DECISION ' This appeal which is filed by Akbar Khan against M/S General Tyre and Rubber Company of Pakistan Limited, hereinafter referred to as Respondents Company is directed against the order, dated 31-8-1999 of Sindh Labour Court No,IV, Karachi whereby the grievance petition filed by the appellant was dismissed. The facts leading to this appeal may be briefly summarized as follows: ' The appellant Akbar Khan was employed as ordinary worker in the Respondents Company for a long time. On receipt of intimation from Quetta that his mother's sister had expired the appellant applied for leave vide his application dated 15-8-1997. After availing his leave when he returned to Karachi he received a charge-sheet dated 29-8-1997 containing the allegation of unauthorized leave for more than 10 days. The appellant submitted his reply denying the allegations of the charge-sheet. After holding necessary enquiry, Enquiry Officer Mr. S. Najam Ahmed found the appellant guilty of misconduct and in consequence of his finding the appellant was dismissed from service with effect from 21st February, 1998 vide order, dated 21-2-1998. Subsequent to receiving the order of dismissal the appellant served grievance notice on 11-3-1998 on the respondents but the same was not replied. He ultimately filed grievance petition in the Labour Court on 17-7-1999 with prayer for his reinstatement in service and awarding him back-benefits, with result mentioned above.
2. While contesting the grievance petition the Respondents Company took Legal Objection that the petition was hopelessly time-barred. I have heard the learned counsel of both the parties and perused the relevant record of the Lower Court. I have also gone through the short order passed by the Sindh Labour Court No,IV dismissing the appellant's petition.
3. It is clear from the Lower Court's order that the appellant's petition has failed on sole ground of limitation. The Lower Court's observations in this connection are as under:- "The application, on the face of it is sufficiently time-barred. The applicant has failed to reasonably furnish the explanation, for such long delay in filing of this petition. Moreover the applicant has also failed to give sufficient cause which hampered him or came in his way to prefer this application so late.
' Accordingly I find no reasonable ground to condone his such long delay and admit his grievance petition. Consequently, grievance petition is refused to be admitted."
' Thus the learned Labour Court has dismissed the grievance petition in limine. Obviously it was not denied by the appellant that his grievance notice as well as his grievance petition were time- barred. As provided in section 25-A of I.R.O., 1969 grievance notice was to be served within 3 months of the delay on which grievance arose. In the present case it was the order of appellant's dismissal dated 21st February, 1998 which provided the cause of grievance to him. As such he was supposed to have given the said notice latest by 21st May, 1998, but instead he served grievance notice earlier than the said date, on 4-3-1998. As such grievance notice was within time.
4. But it is further provided in subsection (4) of the aforesaid section that if the employer fails to communicate his decision within the specified period or if the worker is dissatisfied with such decision, then the matter can be taken to Labour Court within a period of two months from the date of communication of the employer or, as the case may be, from the expiry of specified period within which the decision of the employer was to be communicated. In the present case the grievance petition was filed on 17-7-1999, though it was to be filed within a period of two months from the date of the employer's communication or from the expiry of the period meant for sending such communication. Admittedly the Respondents Company has not given any reply to the appellant's grievance notice but since the appellant himself had served the notice on 11-3-1998 the employer had to give reply thereto within 15 days, that is to say within 15 days from 11-3-1998 on which the respondents are shown to have received the notice. It is thus clear that the period for respondents' reply to the notice expired on 26-3-1998 therefore, two months' period for the purpose of filing grievance petition was to be counted from the said date of expiry. In this way the appellant's petition should have been filed latest by 26-5-1998 but it has been actually filed after the long delay of 14 months. The learned Labour Court is correct in holding that the appellant's grievance petition is hopelessly time-barred. Moreover no satisfactory explanation has been furnished for such delay. The only reason given by the appellant's learned counsel in course of arguments was that the appellant being a poor illiterate person was unaware of the legal position and therefore, instead of taking the matter directly to the Labour Court he fought his battle firstly before the officers of the Labour Department. Such stand taken by the appellant's counsel is confirmed even by the appellant himself in para 4 of his grievance petition wherein he has stated that the appellant being poor man and not aware of the relevant law submitted complaint to Joint Director Labour with bona fide impression that Labour Director may redress his grievance". In this connection it may be observed that it is well-settled law that ignorance of law is no excuse. In 1981 PLC 103 the delay in filing appeal on mistaken advice of counsel was not condoned. In the said case even PLD 1975 SC 22, PLD 1976 SC 195 were also referred. In another case reported as PLD 1989 SC 130, one of the reasons for delay in filing appeal was that the appellant had been bonafidely pursuing appeal ever since the impugned order but failed to obtain relief from concerned quarter.
5. Even on merits the appellant does not have better case. Admittedly he availed leave without being sanctioned and therefore, his absence for the period of alleged leave was obviously unauthorized.
' For the foregoing reasons while upholding the order of Lower Court the appeal filed by the appellant is dismissed.