This appeal is directed against the order dated 7-11-1977 whereby the learned Additional District Judge, Sargodha accepted the appeal and directed the ejectment of the appellants-tenants from the shop in dispute.
2. The facts of the case as stated are that the Rent Controller in an application for ejectment inter alia on the ground of default had on 12-5-1970 ordered the tenants under section 13 (6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 to deposit the arrears of rent from 19-3-1964 to 30- 4-1970 at the rate of Rs. 70 per month before 18-6-1970 and continue paying rent before 15th of every month. As the issue relating to whether a statutory notice was issued by the transferees was decided against the tenants, they preferred an appeal to the learned appellate authority and obtained a stay order on 3-6-1970. The appeal was however, dismissed on 29-7-1970 and the tenants went in for another appeal to the High Court and the order for deposit of rent was again stayed on 31-8-1970. The second appeal was consequently dismissed on 31-10-1975, and the case was remanded to the trial Court for further proceedings.
3. It was stated that on 18-6-1976 the file was received back by the Controller, and the respondents-landlords made the same day an application for the ejectment of the tenants on the ground that they had uptill then failed to deposit rent in compliance of the order passed under section 13 (6) in spite of the fact that the stay order stood vacated on account of the dismissal of the appeal by the High Court. The appellants-tenants also made an application on that day praying for condonation of delay and for a direction to deposit the arrears. It was contended that the order of the Controller passed under section 13 (6) of the Ordinance remained suspended till the appeal was finally disposed of by the High Court. The tenants contended that they did not know of the result of their appeal uptill recently that was why they did not deposit the rent. This application was vehemently contested by the respondents, and they maintained that the default was willful. After going through the arguments of both the parties, the Controller on 20-7-1976 directed the tenants to deposit the arrears of rent uptill then before 30-7-1976 at the rate of Rs. 70 per month already fixed by his predecessor. The respondents, thereon, filed a review application on 7-9-1976 but the same was dismissed on 26-5-1977.
4. Having failed in their attempt to persuade the Controller to strike off the tenants' defence, the respondents-landlords moved another application on 7-9-1976 for striking off the defence alleging that the tenants have failed to deposit rent for the month of June 1976, but they did not succeed. An appeal preferred before the learned Additional District Judge, was accepted and the tenants were directed to vacate the premises forthwith. Hence this appeal.
5. I do not agree with the learned counsel for the appellants that the order dated 20-7-19.76 allowing further time to the tenants to deposit the arrears had attained finality because it was not appealed against. An order of the Controller directing the tenants to pay tentative rent ,g is strictly not an order for ejectment and according to the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Ibrahim v. Muhammad Hussain (PLD 1975SC457) such an order is not appealable.
6. The main question which requires determination is whether the appellants-tenants failed to comply with the order of the Controller passed . By him on 12-5-1970 and for that reason their defence was liable to be struck off. As already stated, the basic order passed on 12-5-1970 under section 13 (6) directed the tenants to pay the arrears of rent before 18-6-1970 and continue depositing future rent before 15th of each succeeding month. This order remained . Stayed uptill the second appeal was finally dismissed by the High. Court on 31-10-1975. It appears on record that the tenants did not bother to deposit the arrears as well as the rent due within a reasonable time and even up to 18-6-1976 when they made an application to the Controller for extension of time on the ground that they did not know about the result of their appeal in the High Court. It is a lame excuse which cannot be entertained. The respondents were duly represented by a counsel. The arguments were heard and the pronouncement was made to the knowledge of the counsel. It is a cardinal. Principle of law that notice to the counsel is a notice to the client. The learned counsel contended; at the Bar that he had informed the appellants about the result of the appeal, but maintained that the letter had not reached them. If a letter was posted to the appellants, the presumption is that it was received by them. It was argued that the appellants had denied in their affidavits having received an information from their counsel and that this fact was believed by the Controller to be true. I have gone through the affidavit dated 18-6-1976 sworn in by Abdul Hameed, one of the appellants but he has nowhere contended that he did not receive the intimation from his counsel. His assertion that he had come to know of the result of the appeal that very day, when the file was received by the Controller, was a vague statement which cannot be given weight to.
7. The question arises whether the Controller was competent to extend time or pass a new order giving the tenants a fresh date for deposit of rent. It was held in Messrs Ansari Brothers v. Holy Trinity Church Trust (PLD 1971 SC 700) that the time for payment of the monthly rent before fifteenth day of each month is statutorily fixed under section 13 (6) of the Ordinance, and r it is not within the competence of the Rent Controller to enlarge that time, In view of the above pronouncement, the order of the Controller passed by him on 20-7-1976 was without jurisdiction and a nullity in the eye of, law. Therefore, the plea that the Rent Controller had jurisdiction to examine whether the default was wilful or that the tenants had, in obedience to that order, deposited the arrears including the rent for the month of June 1976, has no substance.
8. If it is presumed that the letter intimating the tenants about the fate of their appeal did not reach them, even then the default is established. It is admitted by the tenants that they had learnt about the dismissal of their second appeal on 18-6-1976 when the file was received back by the Controller. It is evident that at least on 18.6-1976 the tenants were intimated that the stay order passed in their favour stood terminated and the rent became due forthwith. It was the duty of the tenants to have deposited the rent within a reasonable time which according to Shah Wall v.
Ghulam Din (PLD 1966 SC 983) and the case of Ansari Brothers was the time initially granted by the Controller. In the present case the Controller had directed on 12-5-1970 to deposit rent before 18-6-1970 i.e. Within 36 days, and under the rule of "reasonable time", the tenants were required to deposit the arrears within 36 days of attaining knowledge about the payability of the rent i.e. 18-6- 197 which elapsed on 24-7-1976. Thus the arrears paid on 30-7-1976 cannot be deemed to be in compliance of the order passed under section 13 (6). But the position regarding the rent for the month of June 1976 is different. The statute required this payment to be made before 15th of July 1976 which was not done. The tenants had thus definitely and wilfully defaulted in depositing rent in time.
9. The learned counsel referred to a. Few of the reported cases and contended that the Controller had, anyhow, passed an order requiring the tenants to deposit rent before 30-7-1976. He argued that the acts of the Court are not to prejudice the parties. There is no cavil at the principle laid down in those cases, but there is a difference between a wrong order which is altogether void and without jurisdiction. Since the order passed on 20-7-1976 was a nullity, it did not have the effect to prejudice the tenants.
10. For the reasons aforementioned there is no force in the appeal and the same is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs. Since the dispute is pending for a long time, I am thus not inclined to grant the tenants any further time for vacating the premises.