' QAZI MUHAMMAD FAROOQ, J.---This is a petition for leave to appeal from the judgment, dated 23- 12-1998 of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi whereby Regular Second Appeal No, 87 of 1977 arising from the orders, dated 23-12-1975 and 22-10-1976 of the learned lower Courts with regard to restitution of possession of certain landed property was accepted.
2. The relevant facts in brief are that vide Mutation No,850 attested on 14-12-1956 one Muhammad Nawaz had mortgaged land measuring 36 Kanals, 18 Mamas comprised in Khasra Nos.870, 969 and 15 Kanals, 1 Marla comprised in Khasra No,874 alongwith some other land for a sum of Rs,3,000 in favour of Pir Bakhsh, Amir Khan and Maula Bakhsh. The mortgagee rights of Pir Bakhsh were transferred on his death in favour of his son Mumtaz Hussain and daughter Mst. Sultana Bibi.
Through another Mutation No,1193 attested on 6-4-1963 the same mortgagor had mortgaged land measuring 37 Kanals, 1 Marla comprised in Khasra No,950, land measuring 16 Kanals, 6 Marlas bearing Khasra No, 962, land measuring 20 Kanals, 11 Marlas comprised in Khara No,956 and land measuring 22 Kanals, 6 Marlas bearing Khasra No,968 for a sum of Rs,3,100 in favour of Muhammad Nawaz, Muhammad Arif, Fateh Muhammad and Ghulam Abbas. Thereafter, the said mortgagor sold land measuring 137 Kanals comprised in Khasra Nos. 870, 969, 874, 950, 962 and 956, subject to the existing mortgage, for a sum of Rs,15,281 including the mortgage charge of Rs,4,963 in favour of Muhammad Nawaz, Fateh Muhammad and Muhammad Arif, vide Mutation No,245, dated 10-6- 1969. In order to preempt the transaction Altaf Hussain, son of the vendor, filed a suit on 3-6-1970 which was decreed in his favour on 8-5-1974 by the learned Civil Judge, Talagang, on payment of a sum of Rs,11,830 including the mortgage charge of Rs,4,963 with the observations that the "mortgage charge will remain intact". He was also directed to deposit the pre-emption amount, less the amount already deposited, before 8-6-1974 failing which the suit shall stand dismissed.
The appeal preferred by the vendees was disposed of by the learned District Judge, Campbellpur, vide judgment, dated 12-12-1974, by consent of the parties in the terms that the pre-emption amount was enhanced to Rs,13,530 including mortgage charge of Rs,4,963 and the decree-holder was directed to deposit the enhanced amount of Rs,1,700 in the lower Court before 18-1-1975, failing which the suit would be deemed to have been dismissed. The pre-emptor deposited a sum of Rs,8,567 i.e, Rs,3,056 as Zare-e-Punjam, Rs,3,811 in compliance with the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and Rs,1,700 as ordered by the Appellate Court and also got possession of the suit land on 1-6-1974 in execution of the decree. On 12-5-1975 an application was moved by the vendees under section 144 read with sections 47 and 151, C.P.C. For restitution of possession of the land in dispute on the ground that the suit stood dismissed on account of failure of the pre-emptor to deposit the pre-emption amount as ordered by the trial Court. It was alleged in the application that the pre-emptor had deposited a sum of Rs,8567 instead of Rs,13,530. The application was resisted by the pre-emptor mainly on the ground that he had not deposited the mortgage amount of Rs,4,963 as the mortgage was still intact. The application was dismissed by the learned trial Court on 23-12-1975 and the first appeal filed by the vendees was also dismissed by the learned District Judge, Campbellpur on 22-10-1976. However, the second appeal filed by the vendees was accepted by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi on 23- 12-1998 and the decree-holder and other respondents were directed to hand over the possession of the property in dispute to the vendees. Feeling aggrieved the decree-holder and two others have filed this petition for leave to appeal. They have also moved an application alongwith the petition for condonation of delay of 129 days in filing the present petition on the grounds that the regular second appeal was heard on 8-12-1998 but the judgment was announced without notice to the parties and their counsel, correct number of the appeal and full particulars of the parties as well as the names of the counsel for the parties were not mentioned in the supplementary cause list for 23-12-1998 wherein the appeal was shown listed for pronouncement of judgment and the petitioners had learnt about the pronouncement of judgment on 9-6-1999 in their village. The application for condonation of delay was strenuously resisted by the learned counsel for the caveator on the ground, inter alia, that according to their own showing the petitioners had got the knowledge of the judgment on 9-6-1999 and had applied for the certified copies on 10-6-1999, which were supplied on 15-6-1999, but the appeal was filed on 30-6-1999 and no explanation for delay of each day had been given in the application for condonation of delay.
3. Before adverting to the merits of the case it is necessary to dispose of the application for condonation of delay in filing the petition.
4. It is evident from the record that the impugned judgment was reserved on 8-12-1998 and pronounced on 23-12-1998. However, the copy of the daily Single Bench Cause List for 23-12-1998, available on record, makes it manifest that only the title of the second appeal is mentioned therein and the names of the counsel for the parties are missing and the number of the appeal is recorded as 87-87 instead of 87 of 1977. Besides, there is nothing on the record to show that any notice with regard to pronouncement of judgment was given to the petitioners or their counsel. In this backdrop we would have taken a lenient view in the matter of condonation of delay had the petition been barred by limitation by one or two months and not by 129 days. The petitioners had engaged a counsel and the reserved judgment was pronounced after a fortnight, therefore, it does not stand to reason that they had got knowledge of the same after about six months. We are convinced that if they had kept contact with their counsel or his clerk they would have certainly got the knowledge of pronouncement of the judgment within a reasonable time notwithstanding non- service of notice. A litigant is required to pursue his case with reasonable diligence and care and his responsibility does not come to an end when the judgment is reserved. In such an eventuality he is supposed to establish contact with his counsel and remains in touch with him in order to find out the result of the case. The inordinate delay in filing the petition leads to two inescapable conclusions. First, that the petitioners were aware of the pronouncement of judgment and were not inclined to challenge it and when at a later stage they decided to file a petition for leave to appeal in this Court they mentioned a wrong date of knowledge of pronouncement of judgment therein to escape the bar of limitation. Secondly, the petitioners did not pursue their case with reasonable diligence and their conduct was negligent during the period between the date when the judgment was reserved and the date on which they had professedly got knowledge of its pronouncement.
The plea set up by them thus hardly constitutes a valid ground for condonation of delay. The application for condonation of delay is, therefore, dismissed and the petition is held to be barred by limitation.
5. Even on merits justification for interference had not been made out. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the mortgage amount was rightly deducted by the pre- emptor from the pre-emption amount becauase the sale transaction was subject to mortgage, the second set of mortgagees was not a party to the suit, it was not a case of merger as the suit land was purchased by three out of four mortgagees of the first set of mortgagees and the learned trial Court had specifically kept the mortgage charge intact. The arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the caveator were to the effect that the mortgage had virtually merged in the sale as the suit land was purchased by three out of four mortgagees and for that very reason the pre-emptor had obtained physical possession of the suit land during the execution proceedings, the pre-emptor had not complied with the order of the learned trial Court with regard to deposit of the pre-emption amount and the deduction of the mortgage amount having been made unilaterally was illegal.
6. It will be pertinent to reproduce at this stage the order of the learned trial Court in regard to deposit of the pre-emption amount. It is worded thus:-- ' "The suit succeeds and is decreed in favour of the plaintiff as against the defendants on payment of Rs,11,830.00 including the mortgage charge of Rs,4,963.00 which amount less than 1/5 pre- emption money already deposited should be deposited for the vendees up to 8-6-1974, else the suit to be deemed as dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs."
7. The pre-emptor was directed by the learned trial Court in unequivocal terms to deposit a sum of Rs,11,830 including' the mortgage charge, which amount was enhanced to Rs,13,520 by the Appellate Court, as the pre-emption amount but instead of complying with the order in letter and spirit or getting it' modified through a review petition or a revision petition he had deducted the mortgage amount on his own initiative and deposited the balance amount of Rs,8,567. The methodology adopted by the pre-emptor cannot be approved as the order in question was interpreted by him in his own wisdom and modified unilaterally. Needless to mention that if a litigant considers an order or a judgment passed in a case to be vague or erroneous the proper course of action for him is to file a review petition before the same Court which passed the order/judgment or take the matter before the Appellate Court in appeal or revision, as the case may be. He cannot assume the role of a Court and if he chooses to do so he must thank himself alone for the unsavoury consequences.
' For the reasons stated above, leave is refused and the petition is dismissed. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.