This matter has come on remand to this Court by the Supreme Court of Pakistan and arises out of a suit for possession through pre-emption filed by respondent Muhammad Bashir, wherein he had assailed order, dated 13-6- 1983 passed by the Board of Revenue dismissing the revision petition of the petitioner and affirming the order, dated 22-2-1982 of the Additional Commissioner, Lahore, whereby the order of the Assistant Commissioner/Collector was set aside on 30-12-1978, and the suit filed by respondent Muhammad Bashir against Shafaat Mahmood petitioner was decreed with respect to 72 Kanals and 9 Marlas of agriculture land situated in Mauza Bhurekay, Tehsil Pasrur, District Sialkot. This Court had accepted the Constitutional petition and remanded the matter for decision afresh to the Collector. A review application was tiled in this Court which, however, was dismissed. Thereupon, the respondent went to the Supreme Court of Pakistan which was pleased to set aside the judgment of the High Court and remanded the case specifically for determination of the question as to whether the limitation for filing a suit would run from the date of registration of the sale-deed as provided by Article 10 of the Limitation Act, 1908 or from the date of execution of the sale-deed in view of section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908.
2. Mr. Shamim Abbas Bukhari, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that under section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908, a document is deemed to take effect from the date on which it is executed and not registered.
3. On the other hand, Mr. Zafar Iqbal, Advocate has submitted that Article 10 of the Limitation Act, 1908 is quite clear that the limitation would run from the date, the document is registered and not when it is executed.
4. In order to appreciate the contentions of the learned counsel for the' petitioner, both Article 10 of the Limitation Act, 1908 as also section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908 may be reproduced. Article 10 reads as under:-- 1 2 3 "To enforce a right of pre- emption whether the right is founded on law, One Year When the price becomes payable. When the purchaser 1 2 3 or general usage, or on special contract. takes, under the sale sought to be impeached, physical possession of the whole of the property sold or, where the subject of the sale does not admit of physical possession when the instrument of sale is registered.
5. While section 47 of the Registration Act is in the following words:-- "47. Time from which registered document operates.--- A registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made, and not from the time of its registration."
6. No doubt section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908 on its plain reading ordains that a registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have been commenced to operate, if no registration thereof is required or made, and not from the date of its registration, but Article 10 of the Limitation Act,_ 1908 clearly provides that the limitation is to be computed froni the date of registration of sale-deed and not from its execution. The plain meaning of the statute cannot be defeated and the period of limitation abridges by reference to section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908. This question came up before the Dacca High Court in Muhammad Meher Ali v. Muhammad Karam Ali Sarkar PLD 1965 Dacca 305, wherein it was held that section 47 of the Registration Act applies between the transferor and transferee. It has no relation with the rights of the person who is not a party to the said document. He comes into the picture after the registration i.e. when the deed of transfer was duly completed by the date of registration comes into existence. The same view was taken by the Calcutta High Court in Gobardhan Bar v. Gunadhar Bar AIR 1941 Cal.
78. No law or precedent has been cited which could persuade me to take a different view. That being so, it is held that the date from which limitation will be construed shall be the date on which the document is actually registered and not from the date of its execution.
7. The learned counsel has argued that the respondent No.3 was lessee and not a tenant. However, no such plea appears to have been raised in any of the Court below nor in the written statement filed by the said respondent.
In view of what has been said above, this petition is dismissed within no order as to costs.