' AJMAL MIAN, C.J.---This is a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment, dated 28-7-1997 passed by a learned Division Bench of the Lahore High Court in Criminal Appeal No,1242 of 1988 filed by the convict and Murder Reference for confirmation of the death sentence submitted by the learned Judge, Special Court No,VIII, Sargodha constituted under Act XV of 1987, in respect of conviction recorded under sections 302/34, P.P.C. Against Matiullah and Khuda Yar and also in respect of convictions and sentences on various counts referred to in the impugned judgment, allowing the same by recording acquittal in favour of convict Matiullah and reducing the sentence of death to life imprisonment of convict Khuda Yar. The petitioner, who is complainant, has filed the present petition for leave to appeal.
2. Mr. M. Farooq Bedaar, learned counsel for the petitioner, has candidly submitted that he would not press the above petition against acquittal of respondent No,1 Matiullah, but would press against the reduction of sentence from death to that of imprisonment for life of respondent No,2 Khuda Yar.
' In support of the above petition against respondent No,2 Khuda Yar, the learned counsel has invited our attention to pages 32 and 33 of the paper-book wherein the learned Judges of the Division Bench without recording any reason has held that the death sentence awarded to the above accused was not confirmed.
3. It is true that the normal sentence in a murder case is death. The Court has to award the above normal sentence in the absence of any mitigating circumstances. Additionally, the Court is supposed to record mitigating circumstances in order to justify the award of lesser sentence of imprisonment for life in place of death. In the instant case, the learned Judges of the Division Bench had failed to adhere to the above rule. We would have granted leave against the above alteration in the sentence without recording any reason by the High Court. However, we have examined the case and found that there was cross-firing between the accused and the complainant parties. The above fact could justify the imposition of the lesser sentence than that of death. Though the impugned judgment suffers from legal infirmity on account of non-recording of the reasons for altering the sentence of death to that of imprisonment for life, but in view of the above factual position we are of the view that it will not serve any purpose to grant the leave as there was justification present in the case for awarding lesser punishment than death sentence as pointed out hereinabove.
' Leave to appeal is refused and the petition stands dismissed.