned Trial Judge did not allow either party to examine any evidence and proceeded to determine the controversy on admitted facts.
We are of the view that there was no legal flaw in this approach of the learned Judge because the dispute between the parties could easily be decided one way or the other on consideration/assessm ent of the contents of the application. The list of witnesses included the name of four Hon. Chief Justices of the Lahore High Court, to learned Judges of the said Court, wife of one of the learned Chief Justice and his three sons and 13 Civil Judges besides some Editors of some of the news papers. We went through the list and description about the documents sought to-be produced through the witnesses and to say the least this was entirely irrelevant to the issue involved and absolutely baseless and intriguing. If these witnesses were required to be produced for proving some documents that could have been done by bringing the certified/attested copies on record but it is amusing that no certified or attested copy of any such document has been placed on record. There is no need to refer to the various judgments cited to in support of this argument as those judgments have been given in entirely different set of facts which even remotely have no resemblance with the facts of this case. Moreover, it is by now settled proposition of law that in dealing with contempt proceedings the Courts are not bound by the Civil Procedure Code or Criminal Procedure Code or other technicalities involved in Civil or Criminal proceedings. It has been so observed in the recent judgment of this Court reported as Muhammad Ibrahim and others w. Syed Ahmed and others vs. Syed Ahmed and others (PLD 2000 S.C. 71):- "Admittedly, the Code of Civil Procedure regulates civil proceedings but the contempt proceedings are neither civil nor criminal and it partakes both. The power exercised by the Court in contempt proceedings is in the nature of special jurisdiction. Section 7 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1976 lays down a procedure for Supreme Court and High Court. Where it is necessary in the interest of effective administration of justice to proceed against a contemner, he may be proceeded against by setting forth the substance of the charge against him and the ground on which he is charged with contempt of Court and calling upon him to show cause why he should not be punished, after holding such enquiry and taking such evidence as the Court deems necessary. A bare perusal of Section 7 of the Act indicates that section 12(2), C.P.C., is not applicable to proceedings initiated under the Act. Clause (3) of Article 204 of the Constitution provides that the exercise of the power conferred on a Court may be regulated by law and subject to law by rules made by the Court. The superior Courts are not bound by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure or by the technicalities of ordinary criminal proceedings or civil proceedings in dealing with a contempt matter. The basic requirement in such cases is the ascertainment of truth by providing the contemner a fair hearing to defend himself".
It has been noted in the earlier part of this judgment that the statement of the contemner was recorded in 14 days which spread over 59 pages and he could produce any document he wanted to rely on and thus it is obvious that he was afforded full opportunity to defend himself.
7. The next argument of the learned counsel was that the application was directed against the departmental authority and not the judicial. Authorityj of any Judge' of-the High Court nor it criticised any judicial work of any Judge, therefore, it was not covered by any of-the provisions of the Contempt of Court Act. He relied on PLD 1976 S.C. 376, PLD 1973 Lahore 778, AIR 1966 Andra Pradesh 167 and AIR 1954 S.C.
10. To understand this argument in its correct perspective the contents of Section 3 of the Contempt of Court Act are reproduced:- "3; Contempt of Court.- Whoever-disobeys or disregards any order, direction or process of a Court, which he is legally bound ,to obey; or commits a wilful breach of invalid undertaking given to a Court; orders anything which is intended to or tends to bring the authority of a Court or the administration of law into disrespect or. Disrepute, or to interfere with or obstruct or interrupt or prejudice the process of law or the due course of any judicial proceedings, or to lower the authority of a Court or scandalize a Judge in relation to his office, or to disturb the order or decorum of a Court, is said to commit "contempt of Court"
8. The following words occurring in the said Section are relevant for assessing this argument:-- "Orders anything which is intended to or tends to bring the authority of a Court er the administration pf law into disrespect or disrepute, -------- ------------------------------------ -------------------------------------------------------- or to lower-the authority of a Court or scandalize a Judge in relation to his office".
If the averments in the application Cr. Original No. 56 of 1992, are kept in juxta position with the above portion of Section then these are clearly covered under it. What was meant by tiling the application was that the learned' Chief Justice and the learned Judges initiated^ the judicial inquiry against the appellant with ulterior motive in order to avenge their. Insult/disgrace caused to them by filing Reference against the Chief Justice and not complying with the orders, directions of the Chief Justice and the other to Judges. The judicial inquiry was ordered by the Chief Justice in his capacity' as Chief Justice and not in his private, capacity and to allege that it was biased and motivated clearly lowered tile authority of the Court and amounted to scandalize the then Chief Justice and the Judges in relation to their office. The rule laid down in PLJ 1976 S.C. 376 has no relevancy as in that the word person occurring in Article 199 (5) of the Constitution was interpreted in different context. However, even then it was held " Word "person"; "High Court" is not a "person" to whom a writ may issue; Terms "High Courts" and "Supreme Court" used in Art. 199 (5) includes Judges of these Courts; High Court and individual Judges who constitute High Court ire inseparable from each other; Each Judge is a High Court". Any how in' the present case the Chief Justice and the Judges are not alleged to have acted in their person/private capacity but they are alleged, to have asserted their status as Chief Justice and Judges and initiated inquiry against the appellant. '"Yusuf Ali Khan, Bar-at-Law vs. The State" (PLD 1977 S.C. 482), rather goes against the stand of the learned counsel as it has been held:-- "Statement can amount to contempt only when such statement undermines or tends to undermine public confidence in Courts".
PLD 1973 Lahore 778 lays down that it is discretionary with the High Court to act or not to act on the information furnished to it to proceed against certain person for contempt. However, in the present case the High Court has in no way erred in initiating the contempt proceedings. "Brahma Prakash Sharma and others vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh" (A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 10) makes a distinction between defamatory attack on person of Judge in his personal capacity and the one which is calculated to interfere with due course of justice or administration of law. It has' been observed therein:-- "A defamatory attack on a Judge may be a libeler so far as the judge is concerned-, and it would be open to him to proceed against the libeller in a proper action if he so chooses. If, however, the publication of the disparaging statement is calculated to interfere with the due course of justice or proper administration of law by such Court, it can be punished summarily' as contempt. One is a wrong done to the Judge personally while the other is a wrong done to the public. It will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the Judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the Court's administration Of justice, or if it is likely to cause embarrassm ent in the mind of the Judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties".
We, have already held that attributing improper and dishonest motive to the Chief Justice and the to learned Judges in initiating inquiry against the appellant under the disciplinary rules would- definitely lower the confidence of public in the credibility of the judicial system Which those Judges were to administer. AIR 1966 Andra Pradesh 167 it also in no Way relevant. AIR 1976 S.C. 354 and AIR 1975 S.C. 383 do not deal with, contempt matter. It was in the end strenuously urged that the averment in the application and the plea of truth taken therein were in good faith and in temperate language for initiating contempt proceedings and were, therefore, protected from contempt proceedings under section 3 (vi), (vii) of the Contempt of Court Act. It was further submitted that the denial of the learned Judge to allow the appellant to produce evidence in his defence, the appellant was deprived of the protection available to him under the said clause of the Section. This argument is misconceived. The averment in the application and the alleged plea of truth had nett been made in the circumstances and before the authorities as envisaged under the said to Clauses. The-application was submitted in the High Court and Chief Justice was arrayed as respondent No, 1 therein and it was not submitted before the Chief Justice of the High Court or the Chief Justice of Pakistan for initiating action against the Chief Justice or other Judges in any reference against them. The contempt proceedings have not been started against the appellant for his allegation in the reference made by him before the competent authority but those have been started on the basis of the application (Cr. Original No. 56/92) which he had filed in the High Court.
9. We therefore, find no merit in this appeal and, accordingly, while dismissing it maintain the conviction of the appellant under section 3/4 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1976 read with Article 204 of the Constitution. However, we have noticed that the show-cause notice was issued to the appellant on 19.9.1992, and he was convicted by the learned single Judge on 28.11.1993 and during this period of more than seven years he has remained under suspension, strains and stress, therefore, the ends Of justice will be met if the sentence imposed on the appellant is reduced.
Consequently, we reduce the sentence of the appellant to one month's S.I. But maintain intact the amount Of fine of Rs. 5000/- and in default of its payment the sentence of one month's S.I. A copy of this judgment should be sent to the Registrar of Lahore High Court, Lahore, who would issue process to the appellant directing- him to surrender and undergo the imprisonment imposed on him.
9. We therefore, find no merit in this appeal and, accordingly, while dismissing it maintain the conviction of the appellant under section 3/4 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1976 read with Article 204 of the Constitution. However, we have noticed that the show-cause notice was issued to the appellant on 19.9.1992, and he was convicted by the learned single Judge on 28.11.1993 and during this period of more than seven years he has remained under suspension, strains and stress, therefore, the ends Of justice will be met if the sentence imposed on the appellant is reduced.
Consequently, we reduce the sentence of the appellant to one month's S.I. But maintain intact the amount Of fine of Rs. 5000/- and in default of its payment the sentence of one month's S.I. A copy of this judgment should be sent to the Registrar of Lahore High Court, Lahore, who would issue process to the appellant directing- him to surrender and undergo the imprisonment imposed on him.