BASHARAT AHMAD SHAIKH, J.---Appellant A.I Shan filed a writ petition in the High Court in which he made the following averments. He was an owner in a village Barban Tehsil Mirpur, and was also a cultivator in village Khambal. The lands of both these villages were acquired for the construction of Mangla Dam Reservoir under two respective awards made in 1960 and 1962. Consequently a mutation was sanctioned in which Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and Water and Power Development Authority were shown as owners of the acquired land. Now the Mipur Development Authority and its functionaries have illegally and without any authority marked plots over the lands mentioned above and have allotted them to different persons. The Mirpur Development Authority has no authority to utilise the land belonging to the Government. In any case the land under reference was acquired for the construction of Mangla Dam Reservoir and could not be used for any purpose other than the purpose for which it was acquired. For both these reasons the marking of plots and the allotment of those plots was illegal. For that reasons allotment of Plot No.107 Sector D-3, West made on 17th July, 1997 to Muhammad Saleem, one of the respondents in the writ petition, was illegal.
2. Following prayers were made in the writ petition,-- "It is, therefore, prayed that while accepting the writ petition, the acts of respondents Nos.1 to 3 in marking and allotting the plots over the land owned by respondents Nos. 6 and 7 may kindly be declared against law, without jurisdiction and null and void, against the rights of general public and it may also be declared that the allotments of plots in Sector D-3, West-1, Mirpur, owned by respondents Nos.6 and 7 including the allotments of respondent No.4, dated 17-7-1997 about Plot No.107 situated at Sector D-3 West-1 may also be declared against law and without jurisdiction are against the original purposes of acquisition made at the time of construction of Mangla Dam and this land may kindly be ordered to be used only for that purpose and not for any other purpose like the allotment. The allotments made in this Sector may kindly be declared illegal, without jurisdiction and lawful authority, with costs.
Other appropriate relief available to the petitioner, may also kindly be granted to him. "
3. A learned Judge in the High Court directed the Mirpur Development Authority to submit parawise comments. It was submitted in the comments that Water and Power Development Authority had issued a "No Objection Certificate" to the Mirpur Development Authority to set up a housing scheme on the land under reference. It was contended that writ petitioner A.I Shan was not an aggrieved person in any sense of the term.
4. The learned Judge dismissed the writ petition in limine by holding that the land under reference, according to the very contents of the writ petition, belonged to the Government and the Water and Power Development Authority; Therefore, the writ petitioner had no locus standi to agitate the matter. It was also observed that A.I Shan did not make a prayer that the land acquired from him may be de-awarded because it was not being used for the purpose for which it was acquired.
5. This appeal arises out of the leave granted to A.I Shan. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties we agree with the High Court that the appellant has no locus standi to challenge the action of the Mirpur Development Authority to mark plots on the awarded land which has been done in pursuance of a residential scheme. The appellant was paid compensation for the land which previously belonged to him whereupon its ownership passed to the Government. Even if it is true that the land belonging to the Government cannot be disposed of by the Mirpur Development Authority, the appellant, being now a stranger to the land, has no locus standi to challenge the action of the Mirpur Development Authority.
6. The other point raised by Mr. Muhammad Yunus Arvi is that the land was acquired for the Mangla Dam Reservoir but since subsequently was not needed for that purpose it could not be used for any other purpose. The learned counsel relied on the case reported as Muhammad Akbar (through legal representatives) and 7 others v. The Commissioner, Rawalpindi Division and 2 others (PLD 1976 Lah. 747) in support of his contention. According to learned counsel it was held in that case that land acquired for a particular purpose must be used for that purpose and it could not be utilised for any other purpose. Ch. Lal Hussain, the learned counsel for the Mirpur Development Authority, vehemently contended that the proposition put forward by the learned counsel for the appellant lacks the approval of any Court. He cited a judgment of this Court reported as Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government and others v. Gohar Rehman and others (1996 SCR 112) to contend that in fact the legal position is to the contrary. He submitted that it has been laid down in the judgment mentioned above that if any lend remains surplus after utilising its main part for the purpose for which it was acquired the Government is at liberty to use such surplus land as it desires. It was further held that the Government can even sell that land subsequently if the original public purpose for which it was acquired has been fulfilled.
7. Ch. Muhammad Reaz Alam, the learned counsel for the respondent No.4, the allottee of Plot No. 107, contended that in Muhammad Akbar's case the whole land acquired was being used for a purpose other than the one for which it had been acquired. He, therefore, contended, that the judgment of the Lahore High Court was inapplicable.
8. We have gone through the two judgments and find that the controversy raised by Mr. Muhammad Yunus Arvi stands concluded by the judgment of this Court in Gohar Rehman's case in which, after noticing a number of reported judgments, the following conclusion was recorded by this Court,--- "It is amply clear from the above authorities that if after completing the original 'public purpose', there remains any surplus land, that can be utilised by the Government according to its option. In such an eventuality, the original title of the Government or for that matter the award is not adversely affected.
As is evident from the survey of the authorities of the learned counsel for the respondents, the same are distinguishable and do not help the case of the respondent because in those cases the purpose for which the land was acquired was diverted for altogether a new purpose and no part of the land was utilised for the original purpose whereas in the instant case the major part of the land was utilised for the purpose it was acquired and only a small portion of the surplus land was used for a purpose which was ancillary to the original purpose."
It is well-known that thousands of acres of land was acquired for construction of Mangla Dam Reservoir out of which only a small portion is stated to have become surplus. Therefore, the judgment of this Court in Gohar Rehman's case is fully applicable to the present case.
9. So far as the judgment of Lahore High Court in Muhammad Akbar's case is concerned, we find that the proposition canvassed by Mr. Muhammad Yunus Arvi has not been laid down in that judgment. What that judgment lays down is that since private land of people can only be acquired by the State for public purpose, the Land Acquisition Act does not envisage that land may be taken frown one person to be given to another. Facts of the case were that the land was acquired in District Jhelum, bordering district Mirpur, for rehabilitating a Pir. The High Court held that it was not a public purpose and quashed the acquisition proceedings. It was held as follows:-- "From the preamble as well as the relevant provision in the Land Acquisition Act, it is quite clear that land of people may be acquired by the State for a public purpose, meaning thereby for the use of the public or people at large, or, for a company under Part VII of the Act for its use which the Provincial Government believes would serve some specified statutory purposes. The Land Acquisition Act, 1804 does not envisage at all taking of land of one to be given over to the other.
One cannot rob Peter to pay Paul. That may be Robinhood's philosophy but that is not part of the law that is expressly barred by the fundamental law of the land i.e. The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan which allows acquisition of private property only for public purpose."
Therefore, we reach the conclusion that the writ petition did not disclose a prima facie case and has been rightly dismissed in limine.