' MUHAMMAD YUNUS SURAKHVI, J.---This appeal, by way of leave of the Court, is directed against the judgment passed by the High Court on 2-6-2000, whereby Writ Petition No,172 of 2000 filed by respondent No,1 was accepted.
2. The precise facts, giving rise to the present appeal, are that respondent No,1, Mirza Zaid Ullah Khan, filed a writ petition in the High Court seeking a writ of mandamus against appellants herein to upgrade the 15% of posts of District and Sessions Judges in B-21 which was accepted by the High Court vide impugned judgment, dated 2-6-2000. Hence this appeal by Azad Government and Secretary Finance.
3. At the very outset two preliminary objections were raised by Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan, the learned counsel for respondents, (i) that the appeal filed by appellants herein was barred by limitation and as such was liable to be dismissed and (ii) that the notification, dated 29-7-2000 was issued by Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs Department without obtaining approval of the Government. The notification, dated 29-7-2000 was issued subject to approval of the competent authority, i,e, the Prime Minister. The approval of Prime Minister was obtained after expiry of period of limitation, as such the appeal was incompetent as the same was filed without the approval of the competent authority. The learned counsel contended that the judgment under appeal was passed by the High Court on 2-6-2000, whereas petition for leave to appeal before this Court was filed on 7-8-2000. The learned counsel submitted that application for obtaining copy of the judgment of High Court was submitted on 2-8-2000 and the same was supplied on 3-8-2000. Even after deducting two days spent in preparation of copy of judgment, the appeal is still barred by limitation of four days. The learned counsel vehemently pressed into service the submission that the two days spent in preparation of copy of the judgment of High Court could not be deducted under law from the period of limitation because as a matter of fact the application for obtaining copy of the judgment of High Court was moved on 2-8-2000, when the period of sixty days prescribed for lodging the appeal before this Court had already expired. The learned counsel also strenuously argued that in the application for condonation of delay no cogent reason has been advanced and the only ground taken is that the counsel for the appellants was out of Headquarters and came back on 2-8-2000. Even it was not shown in the application that for how many days and for which purpose Mr. Farooq Hussain Kashmiri, the learned counsel for the appellants, left the station. However, it is clear from the averment made in the application that he came back to the Headquarters on 2-8-2000. According to the learned counsel for respondents even if the aforesaid averment is accepted as correct, he could have filed the petition for leave to appeal on 3rd or 4th of August, 2000, when the Registry Office of this Court was open, but the counsel for the appellants filed the same on 7-8-2000. Thus, the learned counsel for respondents maintained that the appeal being barred by limitation was liable to be dismissed.
4. The learned counsel in support of his second contention relied upon an unreported case of this Court titled Azad Government and another v. Syed Adnan Ahmed Gilani and others (Civil Appeal No,125 of 2000, decided on 5-10-2000 wherein it was observed as follows:--- "The question whether the appeal is maintainable or not poses no problem because the proposition already stands settled by this Court in an unreported case of this Court in Civil Appeal No,36 of 1986 titled Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir through Chief Secretary v. Moeen-ud-Din Shah which was pronounced on 16th May, 1987. In the present case the facts were that the appeal was filed subject to the approval of the Government. The approval of the Government was subsequently accorded when the period of limitation had already expired. This defect was considered as fatal and the appeal was dismissed . "
5. In reply Mr. Farooq Hussain Kashmiri, the learned counsel for the appellants, submitted with vehemence that sanction of the-Government for filing petition for leave to appeal was issued in his favour on 29-7-2000 and he being out of Headquarters came back on 2-8-2000. He on the same day, applied for obtaining the copy of the judgment under appeal which was delivered to him on 3-8-2000. Thus, the appeal filed. By him on 7-8-2000 was well within time.
6. After hearing the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, it may be stated that in the application for condonation of delay the only ground pressed into service by Mr. Farooq Hussain Kashmiri, the learned counsel for the appellant, is to the following effect:- "that the Government sanction Notification for filing the petition was issued on 29-7-2000 which was 'Saturday' and the counsel nominated for the needful was out of Headquarters and he came back on 2-8-2000."
7. Apart from the above-stated vague and ambiguous ground no other ground worth any substance has been taken in the application for condonation of delay. It has not been disclosed in the application or condonation of delay that for which assignment the counsel for appellants left the Headquarters and where he had gone. The above-stated ground cannot be construed to be one of the valid and recognised grounds for condoning the delay but even if we accept the version of the learned counsel for the appellants to be true, according to the averment made by the appellants in their petition for leave to appeal, the copy of the judgment under appeal was delivered to him on 3-8-2000 and had he been vigilant and cautious enough he could have filed the appeal on 3rd or 4th of August, which were working days, but the appellants and their counsel slept over the matter and filed the petition for leave to appeal on 7-8-2000, which was clearly barred by limitation. It has already been pointed out that the application for obtaining the copy of the judgment of High Court was submitted before the Copying Officer by the appellants on 2-8- 2000, whereas the period of limitation had already expired on 1-8-2000.
8. It needs no elaborate thought that a party seeking the condonation of delay has to satisfactorily explain the delay of each and every day and the explanation put forth must be a reasonable and cogent which is asking in the instant case. In Mehboob and another v. Muzaffar Din (1992 SCR 338) it was held that delay of each day has to be explained. Petition was late by one day but the delay was not excused and the petition was dismissed as being barred by limitation.
' In Muneer Hussain v. Custodian of Evacuee Property and 4 others (1995 SCR 349) it was observed that delay of each day should be explained to the satisfaction of the Court and the Court had to take a strict view in matters of condonation of delay.
' In another case Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Ch. Abdul Latif PLD 1983 SC (AJ&K) 70 while dealing with the question of condonation of delay in filing petition for leave to appeal it was observed by this Court that for condonation of delay there must be a sufficient cause and the Government was not entitled to any preferential treatment as the other party' cannot be deprived of a valuable right accrued to it without convincing and sufficient cause.
9. To far as the second objection of the learned counsel for respondents is concerned, after examining the relevant file we are of the view that this objection too must prevail for the reasons to be stated hereinafter. The Services Department moved the Law Department to file the appeal on 24-7-2000, on which there appears a note of the Deputy Secretary Law that Law Minister being not available at headquarters the appeal may be filed subject to approval of the Government vide his note, dated 28-7-2000. The file was submitted to Additional Secretary Law, Atta Mohi-ud-Din Shah, who vide this note, dated 29-7-2000, also opined that a very short period is left for filing the appeal therefore the same may be filed subject to approval by the Government. The approval of Law Minister was thus obtained subsequently on 23-8-2000 when the period of limitation for filing the appeal had already expired. Following the dictum laid down in Azad Government and another v.
Syed Adnan Ahmed Gilani and others, referred to above, we have reached the conclusion that the appeal was filed without the approval of Government and the Government did not give any ex post facto sanction to validate the *Government order, dated 29-7-2000. Thus, from the above facts it becomes clear that the Services Department had been negligent enough to move the Law Department at a very late stage. It follows from the foregoing observations that the Government did not authorise the filing of present appeal in this Court. Thus, the appeal was not maintainable.
' In the light of what has been stated above, without adverting to the merits of the case, the appeal being barred by limitation and incompetent in the eye of law for reasons to be stated hereinbefore is liable to be dismissed and we order its dismissal accordingly.