DECISION ' This appeal arose from the order, dated 14th October, 1999 of Sindh Labour Court No, VII Sukkur whereby the appellant's grievance petition was dismissed. The appellant's case, as reflected in his grievance petition, is that he was initially appointed by the respondents Company as a Site Supervisor on probation for a period of three months with effect from 1st January, 1996 vide Appointment Letter dated 31-12-1995. The terms and conditions of his appointment specified in the said letter provided that he would be paid gross salary of Rs,5,000 per month; that he would not be entitled to any other benefit; that the Company could terminate his service at any time without notice and that he could leave Company's Service by giving one month's notice in writing and that his service would be regularised on satisfactory report of his Site Incharge. On completion of probationary period the appellant's salary was enhanced to Rs,10,000 per month and he executed a fresh agreement dated 6-9-1996 in favour of the respondents. His services were also regularized but only verbally and when he insisted for written order he was simply kept on empty hopes.
According to appellant's version of the case he held the same post throughout, doing manual work by hand, namely: preparation of maps and taking measurement of land for purpose of acquisition and checking of Security Gate Passes and other such work. The respondent's Company extended the contract of his work five times without break untill 30th June, 1999 when he was verbally informed that his services were no longer required. The appellant's case is that his services were terminated though there was no complaint against him nor any domestic enquiry was held against him with regard to any misconduct. Furthermore, that though he worked extra time, yet he was not paid overtime nor was he allowed any bonus nor provided any medical facility and no kind of leave was allowed to him. His dismissal from service being mala fide he served the Respondents Company with grievance notice dated 22-10-1999 to which the Company gave reply dated 2-11- 1999. But his grievance remained unredressed. Thereafter, he filed grievance petition on 1st December, 1999.
2. In reply statement the Respondents Company took a number of Legal Objections; namely, that the petition was not maintainable under section 25-A, I.R.O. 1969, as no right was guaranteed or secured to the appellant under any law, award or settlement; that the appellant was not a workman as he was engaged in supervisory/management cadre purely on contract (temporary basis) only to supervise land acquisition work on gross salary of Rs,10,000 per month; that he did not serve grievance notice on other respondents made party, that the Labour Court Sukkur had no territorial jurisdiction because the appellant was engaged in service by the Power Company at Islamabad; that the appellant's job was temporary, limited only to land acquisition work and another related thereto and on completion of the said work there was no justification to retain the appellant in service.
3. Apart from above, Respondent Company has denied the issuance of first Appointment Letter and hence the question of appellant's being on probation for three months did not arise. It was also denied by the Company that on satisfactory completion of probation his salary was enhanced from Rs,5,000 to Rs,10,000. According to the Company the appellant was engaged for the first time by Liberty Power Company Islamabad by Company's Letter of appointment, dated 9th September, 1996 on contract basis with authority to supervise and facilitate the purchase of Project land and to hand all related matters with landowners, representing the company before various Government's Departments and Revenue Authorities, advising the Company for payment to various parties, signing Agreements and Receipts on behalf of the Company. The Company have enclosed the sample documents to prove their version.
4. I have heard the learned counsel of both the parties and with their _ help I have also perused the relevant documents relied upon by them. Opening his arguments, the appellant's learned counsel strongly pleaded that the case be remanded back to Lower Court for recording of evidence because in its absence not only parties could not be able to establish their case but also it will be difficult for Tribunal to appreciate the viewpoints of the parties' Advocates. In this connection he particularly referred to the dispute of the parties over the status of the appellant being workman or not. So far this point is concerned. I do not think that in view of the mass of documents available on record any further evidence would be needed or that the Tribunal would find it difficult to come to the definite conclusion with regard to the status of workman. The first and foremost documents in this regard are the appellant's Appointment Letters. The appellant has relied on two such letters, one dated 31st December, 1995 (A/1) and another dated 9th September 1996 (A/2). The Respondents Company (Liberty Power Limited) has disowned the first letter and rightly as because it is neither written on the Company's Letter Pad nor is it shown to have been issued by the respondent Company. Therefore, this letter was not be helpful to the appellant. Coming to another letter, dated 9th September, 1996 (A.2), it was admittedly issued by the Respondent Company. It clearly shows that appellant was appointed to supervise the land acquisition for Liberty Power Limited. Terms and conditions on which his appointment was made have been specifically mentioned in the said letter. The last paragraph of the letter reads as follows:--
9. This contract is valid only until 31st August, 1997, until] it is renewed by the Company. The Company can terminate the contract without notice. If the contract terminates during the contract period, the Company will only pay the service charge of the current month.
' If the above terms and conditions are acceptable, please sign the duplicate copy of this letter."
' Thus, the concluding para. Of the Letter of Appointment leaves no doubt that the appellant's appointment was not only contractual but purely temporary (terminable even during contract period without notice). At the end of the letter the appellant was required to sign the duplicate copy of the letter. The terms and conditions specified in the letter were acceptable to him and he had duly signed the duplicate copy of the letter. I am, therefore, fully convinced from the above letter that the appellant's job was of supervisory nature. Not only that but his appointment was purely temporary and of contractual nature, to be regulated by the terms and conditions of contract detailed in the letter itself. No further proof was needed to establish the points if the appellant was workman or not. His job being of supervisory nature he could not be placed in the category of workman. This point is further established by documents Annexures R.14 to R/24 which, to borrow the language of the Lower Court, 'prima facie' establish that the appellant had been performing duties of supervisory nature".
5. Having arrived at the above conclusion, it would follow that the appellant's appointment was governed by the terms and conditions of his appointment stipulated in the appointment letter. His claim of overtime, medical facility, grant of leave etc. Not being covered by the appointment letter, would not be admissible to him.
6. Coming to the termination of his services appellant had raised a number of issues; namely, that there was no complaint against him nor was he involved in any misconduct. He further stated that no domestic enquiry was held against him. All these questions are obviously redundant. It is not even the Company's case that appellant's services were terminated on the ground of misconduct or any other complaint against him. It was quite right that he was appointed temporarily for particular job namely to supervise acquisition of land required for the project and all matters connected with it. So long the said job continued he was also allowed to continue in service so much so that on termination of contract's period it was renewed from time to time and in all five times, but after the job was completed there was no justification to continue the appellant in service and hence his termination of services.
' In view of above discussion the learned Court below has come to the right conclusion that the appellant was not a workman within the meaning of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 and I.R.O., 1969, and therefore, these Ordinances were not applicable to him. Consequently the grievance petition filed by the appellant was not maintainable under section 25-A I.R.O. Because no right guaranteed or secured to him under any law, award or settlement was infringed. Instead his appointment was wholly regulated by the terms and conditions of contract specified in the appointment letter and repeated in every subsequent letter by which his appointment was extended from time to time. His Job description is also clear from said letters of appointment/extension. Any further evidence particularly oral evidence was not called for to lend any support to the documentary evidence discussed above. If oral evidence was not recorded, the findings arrived at by the learned Labour Court were least affected. Even otherwise as is clear from the judgment of the Lower Court the appellant himself was to blame for non-recording of oral evidence because despite the repeated opportunities given to him, he did not turn up for recording of the said evidence. ' The brief facts of this appeal are that appellant Sarfraz Ali filed grievance petition under section 25-A, I.R.O. 1969 for his reinstatement and back benefits.His case was that he was employed as Inspector in the Respondent's Establishment on permanent basis on 25-1-1996.
The nature of his duty was purely clerical though he also did manual work at Seaport. However, he was removed from service on 6-2-1998 without assigning any For above reasons while endorsing the decision of the Lower Court appeal is dismissed. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.