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2001 P Cr. L J 1976

ABDULLAH TANG vs SALEEM SABA and another

Citation2001 P Cr. L J 1976
CourtSindh High Court
Case No.Criminal Miscellaneous Application No,166 of 2000
Date2001-06-01
Judge(s)S. A. Rabbani
ResultCase remanded

' The present applicant was tenant of the respondent in respect of two shops in P.E.C.H.S., Karachi.

The respondent tiled Rent Cases Nos.896 and 897 of 1992 under Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 for eviction of the applicant. The Rent Cases were allowed by the Rent Controller, and the respondent filed Execution Application No,21 of 1999 before IVth Rent Controller, Karachi East. In the execution proceedings, the present applicant filed objections as well as an application with the prayer for action against the respondent under section 476, Cr.P.C. For alleged perjury before the Rent Controller. The Rent Controller rejected the objections and dismissed the application under section 476, Cr.P.C. And allowed the execution application, by his order, dated 11-8-1999.

2. The dismissal of application under section 476, Cr.P.C. Was challenged by the present applicant before the Sessions Court, Karachi East through Criminal Revision No,76 of 1999. The Vth Additional Sessions Judge, Karachi East, entertained the revision but, on her finding that Rent Controller is not a Civil Court, and therefore, section 476, Cr.P.C. Read with section 193, P.P.C. Is not applicable before the Rent Controller, the revision was dismissed being not maintainable. The order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge. On 3-3-2000, has been called in question in the present proceedings in exercise of jurisdiction under section 561-A, Cr.P.C.

3. Mr. Abrar Hassan, learned counsel for the applicant, submitted that the, respondent had already withdrawn rent from the Court where it was deposited by the applicant, but he made false statement in affidavit-inevidence and reiterated it in cress-examination and thus, he committed perjury in the proceedings before the Rent Controller. He submitted that the Court .Vas misled by the false statement and the applicant suffered thereby. Mr. Abrar Hassan stated that the Supreme Court, in the order in Civil Petitions Nos.507 and 508-K of 1999 observed that false statement was made by this respondent.

4. Learned counsel for the applicant contended that application under section 476, Cr.P.C. Was filed before Executing Court and not before Rent Controller and Executing Court is a Civil Court. In support of his case, he cited Abdul Haleem v. The State 1994 SCM R 1103.

5. Mr. Yousuf Moulvi, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that the fact that application under section 476, Cr.P.C. Was filed after about a year of the alleged perjury, shows mala fide on the part of the applicant. He contended that Rent Controller is not a Court in support of this contention, he relied upon Abdul Razzak v. Muhammad Raghib and another 1988 MLD 2801. Mr. Yousuf Moulvi submitted that it is the discretion of the Court to take cognizance and the Rent Controller in this case held that no perjury was committed.

6. Mr. Arshad Lodhi, learned A.A.-G. Simply supported the impugned order.

7. This case involves some important questions. First is whether Rent Controller under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance is a Court?

8. Mr. Yousuf Moulvi relied upon an S.B. Ruling of this Court in the case of Abdul Razzak 1988 MLD 2801. In that case, it was held that the Rent Controller, before whom the original proceedings were pending, was not a Court and a complaint was not required to be filed by him. The Supreme Court authority, relied upon for that finding, was Khadim Mohiuddin and another v. Ch. Rehmat Ali Nagra and another PLD 1965 SC 459.

9. The case before the Supreme Court was in respect of West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. Following were the relevant observations and findings:- ' "From the provisions of the Ordinance it appears that though under section 16 of the 'Controller' has been given powers of summoning and compelling the production of evidence' he is not bound in every case to follow the procedure as laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure. He has been given powers under sections 4, 10(3) and 12 to make orders after holding such enquiry as he thinks fit. In such cans the question of nature of enquiry is left to him. That means that in such enquiries the parties have no right to insist on production of such evidence which they desire to adduce in support of their case. Therefore, no machinery is prescribed for summoning witnesses or compelling production of documents in such enquiries. In short these enquiries may be such as are conducted by an Executive Officer. Furthermore, the Controller has been given powers to regulate the use by a landlord of his own property, inasmuch as within the Urban Area the landlord may not convert a residential building into a non-residential building. The power thus, conferred on the Controller would appear to be purely executive. Then subsection (3) of section 13 says that before putting the landlord in possession of the tenanted premises the Controller should be satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide'. But there is no express mention of any enquiry by the Controller. If the word 'satisfied' imports the necessity of enquiry, even then it cannot be said that in holding such enquiry he will be bound by any particular procedure.

' We therefore, conclude from the foregoing examination of the relevant provisions of the Ordinance that though some of the functions of the Controller, are judicial in character, but yet he is not required to act judicially in discharging many of his functions. In these circumstances, it will be difficult to hold that the Controller while performing his functions under this Ordinance acts as a Court. At the most it may be said that he acts in a quasi-judicial capacity."

10. It may be seen that with change of the law, viz. The Ordinance, the legal position changed.

Section 19 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, made all the difference. This section prescribed the procedure to be followed by the Controller in all cases with an exception of an application under section 14. Receiving evidence is an essential part of this procedure. There was no such procedure in West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. Sections 8, 11, 12 and 15 of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, all require an application to be made to the Rent Controller. On which the Controller has to adopt the procedure given in section 19.

11 . Since receiving evidence in the form of affidavits and cross-examination is an essential requirement of the proceedings before the Rent Controller under section 19 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, they are judicial proceedings and not quasi judicial. Judicial proceeding, as defined in the Criminal Procedure Code, includes any proceedings in the cause of which evidence is or may be legally taken on oath. No executive functions have been assigned to the Controller under the Ordinance, 1979 in force in Sindh. The Controller under West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, was not a Court as he was assigned some executive functions and was not hound to receive evidence on oath in all cases, and proceedings before him used to be quasi judicial. A Controller under Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, conducts judicial proceedings, receives evidence on oath and performs no executive functions. He is, therefore, a Court within the known relevant meanings of the word.

12. After a finding that Rent Controller is a Court, the next question would be whether it is covered by the classes of Courts mentioned in section 476, Cr.P.C. Subsection (I) of this section provides that "when any offence referred to in section 195 subsection (1), clause (b) or clause (c), has been committed in or in relation to, a proceeding in any Civil Revenue or Criminal Court, the Court may take cognizance of the "offence and try the same in accordance with the procedure prescribed for summary trials in Chapter XXII".

13. The object of the provision was, obviously, to empower the Courts conducting judicial proceedings to try the said offences mentioned in the section, that are committee in such proceedings before them. Such powers were equally required by all Courts. This was done by mentioning all categories of Courts within reference to the broad nature of subject-matter of the proceedings, In that sense, a subject of the proceedings may be of civil nature. Related to a crime or the revenue matters. These three categories, thus, cover all sorts of Courts. The meanings of "Civil Court" in the Black's Law Dictionary are the Court established for the adjudication of controversies between individual parties, or the ascertainment, enforcement and redress of private rights. The disputes within the jurisdiction of Rent Controller or a Family Court are civil disputes about private rights. These Courts are, therefore, included in Civil Courts category given in section 476, Cr.P.C. It cannot be inferred that the Legislature gave these powers to Revenue Officers but intended to deprive Rent Controller or a Family Court of them. The intention was to empower all sorts of Courts with these powers, as these three categories cover all Courts. A Rent Controller under Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, may, therefore, take cognizance of an offence under section 476, Cr.P.C.

14. The next question in this case is whether the Additional Sessions Judge was legally authorized to entertain criminal revision against the order of the Rent Controller. The revisional powers of Sessions and Additional Sessions Judges have been given by section 439-A, Cr.P.C. These powers are in respect of any proceedings before a Magistrate only. The law does not provide that while exercising powers under section 476, Cr.P.C. a Court becomes a Magistrate. The proceedings were not before a Magistrate and, therefore, the revisional powers under section 439-A, Cr.P.C. Could not be exercised by the Additional Sessions Judge. The order of the Additional Sessions Judge, challenged in these proceedings, is wholly without jurisdiction and the findings therein are void and of no consequence.

15. Last is the point about exercise of inherent jurisdiction under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. To secure the ends of justice in this case. Mr. Abrar Hassan contended that the respondent made false statement in the proceedings before the Rent Controller that resulted in an order against him and he had to go upto the Supreme Court for justice. He submitted that the Supreme Court has given a definite observation in the order in Civil Petitions Nos.507 and 508-K of 1999, that the respondent made false statements.

16. Mr. Yousuf Moulvi submitted that the Rent Controller has given a finding that no perjury was committed, and it was the discretion of the Court to take cognizance and it declined to do so. The finding of the Rent Controller was certainly before the observation made by the Supreme Court. It would, therefore, be appropriate to re-examine it.

17. As a result of what has been discussed above, the impugned order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, being without jurisdiction, is set aside. The matter is remanded to the Court of the Rent Controller for reconsideration of the application under section 476, Cr.P.C. This Criminal Miscellaneous application is disposed of accordingly.

Cited by 2 cases

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