1. ' ABDUL KADIR (MEMBER).-The crucial point in this appeal relates to the plea of limitation. This had also been raised in a number of appeals, previously and we had dealt with it in brief. But in this appeal a fresh ground had been pleaded and so we have decided to give detailed reasons.
2. ' The facts in the instant appeal are that the original order of compulsory retirement of appellant was passed by D. I. G. Police on 9-4-1975. The appeal to the I. G. Police was preferred on 22-4-1975.
3. This appeal remained undecided. Therefore within the meaning of section 4(a) of the Sind Service Tribunals Act, 1973, the appellant could not file an appeal before this Tribunal till 90 days had expired after 22-4-1975. This period of 90 days expired on 21-7-1975. After expiry of 90 days the position would revert to an opening paragraph of section 4 ibid wherein it is laid down that appeal is to be filed within 30 days after the date of communication of final order whether original or final.
4. If no decision is taken or communicated by the appellate authority, the appellant has himself chosen to prefer the appeal against the original order for which the maximum period of limitation available to him would be 30 days which will commence immediately after 21-7-1975 when prescribed embargo of 90 days terminated.
5. ' The learned counsel for appellant has contended that the appellant had two options namely :-
(1) To wait for decision in appeal and prefer appeal thereafter within 30 days of communication of order in appeal, or
(2) To prefer appeal under section 4(a) ibid after expiry of 90 days in which case there is no period of limitation prescribed as he can await a decision in appeal for any length of time.
6. The provisions of clause (a) of section 4 are in the nature of proviso to the main section. It is settled law that proviso is the rule of exception but the case as a whole would be governed by the main section. Thus an appeal filed within the meaning of section 4(a) for the purpose of limitation would still be governed by the main section. Otherwise the use of words "original or appellate order" would appear to be redundant. The proper interpretation of section 4 in conjunction with clause (a) would be that no doubt appellant has a choice between two options defined by the counsel for appellant, but the appellant has exercised his option, he shall for the period of limitation be governed by the period of 30 days laid down by law. If he chooses to opt for waiting for decision in appeal, the period of 30 days will commence from the date of communication of order in appeal but in case he exercises option not to wait till the decision in an appeal, he can file appeal against the original orders within 30 days from the date of original order but in calculating this period, the period of 90 days shall be excluded as during this period of 90 days he is under legal embargo against preferring an appeal in this Tribunal. He will get further exclusion of time between the original order and date of preferring appeal if the same is filed within time. Barring the exclusion of time on these two accounts, the period of 30 days for filing appeal cannot be abridged any further.
7. ' In this context it would also be worthwhile to observe that ordinarily no appeal can be filed against the original order unless the appellant has exhausted remedy of appeal, review, representation provided by Service Rules as applicable to him. But to this general law the exception would be the case when appellant is allowed option by section 4(a) in which case he need not wait for final order and he can prefer an appeal even against original order provided he has actually availed of his right of appeal, review etc. But due to no fault of the appellant the appellate or higher authority has failed to take or communicate a decision to the appellant. This could be the only reasonable and rational interpretation of the words "original or appellate order" in section 4. Any other interpretation would reduce the use of words to redundancy which is not permissible for the purpose of interpretation of statute.
8. ' In view of this matter we find that the original order which has been actually impugned in this appeal was communicated to the appellant on 10-4-1975 and he was under obligation to file an appeal within 30 days therefrom. But in calculating this period of 30 days, time will be excluded from 10-4-75 to 22-4-75 during which the appellant had a right to prefer the appeal to departmental appellate authority and from 23-4-1V75 to 22-7-1975 a period of 90 days during which he was under legal embargo from filing appeal in this Tribunal. Thus the period of limitation 30 days could commence from 22-7-1975 and the appeal should have been preferred on 21-8- 1975. The appeal has actually been preferred on 23.10-1975 which is belated by more than 60 days and liable to be dismissed.
9. ' Since we have held that the appeal is time-barred without showing any sufficient cause of delay and is on that account liable to be dismissed, we do not go into other issues involved in the matter.
10. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed as time-barred.