' This is an appeal against the order dated 1-9.1976 of the Additional Commissioner, Sargodha by which the order dated 18-5-1976 of the Deputy Commissioner/Collector making allotment of one square of state land to the heirs of late A.S.I. Mohammad Rafique Butt was set aside.
2. Brief facts are that the appellant's son Mohammad Rafique Butt, an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, was killed in an encounter with a notorious outlaw Chiragh Bali, while on duty. The Government of the Punjab sanctioned the grant of one square of the land to the heirs of the deceased A. S. I. In recognition of his devotion to duties and gallantry shown by him in the said encounter. The Board of Revenue accordingly, after calling a report from the Deputy Commissioner/Collector, Lyallpur, directed that the land comprising Killas Nos, 1 to 25 of Square No, 16, situated in Chak No, 372/0B, Tehsil Samundri, District Lyallpur, may be allotted to the heirs of the deceased. As this land was held by the respondant on temporary lease for ten years, the Deputy Commissioner therefore, issued a notice to the respondent and after hearing his objections cancelled the land from his name and allotted the same to the heirs of the deceased A. S. I. The respondent challenged this order in appeal before the Additional Commissioner, Sargodhe, who by his order, dated 1-9-1976, accepted the appeal mainly on the ground that under the conditions governing temporary leases for 10 years, the land could be resumed only for "public purpose" and as in the instant case the land was resumed for the benefit of a particular individual and not for a "public purpose", there. Fore, it was not competent for Collector to terminate the lease of the respondent and resume the land for allotment to the heirs of the deceased A. S. I. The present appeal questions the legality and proprieto of this order.
3. It has been vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that since the deceased A. S. I. Had laid down his life in the service of the community and for the general, good of the public, therefore, the posthumous award in the form of allotment of land to his family in the recognition of his services would be for no other than a "public purpose" and in the "public interest". In support of his argument the learned counsel relied on a decision of this Court reported as Moor Ali Shah v.
Jabal Din (1) wherein it has been held that allotment under the Pedigree Livestock Breeding Scheme, though made in the name of an individual, was considered to have been made for a "public purpose". Reference was also made to a ruling of the Dacca High Court reported as PLD 1959 Dacca 154. In that case the property was requisitioned by Government for establishing a (private) textile mill to meet acute shortage of cloth in the Province. Their Lordships who decided that case have held "that on the face of the order, it was difficult to see that the requisition was not for a public purpose. From the mere fact that the mill would make profit, it could not be urged that the purpose of the requisition was not a public purpose. What the Court has to see in such a case is if the requisition was made with reference to the needs or convenience of the public. If so, the mere fact that some individual derived greater benefit will not make the requisition bad." Accordingly it has been argued by the learned counsel that since the deceased had sacrificed his life in the service of the community and the State, therefore, the land resumed for allotment to his bereaved family in recognition of his services was for a public service and the mere fact that some individuals were to derive benefit will not exclude it from the purview of that purpose.
4. As against the above arguments, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the land in dispute was allotted to the petitioner for a period of 10 years under a statement of conditions contained in cation No, 3369/67-198-CL-I, dated 7-2-1968. Under paragraph 22 of the said notification a lease granted for 10 years could only be terminated if the land or any portion thereof was required for any public purpose. Again, in paragraph 1 of the same notification it has been laid down, inter alfa, that the temporary cultivation conditions published under Notification No, 2664-C dated 22-9-1944, as amended from time to time, shall also apply to the leases under the Scheme t Provided that in the case of repugnancy the present consditions (i,e,, conditions dated 7-2-1968) shall prevail. According to paragraph 15-A of the notification dated 22.9 1944, a temporary lease can be terminated if the land is required for "permanent allotment", or for "public purpose". The learned counsel argued that since paragraph 15-A of the notification dated 22.94944 in so far as it provides resumption of a temporary lease even for "permanent allotment", is repugnant to paragraph 22 of the notification dated 7-2-1968, therefore, the latter would prevail. In other words, the learned counsel argued, a temporary lease made under notification dated
(1) 2 Rev. Rul. 168 7-2-1968, was to be terminated only if the land was required for a "public; purpose" and not for a "Permanent Scheme". As in the instant case, the allotment made to the heirs of the deceased A. S. I.
Was not for "public purposes' but was under a "permanent scheme", therefore, the temporary lease of the respondent could not be pre-determined by the Collector. For the construction to be placed on the words ""public purpose" the learned counsel has referred me to PLD 1968 Dacca 280 and PLD 1957 Dacca 419 wherein it has been hold that "public purpose must include a purpose in which the general interest of the community as opposed to the particular interest of individuals, is directly and vitally concerned".
5. I have given my careful thought to the arguments advanced on both sides. The main question requiring determination in this case is whether or not the land allotted to the respondent under 10 years lease Scheme was resumed for a "public purpose" in terms of paragraph 22 of the conditions published under Government Notification of 7th February 1968. The expression "public purpose" has been defined neither in the statement of the said conditions nor in any other relevant law. The answer to the question whether a purpose is public or not will necessarily depend on the object to be achieved by the acquisition and the place that object occupies in the current policy or ideology of the State. If the acquisition is in the general interest of the community and is not intended t promote the private interest of a particular individual or set of individuals, it will be treated to be for a public purpose. There may however be cases where property is required by the Govrnment for individuals who are engaged in works of public utility. Where such is the case, the acquisition will be deemed to be for a public purpose. By holding this view I am fortified in the rulings reported as P L 0 1959 Dacca 1 54, PLD 1959 Dacca 580 and AIR 1961 SC 343. Now adverting the present case I find that the deceased A. S. I. Had laid down his life while performing his duty to safeguard the interest of the community and the State. To reward the services of such person would mean encouraging other to serve selflessly and the cause of the community and the State. Therefore, an award for an act of gallantry will be treated to be for "public purpose" inasmuch as its repercussions and effect are to flow beyond a perticular individual. In such view of the matter I am inclined to think that the allotment made to the heirs of the deceased in recognition of his services was for a "public purpose". It was, therefore, competent for the Collector) to resume the land from the respondent under paragraph 22 of the, Government Notifications dated 7-22-1968 and to allot the same to the heirs of the deceased A. S. I.
6. It was also argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that since the temporary lease was made with the approval of the Divisional Commissioner, therefore, it could not have been determined without his prior approval. There is no force in the argument as under paragraph 22 of the conditions governing temporary leases for 10 years, it is the Collector and not the Commissioner who has the authority to resume the land after due observance of formalities. Since the Collector has determined the lease and resumed the land after due observance of all formalities, no interference is, therefore, called for on that score.
7. As a result of the above I accept this appeal, set aside the impugned order of the Additional Commissioner, dated 1-9-1976 and restore that of the Collector dated 18-5-1976.