' IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, J.---Briefly stating facts of the case are that appellants were employed as Casual workers by respondent on a pipeline construction project known as PARCO. It is stated that on completion of the project their services were terminated as such they initially approached National Industrial Relations Commission for their reinstatement but without getting any relief as such time-barred application under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the "IRO") was filed by them before Presiding Officer Labour Court No,2, Lahore on 1st February, 1982. However, their application was ordered to be returned to them for want of jurisdiction with the direction to present it before the competent Court, as such they filed appeal before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal which was allowed on 10-12-1990. Against the last-mentioned order the respondent i,e, Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Company Limited preferred a writ petition before Lahore High Court, Lahore which was allowed vide impugned order, dated 4th/5th. December 1995. The appellants preferred petition which was accepted and leave to appeal was granted to consider following points:- "(i) That the oral termination of the petitioners was violative of Standing Order 12(3) which expressly provides that service of a workman can be terminated only through a written order assigning explicit reasons. It was so held both by the Labour Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal but the High Court has not attended to this aspect of the matter.
(ii) That there is no such classification on as 'daily wagers' in Standing Order 1 which enumerates various classes and categories of workmen. Petitioners were workmen within the meaning of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 and Industrial Relations Ordinance. They could, therefore, agitate their grievance in the Labour Court in respect of the rights guaranteed under Standing Orders Ordinance.
(iii) That the petitioners had pursued their remedy, before the Special Authority/Member, N.I.R.C.
Bona fide and as such the time consumed in those proceedings was a sufficient cause for condoning the delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act. In any case, the delay having been condoned by the Labour Appellate Tribunal in his discretion, it was not available to the High Court to reverse that decision in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction in writ."
2. Learned counsel for appellants contended that appellants were permanent workers in the organization of the respondent, therefore, their services were not liable to be dismissed on the ground that they were daily wagers. He further stated that the Presiding Officer Labour Court No,2 Lahore vide judgment. Dated 25th June, 1983 has held that the appellants enjoy status of permanent worker but relief was not granted to them for want of jurisdiction. However, these findings were maintained by Labour Appellate Tribunal vide order dated 10-12-1990 and in this way the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere in the concurrent finding of facts. He further stated that the Labour Appellate Tribunal had condoned the delay in filing of petition under section 25-A, I.R.O. And the orders being with jurisdiction was not open to be interfered by the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
3. None appeared on behalf of the respondents.
4. On having gone through the impugned judgment we consider it proper to take up at the first instance Point No,ii mentioned in the leave granting order. It is true that under section 2(xxviii) of I.R.O. Worker and workman has been defined but without showing any classification namely as to whether a daily wager can also be considered to be a worker or workman. Similarly in the definition of worker under section 2(i) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the "Ordinance") there is no such classification.
Thus, in view of such situation in order to find out that what is the status of worker or workman who is employed on casual or daily wage basis we have to make reference to Standing Order No,1 which provides the classification of the workman. According to its clause (b) a permanent workman is a workman who has been engaged to a work of permanent nature likely to last more than nine months whereas its clause (e) provides that a temporary workman is a workman who has been engaged for work which is of an essentially temporary nature likely to be finished within a period not exceeding nine months. On careful ,perusal of the definition of permanent workman and a temporary workman to determine the status of a workman it is essential to look to the nature of work against which he has been employed. At a time there could be a work which is likely to last for more than nine months but before its completion service of that person has been terminated arbitrarily or contrary to the Rules governing the service then such person can maintain his claim for his reinstatement and if the nature of the work is likely to be completed within a period of none months but it has not been completed during that period but was completed beyond the period of nine months and on completion of the work the service of the worker has been terminated he cannot legitimately make out a case for his reinstatement on the job. Thus much emphasis has to be laid on the word "likely to be".
' This proposition has been examined by this Court in the following judgments, relevant paras therefrom are also reproduced hereinbelow: Pakistan International Airlines v. Sindh Labour Court No,5 and others (PLD 1980 SC 323).
"According to the learned Single Judge, the respondents had become permanent workmen solely, because they had been in the appellant's employment for more than nine months. But, as submitted by Mr. Sarwana, this view ignores the words 'likely to be' which precede the words 'finished within a period for exceeding nine months' . Redundancy is not to be attributed lightly to the Legislature and the words 'likely to be' were inserted because given the nature of human beings 'work' expected to be finished within nine months might not be finished during that period, because a human error, miscalculation, negligence or any other cause. And, the insertion of the words 'likely to be' make it clear that a workman cannot become a permanent workman if the work for which he was employed was expected to be finished within nine months but was in fact completed after the expiry of nine months. This is obvious and Mr. Mohsen Ali did not even attempt to defend the sweeping observations of the learned Single Judge."
' Muhammad Yacoob v. The Punjab Labour Court No,1 and 5 others (1990 SCM R 1539).
' In order to get the benefit of the Standing Orders Ordinance in the matter of termination of service, the petitioner had to show that he was a permanent workman. A 'Permanent workman' has been defined in the Standing Orders Ordinance by reference to the nature of the work on which he has been engaged or employed. If the work is not of a permanent nature, then howsoever, long may be his employment, he cannot be taken to be a permanent workman. The length of the period of employment by itself has not been made the ground or a test for determining the nature of the work. Keeping in view the nature of the work on which the petitioner was employed, namely, an addition to the regular strength of Malis for the maintenance of the gardens and the ground on daily wages or on work-charge basis, it cannot be said that such additional work being done by him was of a permanent nature necessarily. As regards the stigma attaching to the permanence of his services, the petitioner has as witness admitted that the termination order was oral and not in writing."
' Executive Engineer, Central Civil Division Pak. P.W.D., Quetta v. Abdul Aziz and others (PLD 1996 SC 610).
"14. The ratio of the above judgment in the case of Muhammad Yagoob (supra) seems to be that the period of employment is not the sole determining factor on the question, as to whether a workman is a permanent workman or not but the nature of the work will be the main factor for deciding the above question. In other words, if the nature of work for which a person is employed is of a permanent nature, then he may become permanent upon the expiry of the period of nine months mentioned in terms of clause (b) of paragraph 1 of the Schedule to the Standing Orders Ordinance provided, he is covered by the definition of the terms 'worker' given in section 2(i) thereof. But if the work is not of permanent nature and is not likely to last for more than nine months, then he is not covered by the above provision."
Izhar Ahmed Khan and another v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore ano others (1999 SCM R 2557)
"A careful analysis of the above definition of 'permanent workman' and 'temporary workman' would show that it is the nature of work on which a workman is employed that determines whether the workman is a permanent or a temporary workman. If the work is of a permanent nature and likely to last for a period of more than nine months, the workman employed on such a work will be deemed to be a 'permanent workman'. On the other hand, if the nature of work is temporary and is likely to be finished within a period of nine months, then a workman employed on such work will be deemed to be 'temporary workman'. As a corollary, it follows that mere factor that if the work of a temporary nature continues beyond nine months, it would not make a workman employed on such work a 'permanent workman' as the expression 'likely to be finished within a period not exceeding nine months' used in the definition clause does admit within its scope that a work of temporary nature may in certain circumstances stretch beyond nine months."
' The above judgments have also been considered by this Court in the case of WAPDA v. Kanimullah and others (2000 SCM R 879) and with reference to a specific work against which a worker or workman is engaged it was observed as under:-- "In the instant case, the work for which the respondents were engaged was not of permanent nature. They were retained in service only for a specific project. Therefore, the mere length of service for which they were engaged in the employment* of the appellant would not be a relevant factor in determining the nature of their employment."
In view of the above precedented law it can conveniently be held that as in the instant cases the appellants were engaged against a work on PARCO Pipelines Construction Project which was not likely to continue permanently and was likely to be completed beyond the period of nine months, therefore, in view of such situation when it is held that the job of the appellants as workers was on a specific project, therefore, on its completion their services were liable to be terminated and they cannot claim themselves to be the permanent workers or workmen in terms of Standing Order 1(b) of the Schedule appended with the Ordinance, therefore, their services were rightly terminated.
3. Thus, having held that the appellants were not permanent workers the point noted in leave granting order is answered that notwithstanding the fact that there is no classification under section 2(xxviii) of I.R.O. Between worker or workman who are daily wagers or casual workers but if the nature of the job against which a person is engaged is likely to be completed within the period of none months and in fact had completed later on after the expiry of the said period he would be temporary workman, as such would have no legitimate claim for his reinstatement in the service.
' Thus, in view of above conclusion other points noted in the leave granting order are not discussed.
' For the foregoing reasons appeals are dismissed with no order as to Costs.