' MIAN MUHAMMAD AJMAL, J.---This appeal, by leave of the Court, is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 20-3-1994, whereby R.S.A. No,179 of 1967 of respondent No,1 was allowed as under:-- ' "For the foregoing discussion, the appeal is allowed, the judgments and decrees of the Courts below are set aside with costs throughout and the appellant's suit is decreed with a declaration to the effect that he continued to be in service as a Lecturer in the District Council Intermediate College, Daska and that the impugned order dated 21-1-1962 or later part of the Resolution No, 142 dated 15-12-1962 did not in any manner affect his rights/interests and that he is entitled to all back benefits admissible to him under the service rules applicable to him. The arrears of pay etc. Shall be paid to the appellant within a period of three months, after the receipt of the order."
2. Brief facts of the case are that on 18-10-1963, the respondent instituted a suit before the Civil Court, Daska seeking declaration to the effect that he was a lecturer in the Islamia College, Daska, which was under the administrative control of Anjuman Tableegh-ul-Islam duly registered under Act XXI of 1960. Allegedly, vide Resolution No,21 dated 25-9-1961, the District Council took over the said College alongwith its staff, whereafter, the Principal of the College issued following notice to the respondent:-- ' "My dear Chaudhri Nazir Ahmad, ' The Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore has laid down as one of the recognition conditions that Third Class M.As. Should be replaced by Second Class M.As.
Immediately.
' The College Council discussed the appointment of your successor on 29-1-1962 but deferred the decision, till the approval of the Chairman, District Council, Sialkot.
' As the transfer of the College seems to involve considerable delay, please note that your services will be terminated on 20-2-1962. This gives you clear notice for one month."
' In pursuance of the above notice, his services were terminated after the expiry of the period of notice. The respondent challenged the said order on the ground that the Principal of the College, being not his appointing authority, could not terminate his services, as such the order was void, illegal and ineffective on his rights. Declaration was also sought that the notice dated 21-1-1962 was illegal, void and ineffective upon his rights and that he be declared to be still in service and entitled to his pay w.e.f, 21-2-1962.. As a consequential relief, it was prayed that the defendants be restrained from preventing him to serve in the College. The suit was resisted by the defendants. On the divergent pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed following issues:--
(1) Whether the order dated 21-1-1962 by which the plaintiff's service was terminated is illegal, inoperative and ineffective for the reasons given in the plaint? OPP
(2) Relief?
' Evidence of the parties was recorded and on assessment of documentary evidence, the suit of the plaintiff/respondent was dismissed by Civil Judge II-Class, Daska vide his detailed judgment dated 29-6-1966. Appeal filed by him also met the same fate. However, Regular Second Appeal filed by him was allowed by the High Court vide judgment impugned herein. On 8-11-1995, leave to appeal was granted by this Court as under:- ' "The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the District Council, the petitioner, did not have control over the College from 1-7-1967 onwards as it remained under the control of Municipal Committee till 30-6-1973 and thereafter under the control of the Government and, therefore, no order could have been passed against the petitioner directing reinstatement and also payment of arrears of pay. Leave is granted."
3. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case. The suit filed by the respondent was dismissed both by the trial Court and the First Appellate Court after properly assessing and appreciating the documentary evidence brought on record. The trial Court held that the respondent was a temporary employee of the Anjuman and his services could be terminated at one month's notice. It was further held that he had not been taken on the strength of the District Council till the time he was finally removed so he could not be tetmed as a public servant. After shifting the documentary evidence i.e, Exh.P.W.6/1, P.W.6/2, P.W.6/3, P.W.6/5, P.W.6/6, P.W.6/8, P.W.6/15 to 17, P.W.6/19 and Letter No,5488 dated 19-12-1962 the trial Court concluded that the respondent had never been taken on the strength of the District Council. It was also held that the Principal himself had appointed the respondent, therefore, he could remove him as well. In view of the aforesaid finding, suit of the respondent was dismissed. Feeling aggrieved, the respondent filed appeal before the District Judge, Sialkot, which was dismissed by holding as under:- ' "There is no evidence on the record that before 1-11-1962 or at the time when the appellant was removed from service, the staff of the College was being paid by the District Council. Rather resolution Exh.D/1 dated 15-12-1962 and letter Exh.D2/E, dated 19-12-1962 show that on 1-11-1962 the District Council took charge of the staff of the College and started paying the remunerations of the members of the staff. Exh.D.2 shows that the existing staff of the College was absorbed on 19-12- 1962 with effect from 1-11-1962 and it was ordered that the pay of the Staff be paid from the funds of the District Council from the month of November, 1962. In the list of the employees who were taken over by the District Council, the name of the appellant is not mentioned. Exh.D.2 and Exh.P.W.6/6 need further discussion. In Exh.P.W.6/6 the name of the appellant is also mentioned but in Exts.D.1 and D.2 the name of the appellant is not mentioned. By Exh.D.W.6/6 the staff mentioned in this document was approved to be taken in the establishment of the District Council but it cannot be said that by this resolution the staff was actually absorbed in the establishment of the District Council. That staff was actually absorbed by Resolution No,142 dated 15-12-1962. By this resolution of staff was actually absorbed and in the members of the staff which were mentioned in Exh.D.1 that by resolution No,125 the District Council had decided to take over the existing staff of the College and in the last the name of the appellant is mentioned but it has been made clear that the physical taking over of the staff did not materialise till December, 1962 and that in the meantime some Lecturers left service and some were replaced by the management. As the plaintiff- appellant had been removed from his services by the Management of the Anjuman, therefore, he was not absorbed in the Establishment of the District Council. The difference between Resolution No,125, dated 30-7-1962 and 142 dated 15-12-1962 is that by the former resolution the Staff of the College was approved to be taken in the Establishment of the District Council bin was not actually absorbed but by the latter resolution the staff which existed by that time was actually absorbed with effect from 1-11-1962. So it is amply clear that the actual absorption of the staff of the college did not take place before 15-12-1962 and therefore, before 1-11-1962 the plaintiff-appellant was the employee of the Anjuman and thus was rightly removed by the said Anjuman. I, therefore, come to the conclusion that the findings of the learned trial Judge is correct. Not finding any force in the appeal I dismiss it with costs."
' However, the learned Judge in Chambers, in second appeal, observed that no fresh order of termination was passed on 20-2-1962 and that in view of Resolution No,125, dated 30-7-1962 and Resolution No,142 dated 15-12-1962 which included the name of the respondent in the list of the College Staff, the letter/notice dated 21-1-1962 had lost its efficacy and the respondent continued in service, as such, second appeal of the respondent was accepted and the concurrent findings of the two Courts below were set aside.
4. Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides second appeal to the High Court from a decree passed by an Appellate Court subordinate to 'the High Court on the following grounds:-
(a) When the decision is against law;
(b) When some material issue of law is not decided;
(c) When there is substantial error or procedural defect which resulted in erroneous or defective decisions. ' and by virtue of section 101, C.P.C. No second appeal lies except on the grounds enumerated in section 100, C.P.C. Both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court, after minutely examining and considering in detail from every possible angle the documents brought on record, concurrently concluded that actual absorption of the staff took place on 15-12-1962 and prior to the said date, respondent was an employee of the Anjuman who was competent to terminate his service. It is settled law that the High Court in second appeal cannot interfere with concurrent finding of fact reached by the two Courts below even if it disagrees with that finding on its own view of evidence.
In the case of Abdul Rashid v. Bashiran and another 1996 SCM R 808, this Court after specifying the grounds, as abovementioned, on which second appeal is permissible, ruled as follows:-- ' "Applying this test, we are of the considered view that the decision rendered by the two Courts below was based on judicial consideration of evidence adduced in the case. On the contrary, the decision arrived at by the two Courts below was not shown to be either based on irrelevant or inadmissible evidence or further that the evidence had, in any way, been misread by them. It is thus clear that the High Court in second appeal had wrongly interfered with the concurrent findings of fact simply because some other view-point could also be taken. This view of the High Court is not in accord with the decision of this Court in (i) Pathana v. Mst. Wasai PLD 1965 SC 134; (ii) Khera Din v. Fazal Din 1968 SCM R 1027 and (iii) Azhar Saleem v. Muhammad Anwar Khan 1974 SCM R 484 besides Abdul Majid's and Naseer Ahmad's cases supra."
5. We are of the view that there was neither any misreading nor non-reading of documentary evidence by the-trial and the First Appellate Courts nor the conclusions drawn by them were perverse so as to warrant interference by the High Court in exercise of its powers under section 100, C.P.C.
6. Another aspect of the case is that the learned Judge in Chambers also did not consider that the College remained in the administrative control of Municipal Committee, Daska from 1-7-1967 to 30- 6-1973 whereafter it was taken over by the Provincial Government. As the Municipal Committee, Daska and the Provincial Government had not been impleaded as a party before the High Court, therefore, no decree for payment of back benefits to the respondent, could be passed against them. The respondent was elected as M.N.A. In 1988 and thereafter he could neither claim nor could be granted any back benefits but interestingly, he has been held entitled to all the back benefits admissible to him under the relevant service rules on 20-3-1994.
7. For the foregoing reasons, we accept this appeal, set aside the impugned judgment and decree of the High Court and restore that of the first appellate Court and the trial Court.