DECISION ' The appellant Afzal Ahmed has preferred this appeal from the judgment, dated 17th July, 2000 of Sindh Labour Court No,IV whereby his grievance petition was dismissed. The appellant's case, briefly stated, is that he was employed as Cutter in the Respondents' Mills on 25-7-1960. Since then he had been working on various jobs in various cadres. Lastly when he was working as Supervisor also involving the duties of manual labour, his services were terminated on 1-2-1998 by verbal order. No reason was given for the termination of his services and, therefore, the Termination Order was mala fide and without legal effect. He took the matter to N.I.R.C. Under section 22-A(B) (g) of I.R.O. 1969 but his petition did not find favour with the said Commission. His petition was, therefore, dismissed by Order, dated 4th March, 1999 with remarks that the appropriate forum if approached by the petitioner might consider the condonation of delay made on account of litigation filed before the Commission. Thereafter, the appellant addressed grievance notice to the respondents vide his letter dated 23-3-1999 but the respondents failed to reply the said notice. He then filed grievance petition in Sindh Labour Court No,IV on 9-4-1999 which was dismissed as stated above.
Aggrieved by the impugned order of the said Labour Court he has come in this appeal.
2. In Reply Statement the tespondents have taken a plea that the grievance petition was not maintainable mainly because the grievance notice served by the appellant was hopelessly time- barred. It is further stated that it was clear from the report of the Joint Director Labour East Division Karachi who held the enquiry into the relationship between the parties under the Orders of M.I.R.C.
That the relationship between the parties stood severed in July 1979 and Nance the grievance petition was liable to be dismissed. It further shows that following the severence of appellants relationship with the respondents he was not only paid full and final dues but he also got the benefit of Golden Hand Shake Scheme. As such, the respondents have averred. The appellant was not an aggrieved person under section 25-A I.R.O.
1969.
3. I have heard the learned counsel of both the parties and have also perused the relevant documents available on record. Admittedly no evidence has been led by either party in support of their respective version. It is because the fate of the case hinged only on legal grounds. The foremost legal ground was delay in giving grievance notice to the respondents and filing of grievance petition. The perusal of Labour Court's Order would show that grievance petition filed by the appellant was dismissed on the ground of limitation, In order to appreciate Labour Court's decision, the relevant portion thereof any be reproduced asunder:-- "It is an admitted fact that the main grievance of the applicant was his termination dated 1-2-1998 without any notice or explicit reason and after the alleged termination he was bound to give grievance notices within three months of the cause of action but he has failed to do so and instead of that he filed the petition before N.I.R.C. Even before going to the N.I.R.C. Had not given any notice to the respondents. The Hon'ble,N.I.R.C. Had dismissed his petition on 4-3-1991 and on the face of it, it is clear that after that he had given grievance notice on 25th March, 1999 which is hopelessly time-barred. He has not furnished any plausible explanation as to why the grievance notice was not served upon the respondent (in time). "
I am in full agreement with the views of the learned Labour Court expressed hereinabove. The cause of action (termination of appellant's services) having arisen on 1-2-1998 he was obliged to give grievance notice within three months of the said date (i,e, latest by 1-5-1998) but it was actually given on 25-3-1999 after the delay of more than 10 months. The only ground for such undue delay was that he first approached N.I.R.C. Instead of Labour Court. The learned labour Court has also taken note of the fact that though his petition was dismissed by N.I.R.C. On 4-3-1999 yet the applicant took about three weeks' time in giving the grievance notice on 25th March, 1999. Thus the grievance notice being hopelessly time-barred, it would automatically follow that even the grievance petition was similarly time-barred. Admittedly on separate application was moved by the appellant for condonation of the delay.
4. The N.I.R.C. In its Order dated 4-3-1999 has taken the view that since the appellant's case did not fall 'under the caption unfair labour practices as defined in section 15 of I.R.O. 1969, it has no jurisdiction. Elaborating its view further it was held by the N.I.R.C. That the appellant's case at the most was of his reinstatement and payment of his dues under section 25-A I.R.O. 1969 or of Payment of Wages under Payment of Wages Act, 1936. Consequently his petition was dismissed as not maintainable before the N.I.R.C. It was thereafter that the appellant gave grievance notice and filed grievance petition. The question was whether the period spent on approaching the wrong legal forum was condoneable. The appellant's learned counsel cited some authorities in order to show that if the wrong forum was selected with bona fide belief, the delay made in approaching the said forum could be condoned. However, the learned counsel failed to convince this Tribunal how the appellant bona fide believed that N.I.R.C. And not the Labour Court had necessary jurisdiction to redress his grievance. He has not pointed out any material or document on record to prove the appellant's bona fide belief. On the contrary when he saw no other way to get out of the situation in which the appellant had put himself his learned Advocate had conveniently adopted argument of 'bona fide belief on the part of appellant'. Which in my opinion, was afterthought.
Moreover, the learned Labour Court has rightly remarked that even before approaching N.I.R.C. The appellant had not given any notice to the respondents.
5. Apart from above it could not be overlooked that N.I.R.C. Relying on the report of the Joint Director Labour concluded that no relationship of employer and employee existed between the parties after 1979 when the appellant had allegedly resigned from the respondent's service and was paid full and final dues. The Order of N.I.R.C. Clearly shows that it was with mutual consent of the parties that Joint Director Labour was appointed to hold enquiry about the relationship of the parties and as such the Commission had no doubt about the authenticity of the conclusion made by the Joint Director in his report. Though appellant was obviously not satisfied with the Joint Director's report yet he led no evidence before the Labour Court disprove the plea taken by the respondents that there existed no relationship of employer and employee between the parties after 1979, which also found support from the report of the Joint Director.. Considering the appellant's case from that angle that he caused to be employee of the respondents from 1979 following his alleged resignation, the period for giving grievance notice had to be counted from the date of his resignation, having occurred in 1979. In that case the grievance would be time-barred for more than a decade.
6. For the above reasons, the appellant having failed to get relief both from N.I.R.C. And Labour Court, I see no justification to differ from the views taken by aforesaid two judicial forums. Accordingly while upholding the judgment of Labour Court, the appeal filed by the appellant before this Tribunal is dismissed.