' MUHAMMAD YUNUS SURAKHVI, J.---This review petition has been preferred seeking reversal of our judgment passed on 31-3-2000 in Civil Appeal No,58 of 1999 titled Muhammad Idrees v. Ch. Mehmood Ahmed and another, whereby the appeal filed by Haji Muhammad Idrees, respondent No,I herein; was accepted.
2. The necessary facts, giving rise to the present review petition, are that respondent No,1 filed a suit for recovery of Rs,6,50,000 against the petitioner in the Court of District Judge, Mirpur alleging therein that he was running the business in the name and style of Chaudhry Electronics T.V. And Fridge Centre in Raza Commercial Centre Allama Iqbal Road, Mirpur. An agreement was entered into between respondent No, 1 and the petitioner on 22-3-1994 creating a partnership between the partners. Consequently the respondent advanced an amount oil' Rs,6,50,000 to the petitioner through a Bank Draft No,DDP 0016127 on 22-3-1994, from Union Bank, Mirpur for the extension of his business. The respondent and the petitioner herein in the light of this partnership-deed became shareholders in the said business and were equally entitled to the profit and loss of the same on the daily basis. The partnership-deed was executed by them till 31-8-1994. The petitioner- defendant was proceeded ex parte by the trial Court on 8-8-1995, as despite service he absented him sellf. The trial Court after necessary proceedings dismissed the suit filed by respondent vide the judgment and decree, dated 31-3-1998. On appeal filed by respondent before the High Court, the findings recorded by the District Judge were affirmed and the appeal was dismissed by the High Court vide the judgment and decree, dated 3-3-1999. The appeal taken to this Court by Haji Muhammad Idrees against the impugned judgment of the High Court, with the leave of the Court, was accepted and as such a decree for payment of an amount of Rs,6,50,000 was passed in favour of respondent Haji Muhammad Idrees against the petitioner vide the judgment under review, dated 31-3-2000. It is the aforesaid judgment of this Court against which the present review petition has been filed.
' In support of review petition it was contended by Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan, he learned counsel for the petitioner, that this Court observed in its judgment under review that the petitioner was served with a notice even in this Court when the appeal was filed but despite, service of the petitioner absented himself. The learned counsel contended that the petitioner's address was wrongly shown in the plaint throughout as he was settled at Kohat (N.-W.F.P) since January. 1994 and he never refused to accept the service nor any process-server ever served upon him any summons. The learned counsel contended that in case of refusal of service of summons by the petitioner under Order V, rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was enjoined upon the process-server .To affix a copy of summons on the outer door or upon any other conspicuous part of the house of petitioner in which he was ordinarily residing or carried on business or personally worked for gain but no such procedure was adopted by the process-server, as such the decree was passed against the petitioner in violation of the relevant law which needs reversal. The learned counsel for the petitioner also contended that he acquired the knowledge of the judgment under review on 15th of April, 2000 upon which he promptly filed a review petition. The learned counsel also argued with vehemence that the observations of this Court that the petitioner was served with a notice but despite service he absented himself, is a mistake apparent on the face of record and the same needs reversal.
4. On the other hand Mr. Abdul Majid Mallick, the learned counsel for respondent No,1, by controverting the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the review petition has been filed by the petitioner against the judgment under review passed by this Court, but no mistake apparent on the face of record or error has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The learned counsel for respondent contended that the scope of review petition is very limited as held by this Court in numerous cases, therefore it was enjoined upon the petitioner to point out the mistake or error apparent on the face of record. 'So far as the observation of this Court in the judgment under review is concerned that even in this Court the petitioner despite service did not appear in the Court and he was proceeded ex parte has been recorded through same inadvertence, whereas the fact of the matter is that on the notice issued by this Court, it was reported by the process-server that the petitioner is avoiding service. On the report being submitted by the process-server the Assistant Registrar set down the appeal ex parte against the petitioner, respondent therein. The order was passed by the Assistant Registrar on 30- 6-1999, but the same being appealable order was not challenged by the petitioner. In the instant review petition the case of petitioner seems to be that he came to know about the judgment under review on 15-4-2000, thus he filed the review petition. The petitioner has miserably failed to disclose the source of his information as to how it came to his knowledge that a judgment has been passed against him by this Court.
5. First we advert to the point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that this wrongly stated that the petitioner was served but did not appear. We have checked out the record and find that this statement is only partly correct because the petitioner was not in fact personally served that the report is that he refused to accept the service. Therefore while it is true that it is not correctly recorded that the petitioner . Was served but the legal position is the same because if a person refuses to receive a summons it is deemed that he has been served. Therefore this small mistake in expression has no material bearing on the question of service.
6. It may be stated that the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in case of non-acceptance of service by the petitioner the proper course was to affix the summons on the outer door of his residence as provided under Order V, rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, merits no consideration as being devoid of any legal force. It is clearly provided in Order 1, Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code shall not apply to the proceedings in this Court unless expressly made applicable to these Rules. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is based on Civil Procedure Code which is not applicable.
Confronted with this situation Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan referred us to Order XXXV of the Supreme Court Rules and submitted, that the provisions of Civil Procedure Code are applicable. Order XXXV is as follows:-- "In the absence of any specific provision in this Part of the Rules, the provisions of the Code shall apply, unless the Court otherwise directs."
' The argument has no force because it is stated in Order XXXV reproduced above that the provisions of Civil Procedure Code shall apply to "this Part of the Rules". Order XXXV is in Part IV of the Supreme Court Rules which deals with plaints filed in original jurisdiction of the Court. It has no application to other parts of the Rules.
7. According to the record of this Court the petitioner refused to receive summons of the Court. This was sufficient service and there was no other formality to be completed. It may be pointed out here that when petition for leave to appeal is filed an advance copy is sent to the respondent. This procedural 'requirement was also duly fulfilled in this case.
8. It may also he pointed out that in judgment under review we have also observed in para. No,11 that both the brothers impleaded as defendants in the suit were running their business in the name and style of Chaudhry Electronics T.V. And Fridge Centre and iii order to avoid the consequences of decree manoeuvred for the disappearance . Of defendant-respondent No,1 therein (petitioner herein). Our apprehensions were further strengthened when the judgment under review was announced by us on 31-3-2000, the petitioner all of a sudden promptly filed the review petition on 28-4-2000, stating in para. No,2 of his review petition that he obtained the knowledge of judgment under review on 15th of April, 2000. It is astonishing to note that the petitioner who absented himself from the proceedings in the trial Court, the High Court and in this Court for years took the plea that he was settled at District Kohat (N.-W.F.P) since January, 1994 and acquired the knowledge of judgment passed against him on 15th of April, 2000. It was enjoined upon the petitioner to disclose the source of his information as to when and how he acquired the knowledge of the judgment recorded against him. After abstaining from the proceedings for a pretty long time it is not a sufficient explanation to simply state that he acquired the knowledge of the judgment under review on 15th of April, 2000.
9. So far as the merits of the case are concerned, no mistake or error apparent on the face of record or in the appraisal of evidence has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner. We are therefore of a considered view that right from very beginning the petitioner has the knowledge of proceedings initiated against him, particularly when his real brother Yaqoob Ahmed has been contesting the case throughout before the trial Court, the High Court as well as in this Court.
10. So far as the scope of review petition is concerned, that has elaborately been dealt with by this Court in some of cases. Out of them two cases may usefully be cited. In a case reported as Abdul Qadir and 2 others v. Abdur Rehman and 5 others (1999 PLC (C.S.) 947) it has been observed by this Court as under:-- ' a review petition is competent only if there is a mistake apparent on the face of record or for a reason which is analogous to the 'apparent mistake'. It is well-settled principle of law that the finding given in appeal after considering the relevant material on record would not justify the review of an order or judgment."
' Similarly in a case reported as Alam Din v. Mayor, Municipal Corporation, Mirpur and 4 others (2000 YLR 1891) it was observed by this Court as under:--- ' the point argued before us having been finally resolved one way or the other cannot be re- opened as the scope of review is very limited and it cannot be treated as an appeal so as to re- open the points which stood already resolved."
11. Since the petitioner failed to make out any case for admission of the review petition for regular hearing, therefore, for reasons recorded above, the same stands dismissed.