DECISION (RETD.) MUNAWAR ALI KHAN, J. -- The grievance petition of the appellant Az' am Khan was dismissed by Sindh Labour Court No. 1 Karachi by its order dated 10th December, 1999. In this appeal the appellant has called in question. The said order of the Labour Court. The appellant's case briefly .Stated is that he was employed as chowkidar in the Respondents' Company on 1.1.1992 but no written order of the appointment was given to him. However, his services were terminated on 1.4.1999 for no fault on the appellant's part. Even Termination Order was verbal except that in its place Service Certificate dated 1.4.1999 had been issued. Dis-satisfied with termination of his services the appellant gave Legal Notice dated 14.4.1999 to the Respondent Company by Registered post but it remained unattended. Nevertheless, after the said notice the appellant was taken back on duty again by verbal order. On 31.8.1999 the appellant demanded the payment of his outstanding dues including his salary for the period from October, 1998 to March, 1999 whereupon the respondent management became angry with him and removed him from service by verbal order. Thereafter, he sent grievance notice dated 31.8.1999 by Registered post but it remained un- replied. As his grievance remained un-redressed he was ultimately compelled to file grievance petition dated 2.10.1999.
2. In Reply Statement the very maintainability of the grievance petition has been challenged on the ground that the appellant had no right guaranteed or secured under any law, award or settlement; and therefore the provisions of standing orders Ordinance, 1968 were not attracted. For the (sic) made in the Reply are: that both the grievance notice as well as the grievance petition were hopelessly time-barred; that the Service 'Certificate (Annexure-A) produced by the appellant clearly indicated that he joined the service in January,' 1992 and left the same in March, 1998 and that appellant being watchman in the respondent Company to which the Factories Act was not applicable he could not be considered to have the status of workman.
3. I heard the learned counsel for both the parties and with their help have gone through the written material available on record. The learned counsel for the respondents vehemently argued that both the grievance notice as well as the grievance petition were hopelessly time-barred. As provided in Section 25-A, I.R.C. 1969 the aggrieved worker has to bring his grievance to the notice of his employer in writing within three months of the day on which such grievance had arisen. As stated by the appellant in his grievance petition (para 2) he was removed from service on 1.4.1999 and as such his grievance arose on the said date. He was therefore expected to serve grievance notice on the Respondents Company latest by 31.7.1999 but he had actually, sent the grievance notice by Registered post on 31.3.1999 i.e. One month after the due date. There is no application for the appellant on record indicating that he applied for condonation of the said delay. Thus, the grievance notice was time-barred coming to the grievance petition. It is further provided in Section 25-A referred to above that the employer was obliged to give reply to the grievance notice within 15 days and in case of his failure to do so or if the aggrieved workman was not satisfied with his employer 's reply he had right to take the matter to Labour Court by filing grievance petition within a period of ,two months from the date. Of communication of the employer or as the case may be after expiry of the period of such communication. Thus, the aggrieved person had in all 5 months from the date of grievance for filing 'grievance petition in the Labour Court. Since the grievance had arisen on 1.4.1999 the grievance petition could be filed latest by 15th September, 1999 but he actually filed the grievance petition on 2.10.1999 which was certainly time-barred. Again there is no application for condonation of the delay.
4. The appellant was admittedly appointed as chowkidar (watchman). While relying on Supreme Court authority reported as 1988 SCM R 922, the appellant's Advocate contended (sic) if chowkidars/Havaldars were doing manual work, they were covered by definition of workman. There is no dispute with this preposition. But the appellant has not stated a single word in his grievance petition as well as grievance notice indicating that he was doing annual or clerical job. In absence of such material on records the mere fact that he was chowkidar would not put him in the category of workman. Moreover the (sic) Act not being applicable to the Respondents' Establishment he could not be regarded as workman.
5. Apart from above learned Labour Court has rightly relied on 1981 PLC 195, 1982 PLC 1100 to show that Chowkidar is not a workman. I am, therefore, clear in my mind that he was not a workman.
Consequently, the grievance petition filed by him was not maintainable. Even otherwise he has not proved by any documentary evidence that he had any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law or any award or settlement for the purpose of invoking Section 25-A, I.R.C.
Apart from above the contention or the respondents' learned Advocates was not without force that the Service Certificate produced by the appellant (vide Annexure-A Labour Court record), which was the nature of resignation. Clearly indicated that he had left the service on his own accord and thereby he ceased to be workmen. In this conduction the learned counsel had relied upon the case of this Tribunal reported as Tribunal Decisions 1999 T.D. (Labour) page 353 whereas it was held, the appellant having resigned from their service are as longer workmen as defined in I.R.O. 1969 and as such they cannot invoke Section 25-A filing grievance petition.
6. Further more the learned Labour Court had rightly rejected the appellants' claim that after he had given legal Notice to the respondents he was taken back on duty by verbal order. He stood belied in this respect by his own statements. In paragraph 4 of his grievance petition the appellant had asked the Respondents Company for payment of his outstanding dues on account of salary, etc. For the period from 10.98 to 3.99 (i.e. October, 1998 to March, 1999). Since March, 1999 was given by him as the termination point, then his claim that after service of Legal Notice he was taken on duty by verbal order was obviously untrue. Even . The Company's Certificate referred to above issued in the appellant's favour which he had himself produced also supported the above position that he started his job in January, 1992 and left in March, 1999, and therefore it could not be believed that he was taken back on duty by verbal order and had served for more period. Even otherwise the appellant's statement that he was taken back on duty by verbal 'order looked absurd because the hostile management despite having received one notice after the other from the appellant would not take him back on duty by verbal order. If the Management was happy to take him back in service, there should have been written order for his reinstatement so this story of the appellant that after service of Legal Notice he was taken back, on duty was clearly concocted with a view to overcome the legal objection of limitation and therefore no reliance can be placed on it.
The appellant's objection that his services were terminated verbally and therefore such Termination Order was in violation of law is without force because the Service Certificate referred to above that he had produced was actually the document by which his service came to an end. As decided in the said Certificate he had himself left the service (resigned) and that Certificate would seal his objection.
The upshot of the above discussion is that appeal must fail and it is accordingly dismissed.