' Fazal Din and four others filed Constitutional Petition No, 938/R of 1973 in this Court in which they challenged different orders of the Settlement authorities. The petition was admitted to regular hearing but was dismissed ultimately by my order dated 21-5-1975.
' Against the said order Petition for Special Leave to Appeal was filed in the Supreme Court of Pakistan, that was also dismissed on 12-3-1976. The petitioners then discovered "some new facts" and filed a review petition before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, that too was dismissed with the following observations "We find that the last operative order in the field was made by the High Court on 21-5-1975 and this Court has merely refused to interfere with it and grant special leave against it. The petitioners may if so advised suitably apply to the High Court in this behalf for review of their order, for its disposal in accordance with law."
' Thereafter, the petitioners. Filed the present review petition in this Court.
2. The grounds urged in support of this petition are that during the litigation before the Settlement authorities the petitioners did not know of certain important and material facts. It was later on that certain new and important matters came to light. Those were that Fateh Din son of Ni2am Din, predecessor-in-interest of the respondents, filed Claim No, 19241, which was verified by the then Claims Officer on 5-5-1958. Later on, when Martial Law Regulation No, 49 came into operation, aforesaid Fateh Din on 29-12-1958, submitted an application in the Court of Claims Officer, Sialkot, requesting for cancellation of his claim as he did not own any property in Jammu & Kashmir. On the said application, his claim was cancelled by order dated 30-12-1958.
' It is alleged that in spite of the aforesaid facts, later on, Fateh Din by fraudulent means got prepared Q. P. R.-V Form No, 289 (Entitlement Certificate) dated 11-8-1959, from the Central Record Office and on the basis of the aforesaid document he obtained allotment, ' Petitioners have placed on record copy of application Annex. P. 1, order of cancellation by the Claims Officer Annex. P. 2 and copy of the entitlement certificate Annex. P.
3. It is on the basis of the aforesaid evidence that review is being sought of my judgment dated 21- 5-1975.
' The main emphasis of the learned counsel for the petitioners was on the aforesaid three documents. Learned counsel submitted that the discovery of new and important evidence was made after due diligence, previously it was not within the knowledge of the petitioners, hence this is a fit case for review.
' Learned counsel for the respondents challenged the correctness of the aforesaid three documents on the ground that those were not genuine. He submitted that either certified copies should have been filed or still better the petitioners should have applied for summoning of the relevant record, because a strict procedure had been laid down for an application under Martial Law Regulation No, 49, whether that had been complied with or not could only be verified after perusing the relevant record. He further submitted that the review petition was badly barred by time.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that certified copy of Annex. P. 2 was placed on the record of the Supreme Court, regarding the remaining two documents he submitted that those were admissible in evidence being photostat copies.
5. I called upon the learned counsel for the petitioners to first satisfy me on the question of limitation because the review petition is barred by 720 days. Learned counsel submitted that he had along with the review petition filed an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. It was further submitted that delay was neither intentional nor deliberate, it may, therefore, be condoned. He also took up the position that in the constitutional proceedings, there was no time limit for filing a review petition because Civil Procedure Code was not strictly applicable to such proceedings. This position is not tenable, because in Hussain Bakhsh v. The Settlement Commissioner (I), it was held that the constitutional proceeding are governed by the Civil Procedure Code and a review petition is competent against an order passed in the writ jurisdiction and the review would be in accordance with the Civil Procedure Code.
' Learned counsel then submitted that if at all the time limit is to be taken into consideration then the relevant date for the purpose of this review petition would be when the Supreme Court dismissed the review petition and from that date this petition is within time.
6. I do not agree with this submission. The petitioners are seeking review of an order passed by this Court, therefore, the limitation would start running from the date of the order of this Court, and for that matter, they must show sufficient cause for condonation of delay. In the instant case, the grounds for condonation of delay are very loose to which I shall refer in the preceding paragraph.
' I have gone through the grounds of the review petition as well as those mentioned in the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. The petitioners have not mentioned in the review petition as to when and how they came to know of the "new and important matter". They simply said that "the new evidence, which was previously not in the knowledge of the petitioners has been discovered now".
' In the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, the explanation was "that the delay in filing the review petition is neither intentional nor deliberate". In para. 5 of the said application it is mentioned "that it is, expedient and desirable in the interest of justice to condone the delay and adjudicate the review petition on merits."
' I don't think these are good grounds for condoning the delay. The petitioners are under a strict legal duty to furnish a reasonable explanation and to show sufficient cause for condonation of such an inordinate delay. In my view, they have failed to do so. The averments pertaining to condonation of delay both in the review petition as well as in the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act are of casual type.
7. In spite of the objection of delay, I allowed the learned counsel for the petitioners to address me on merits. The new and important evidence on which the petitioners sought review must be legal and admissible. The petitioners have not cared to mention what was the difficulty in obtaining the certified copies; and in case there was a genuine difficulty the relevant record could always be summoned but no request was made to that effect. I am, therefore, not inclined to treat the photostat copies of the three documents a discovery of new and important matter or evidence as envisaged by Order XLVII, rule 1, C. P. C.
' Scope of review is limited. It is further curtailed by law of limitation, therefore, even if some new and important evidence had been discovered that would not entitle the party aggrieved to file a review petition according to his convenience and pleasure. The law of Limitation is to be strictly observed.
' There is another defect in this petition. The necessary certificate as required by rule 10, Chapter 1-A of the High Court Rules and Orders, Volume V, has not been appended to the review petition.
(1) PLD 1970 SC 1
8. For the foregoing reasons, I dismiss this review petition and leave the parties to bear their own costs.