NASIM SIKANDAR, J.--- Section 194-A(l) of the Customs Act, 1969 provides for appeals to the Appellate Tribunal in four conditions (three after amendment by Ordinance No. XXI of 2000, dated 19-6-2000). The power of the Tribunal to hear appeals against the aforesaid categories is, however, subject to the proviso to-subsection (1), which goes to state another four situations in which the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to decide an appeal though the order may very well fall in any one or more of the classes enumerated in subsection (1).
2. The proviso reads; "provided that no appeal shall lie to the Appellate Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall not have jurisdiction to decide any appeal in respect of any order referred to in subsection (1) if such order relates to--
(a) any goods imported or exported as baggage:
(b) to (e) ..............................................................................
3. It is the interpretation of the word "baggage" as used in the above clause which is a moot point in C.A. No.11 of 1997 and C.As. Nos.42 to 47 of 2000 which are two sets of cross-appeals.
4. The Revenue in C.A. No.11 of 1997 assails the assumption of jurisdiction by the Tribunal despite the fact that the appellant before it (now respondent) was proceeded against by Customs Authorities while attempting to get his baggage cleared for his journey by rail to India from Lahore Railway Station. An examination of his baggage resulted in recovery of two biscuits of gold weighing 20 Tolas and 14 plates of platinum of assorted size weighing 4 Kgs. And 100 grams from specially made cavities of the suit-case. The Tribunal on 21-5-1996 after rejecting the objection of the Department based upon the aforesaid proviso not only proceeded to entertain the appeal but also to set aside the order of the Custom Authorities and directed that the goods seized from the appellant's possession should be restored to him. Following are their reasons for rejecting the objection of the Department:--- "Para.9. The contention that the Tribunal is debarred on jurisdictional ground is not maintainable in that as per the Department's own version the appellant had at the outset committed an offence in tetras of sections 2(S) and 16 of the Customs Act, 1969 punishable under section 156(1)8 (ibid) and had made an attempt to take the goods outside Pakistan in breach of prohibitions and restrictions in vogue through concealment. Such violations are quite distinguishable from those where the articles of baggage are not in reasonable quantity and do not qualify as baggage within the meaning of section 2(bbb) of the Customs Act, 1969 and the definition of baggage contained in the Passengers' Baggage (India-Pakistan) Rules, 1979. The Tribunal is, therefore, of the considered view that all such cases fall within its purview for consideration and disposal.
Para.10. As to this case, the provisions regarding baggage declaration contained in section 139 of the Customs Act, 1969 punishable under section 156(1)70 (ibid) have incorrectly been invoked because it is a case pertaining to an attempt to take notified goods outside Pakistan in breach of restrictions and prohibitions in vogue and not a case where baggage articles have been brought in excess of the permissible limit."
5. In C.As. Nos.42 to 47 of 2000 another Division Bench of the learned Tribunal refused to entertain appeals filed by individual appellants on the ground that their cases related to goods imported or exported as "baggage" which did not fall within their jurisdiction in terms of the first proviso to section 194-A of the Customs Act, 1969. These appellants have assailed the latter view of the Tribunal expressed on their appeals on 30-10-2000.
6. The appellants in C.As. Nos.42 to 47 of 2000 are also individuals and were intercepted while attempting to bring in goods as "baggage" in violation of section 3(1) of the Import and Export (Control) Act, 1950 read with para.7 of the First Schedule to the Imports Trade Control Order punishable under sections l 56(1), 8, 9, 14 and '70. The quantities of goods brought were found to be of commercial nature and, therefore, meant for sale. Having been brought in violation of the aforesaid provisions of law, the authorities seized the goods and after giving them hearing, proceeded to confiscate them.
7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 1t is the case of the Revenue that the learned Tribunal in C.A. No. 11 of 1997 ignored an express provision of law which clearly ousted its jurisdiction on all matters pertaining to "baggage': that the word "baggage" was interpreted totally out of the context and with reference to the provisions of sections 2(S), 16 and section 156 which had absolutely no nexus with the issue as to what amounted to "baggage": that if the interpretation of the word "baggage" as made by the Tribunal is accepted not only part of the provisions of section 194-A but also whole of the provisions contained in Chapter 15, sections 19 to 145 shall become irrelevant and non-existent. Mr. Khan Muhammad Virk. Advocate learned counsel for the Revenue also refers to the provisions of sections 79(3), 179 and section 80 to contend that the Act clearly maintains a distinction between goods brought in or taken out as "baggage" and those exported or imported whether in accordance with the provisions of law and relevant import policy or otherwise.
8 On the other hand, it is the case of the respondent in Appeal No.11 of 1997 and the appellants in the other appeals that interpretation made by the Tribunal finds support not only from the provisions of law as contained in the Act but also the definition of the word "baggage" as given in a number of rules framed under the Act
9. Mr Ashter Ausaf A.I, Advocate, while supporting the interpretation of the Tribunal as made by them in the Departmental appeal states that the Tribunal as a judicial forum had all the justification in the world to interpret the word "baggage" in order to extend its jurisdiction rather than restricting it. Also claim,; that latter interpretation of the Tribunal made in other appeals while refusing to entertain appeals had in fact deprived the appellants of a valuable right of appeal and bpd left them at the mercy of the Customs Authorities acting on the administrative side. According to him it was not only inconvenient but irrational as well. It is claimed that the definition given in Rule 2 of the Passengers (Non-Tourists) Baggage (Import) Rules, 1971, 1972. 1976, 1977, 1992. 1994 and 1996 and the Passengers (Import) Rules, 1998 clearly indicate that baggage means only "used or new personal wearing apparel and other personal, professional or household effects of a passenger, provided that such articles are not for sale, are imported for his personal use or for the use of the members of his family or for making gift, whether such articles are exempt from Customs duty or not". In his way of reasoning the word "baggage" is necessarily restricted to personal. Professional or household effects of a passenger, excluding motor vehicles, which are imported within the allowances in reasonable quantity as given in Rule 2(c) of the Passengers (Import) Rules, 1998.
10. Mian Abdul Ghaffar, Advocate, for other appellants supports his view by referring to Customs General Order No.5 of 1987, dated 1-2-1987 Sub-clause (iv) of clause (1) of that order goes to state that the goods in excess of the duty free allowances admissible to a passenger shall be treated as contravention of imports regulation and dealt with accordingly under the law. It is explained by him that overall Scheme of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder make it vividly clear that the goods remain baggage only when they are for personal or professional use or of household nature and are not for sale In other words, to case the goods are neither of reasonable quantity or are meant for sale these will lost their character and incidence as baggage and will he treated to be an offence punishable under carious items of the table given in section 156 of the Act. It is also pointed out that all rules so far framed under the Act pertain only to import of the "baggage" while in absence of export rules, particularly those regulating export of currency as personal "baggage" no action could possibly be taken against the respondent in C.A. No.1l of 1997. In support of his various submissions, Mian Abdul Ghaffar, Advocate relies upon re:Behram Khursandian v. The Collector of Customs, Karachi 1968 PCr.LJ 229; re: Muhammad Rafiq v. The State 1980 PCr.LJ 318 and re: Sh. Muhammad Omer v. Collector of Customs AIR 1966 Cal. 237. Lastly it is stated that the learned Tribunal having earlier adopted the aforesaid interpretation in C.A. No.11 of 1997 and entertained the appeal, it could not turn about to shut the doors on the faces of the appellants placed in similar circumstances by adopting a totally different interpretation of the word "baggage", to refuse to entertain appeals giving rise to the present C.As. Nos.42 to 47 of 2000.
11. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties we are of the considered view that the learned Tribunal in C.A. No.1 l of 1997 stretched 1 itself unnecessarily and against clear and simple words of the statute to entertain the appeal and to adjudicate upon the same. The word "baggage" as defined in section 2(bbb) (ibid) was attempted to be interpreted by relying upon penalty provision of section 156. The stated rationale being that since the appellant before them had been found punishable by reference to the said provisions including those providing for penalties against violations of import and export regulations his case was covered by their plenary jurisdiction. This was a novel way to confuse the meaning of a simple word which even a layman will not find difficult to understand. The word "baggage" finds mention in number of sections of the Act but no where there is any indication that it could be interpreted 1n the light of the penalprovisions of section 156.
12. An appeal without an iota of doubt is a creature of statute and it has to be confined within the limits of statute as found by the Honourable Supreme Court in re: Muhammad Fareed Jan v.
Colonization Officer, Hyderabad PLD 1965 SC 399. It is also a settled proposition that a right of appeal can be taken away in the same manner it is given. The Legislature is competent to give a qualified or unqualified right of appeal to an aggrieved party. Under the aforesaid provisions of section 194-A the right of appeal has been restricted in the four situations contemplated in proviso to subsection (1). One of such situations being where the order though passed by any of the officers mentioned in the main provision no right of appeal will exist if such order relates to any goods imported or exported as "baggage". A similar provision is also available in Central Excise Act, 1944. Section 35-B(1) has a similar proviso to oust the jurisdiction of Tribunal in as many as five cases. An ouster of jurisdiction, according to the ratio settled in re: Shafiq Hanif (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Bank of Credit PLD 1993 Kar. 707 must be taken to be complete where an intendment of the Legislature is clear and the words spelling out the same can readily and conveniently be found in it. The interpretation of ouster of jurisdiction clauses in cases of superior Courts is different from those provisions which contains an ouster clause in respect of Tribunals of special jurisdiction. While in case of former it is not readily inferred, in case of latter a reasonable inference from the language employed in the statute will be sufficient to constitute ouster.
13. The interpretation of the Tribunal could have been acceptable only if right of appeal was conferred with reference to the acts punishable under the provisions of section 156. It may be noted that in a number of statutes including the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 a right of appeal is conferred with reference to an order under a particular section of the statute. However, in case of section 194-A' the matter is somewhat different inasmuch as sub--clause (a) of subsection (1) confers a right of appeal on any person including the Customs Authorities to assail "a decision or order" passed by an officer of the customs. Even before the recent amendment made in the provision whereby the word "Collector of Customs" was deleted a decision/order was appealable without reference to any particular section of the Act. Sub-clause (b) of the section which now stands omitted did contain a reference to section 193 under which the erstwhile collector of appeal used to hear and dispose of his appeals. The power to hear appeal as conferred on Collector under the omitted section 193 was also not with reference to any particular provision of law or a section.
The only requirement being that officer making the order should be lower in rank than Collector of.
Customs. In our considered view since the -right of appeal under section 194-A(1) (both before and after amendment) conferred upon a person or Custom Authorities is not with reference to any particular provision of the Ordinance including section 156, the assumption of jurisdiction by the Tribunal with reference to that section or import and Export Regulations was totally unwarranted.
14. The golden rule of interpretation of statutes being that every word of the statute must first be assigned its natural meaning. It is only if these meanings do not work or lead to a manifest absurdity that the stage of interpretation is reached. The word "baggage" obviously is not a term of art. Learned counsel for the Revenue is correct in pointing out 'that. If the interpretation of the Tribunal is accepted then almost whole of Chapter XV sections 139 to 145 and a number of other provisions shall stand remove from the face of the statute. The purpose and use of a provision and the rules interpreting it are so known that no useful purpose will be served by repeating them. The intention of the Legislature to oust the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in respect of matters detailed in the proviso is absolutely clear. It appears that the legislature was conscious that an attempt shall be made on the part of the Tribunal to extend its jurisdiction to certain matters which are better left to the discretion of the administrative authorities in the Customs hierarchy, make its intention clear the Legislature after providing for a positive ouster used a specific negative that the "Tribunal shall not have jurisdiction to decide any appeal" if such order related to the matters specified in the proviso. The principle that an interpretation ought to be made to extend and not to restrict a jurisdiction is certainly not applicable to Tribunals of special jurisdictions. That principle is applicable only to Courts of general jurisdiction particularly those exercising Constitutional jurisdiction. Therefore, the learned Tribunal wrongly ignored the double stress employed in the proviso to oust its jurisdiction.
15. The word "baggage" according to Chambers English Dictionary means, the tents, provisions and other necessaries of an army; a traveller's luggage. The part of the argument of the learned counsel based upon the definition of the word in different rules, as referred to above is quite novel.
It is that wearing apparel and other personal, professional or household effects of a passenger are baggage but the container, a box or suit-case is not I included in the term. This interpretation, however; is not acceptable for two reasons. Firstly the definition of word "baggage" as given in the aforesaid Baggage Rules enforced from time to time cannot control or restrict the meaning of the word as given in section 2(bbb) of the Act. Secondly these definitions being peculiar to the purpose for which the rules were being made, cannot be of general import and consequence. The provisions of section 194-A conferring a jurisdiction on the Tribunal to hear appeals against and in respect of certain orders cannot be made dependent upon the quantity or the nature of goods brought in or taken out as "baggage". The interpretation of the Tribunal as supported by the learned counsel for the appellants has made the said ouster clause totally redundant. We have not been able to figure out as to how references to the penalty provisions in the Customs Act or the Import and Export Regulations could be taken to support the proposition that suit-cases and contraband goods concealed therein were not "baggage". The use of words "goods" as well as "baggage" in the proviso rather goes to show that it is not only the, goods or the material but also the container in which it is kept comprises a "baggage". Neither the learned Tribunal nor the learned counsel now supporting its view has explained as to what issue is likely to arise for determination by the Administrative Authorities or by the Tribunal if passenger brings in or takes out only personal wearing apparel and other professional or household effects in accordance with the prescribed allowances which are neither for sale nor are in commercial quantity The acceptance of this interpretation means that the Legislature in its wisdom mentioned the word "baggage' in the proviso only to keep the record straight in as much as the "baggage" conforming to the law and the rules was not to fall within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in any case. This assumption is totally unwarranted both as a fact and a legal proposition.
16. An ouster of jurisdiction is complete where the intendment of Legislature is clear and the words spelling out the ouster can readily and conveniently be found in it. This principle was settled in re: Shafiq Hanif (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Bank of Credit PLD 1993 Kar.
107. As observed earlier the rule of interpretation of an ouster of jurisdiction regarding Tribunals of special jurisdiction and those of superior Courts are totally different. In cases of the Tribunals and other forums of restricted jurisdiction an ouster clause is readily accepted if the words used in the statute sufficiently convey these meanings. The ouster of jurisdiction, as contained in proviso to section 194-A in the case of the Tribunal, in our view is total and absolute. Its purpose is very clear. It is that certain matters of every day occurrence should be left to the discretion of the administration machinery. These matters are mostly dependent upon the policy of the Government which keeps on changing in view of changing economic requirements. The other clauses of the proviso also indicate that the matters which are purely of administrative nature and need immediate action have been kept out of the ambit of the Tribunal. Another reason for the ouster appears that the first two matters covered by the proviso are wholly dependent on appreciation of facts at the given time while the other two categories pertains either to recovery of duties or their repayment from the public, exchequer All such situations fall within the domain of executive functions of the Revenue.
17. The argument that the learned Tribunal in C.As. Nos.42 to 47 of 2000 could not adopt a different view is also not convincing. The precedent as a source of law as we understand ii in the common law regime is restricted only to the judgments of the superior Courts. A decision by a Tribunal of special or restricted jurisdiction cannot have the force of law irrespective of its antiquity. It is correct that a consistency of view adopted by a forum exercising judicial functions is necessary for its harmonious working. Particularly for a forum like the Customs Tribunal which is seated at different cities of the Federating units.
18. In the present case, however, the earlier decision of the Bench of the Tribunal being per incurrium did not at all bind even a single Bench of the Tribunal. A decision per incurrium does not bind either the same forum or even a lower forum. For the reference one may consult a reported judgment of the Karachi High Court in re: Abdul Razzak v. Collector of Custom 1995 CLC 1453.
9. For what has been said above we will hold that the learned Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain appeal in C.A. No. 11 of 1997 while the viewed by them in C.As. Nos.42 to 47 finds support from the law as dismissed above. Therefore, appeal filed by the Revenue (C.A. No.11 of 19971) is accepted; while C.As. Nos.42 to 47 of 2000 shall be dismissed and the impugned order of the Tribunal earlier recorded refusing to entertain appeals shall be maintained.