DECISION ' This judgment will dispose of two Appeals bearing Nos. KAR-457/77 and KAR-458, both directed against an order passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Sind Labour Court No. V, Karachi, dated 31-10.1977, while disposing of an interlocutory application under section 45 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, filed by the appellants Grindlays Bank Ltd. Employees Union against Messrs Grindlays Bank Ltd., Karachi. In Appeal No. KAR-457, the appellanrt are Messrs Grindlays Bank Ltd. Employees' Union whereas in Appeal No. KAR-458/77, it is the Bank itself that has appealed against this interlocutory order of Sind Labour Court No. V, Karachi.
2. The brief facts giving rise to this matter are that Messrs Grindlays Bank Ltd., in July 1975, set up a Corporate Processing Unit for accounts containing Rs. 5,00,000 and more and transferred all such accounts to its Head Office in Karachi where this C. P. U. Is operated. Again, in early October 1977, the Bank issued its Notice as per Annexure 'B' in Appeal No. KAR457/77 whereby Current Accunts should in future maintain a minimum balance of Rs. 2,000 and could only be opened with an initial deposit of not less than Rs. 5,000. In case of Savings Bank Account. It was directed that a Savings Bank Account can be opened with an initial deposit of not less than Rs. 3,000 for checking account and for Rs. 2,500 for non-checking account but a minimum average balance of Rs. 2,000 or more must be maintained in either category of accounts. It is alleged by the appellants namely the Grindlays Bank Ltd. Employees' Union that as a result of these changes and amendments to their rules as introduced by the Management of the Bank, several Clients closed their accounts with this Bank and the Union claimed that this resulted in suspension wholly or partly of work in the Bank; thus amounting to a 'Lock-out'. Hence, the Union filed an application under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, in the Sind Labour Court No. V, Karachi, praying for the enforcement of their right to the Bank continuing with its full working capacity and strength of workers and should be restrained from suspending or closing the work, partially or wholly in derogation of the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Along with this application under section 34, the Union also presented an application under section 45 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, wherein the prayer was to restrain the respondents Bank from commencing or continuing the acts of illegal lock-out. The Sind Labour Court by its Order dated 31- 10-1977, passed on this interlocutory application reached the conclusion that the respondent Bank's introduction of C. P. U. Or the revision of their rules for Savings and Current Accounts did not amount to a lock-out and hence rejected the Union's prayer under section 45 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. However, in its concluding sentence of this impugned Order, the Lower Court stated that "the respondents would not suspend the work in a manner as to enable them to terminate or to do away with the employment of the employees or to act detrimental to the employees after reducing the number of accounts holders in C. P. U. Savings and Current Accounts during the pendency of this case." Hence, these 2 Appeals No. 457/77 by the Bank Employees' Union against the order rejecting their application under section 45 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and Appeal No. KAR-458/77 by the Bank itself praying for the deletion of this last sentence in the impugned order.
3. I have heard Mr. Hameed Siddiqi on behalf of the Grindlays Bank Ltd., Employees' Union and Mr. M.
A. Khan on behalf of the Bank, in both these matters and at great length. I have also perused the Lower Court record and have carefully considered the points urged in these two Appeals.
4. In Appeal No. 457/77, Mr. Hameed Siddiqi, has mentioned in the preamble to in addition section 37(3) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, section 38(3-A) of the same Industrial Relations Ordinance, and has submitted that if this Appeal does not lie then, this matter may be treated as Revision Application. His main grievance against the impugned order of the Lower Court is that this Court in deciding his interim application under section 45 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, has as it were, disposed of his main petition under section 34, thereby deciding the whole case. I find myself unable to accept this contention of the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the Employees' Union. It seems to me that the Lower Court in rejecting the Union's application under section 45 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, has proceeded on the correct lines and has given good and sound reasons for reaching its conclusion, that application under section 45 is premature and is not maintainable. Besides, it has been pointed out by Mr. M. A. Khan appearing on behalf of the Bank that in the first place, no appeal lies from an order under section 45 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and secondly if this Appeal be treated as a Revision application, the relief sought by the applicant Union in this matter is not maintainable. Mr. Khan has pointed out that before a prohibitory order can be passed under section 45(2) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, there must be an Industrial Dispute in existence, an Award and then an appeal against it. He emphasised that section 34 proceedings are not an Industrial dispute. Section 2(14) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, defines the `Lock-out' and although it contains the words "the suspension wholly or partly of work by an employer", such suspension must necessarily occur in connection with an Industrial Dispute. Mr. Khan submitted that even the subsequent words defining lock-out appearing after the words "or" are to be read in relation to an industrial dispute.
Hence, the judgment of the Court below holding the application under section 45 to be premature is unassailable for upto now, not a single worker or employee of the Bank has been reduced or retrenched or had his terms and conditions of employment altered in any manner whatsoever. It is further pointed out by Mr. Khan that the act of the Management in setting up the C. P. U. And in revising their rules, relating to Savings and Current Accounts is the prerogative of the Bank and, as it relates to policy, a matter exclusively within the discretion of the Bank. He also submitted that the C. P. U. Was set up on 2-7-1975, so that the Union waited for more than 2 years before taking the Bank to Court on this point. On this first Appeal No. KAR-457/77, then, I am of the view that no grounds have been made out for interfering with the order of the Court below and that, therefore, Appeal No. 457/77 must stand rejected.
5. There remains the Second Appeal No. 458/77 for decision. As mentioned above, in this Appeal the Bank have asked for the deletion from the impugned order of the last sentence in this Order. In this connection, it has been submitted by Mr. M. A. Khan, appearing on behalf of the Bank that the learned Lower Court having come to the conclusion that there was no actual lock-out and that the application submitted by the Union was premature; it should have closed its order at that point, and not gone on to make further observations concerning future actions by the Bank, which observations are ultra vires and beyond the jurisdiction of the Court below. It was submitted that these words. However, good intentioned they may be, yet amount to a directive to the Bank which having regard to the language of section 45 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, the Lower Court was not empowered to embark upon. In the case of General Iron & Steei Workers' Union v.
Messrs General Iron and Steel Works Ltd. their Lordships of our Supreme Court interpreting the language of section 20 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959, which was the same as section 45 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, held that the direction given by the Industrial Court that 32 persons mentioned in the list be re-instated with continuity of service etc., is beyond the terms of section 20 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959. Again, in a case reported in PLD 1966 SC 498, it was held that "the Industrial Court cannot act on a mere conjecture and its own peculiar idea of social justice, far less as a benevolent despot." I find myself in agreement with the submissions of the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the Bank and accordingly I hold that the last sentence in the impugned order consisting of the words "however, the respondents would not suspend the work in a manner as to enable them to terminate or to do away with the employment of the employees or to act detrimental to the employees after reducing the number of account holders in C. P. U., Saving and Current accounts during the pendency of this case", be deleted from this Order. 1968 SCMR 534