Pakistan Case Law← Search
PLD 2001 Supreme Court 31

ABDUL RAUF and others vs Mrs. SHEREEN HASSAN

CitationPLD 2001 Supreme Court 31
CourtSupreme Court of Pakistan
Case No.Civil Appeals No,157 and 158 of 1999
Date2000-07-11
Judge(s)Nazim Hussain Siddiqui, Abdul Hameed Dogar
ResultAppeals dismissed

ABDUL HAMEED DOGAR, J.--By common judgment we propose to dispose of Civil Appeals Nos.157 and 158 of 1999 as they arise out of judgment dated 27-5-1998 of High Court of Sindh, Karachi, passed in F.R.As. Nos.155 and 156 of 1997.

2. Leave to appeal was granted to the appellants by this Court to examine the following questions of law: Whether the word 'children' in section 15(2)(vii) of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, includes a married daughter; and

(ii) Whether a landlord seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground of personal requirement of his married daughter, is required to bring on record his explanation, as to, why he is providing accommodation to his married daughter and her husband and children."

3. The respondent, Mst. Sheereen Hassan, filed Rent Cases Nos.758 and 759 of 1992 under section 15 of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the "Ordinance") against the appellants namely Abdur Rauf and Tariq Siddiqui, respectively, mentioning therein that she is the owner/landlady of the commercial building constructed on Plot No,255/C, Central Commercial Area, PECHS, Karachi known as 'ALKASHAN' consisting of two flats and three shops (measuring 850 sq. Ft.) on the ground floor. Shops Nos.1 and 2 were let out to the appellants in September, 1981 and the rent was agreed to be paid at the rate of Rs,325 per month. The respondent had already obtained the possession of Shop No,3 under judicial orders and had kept the said shop for the use of her daughter Nelofer Hassan who passed her M.B.B.S. Examination in the year 1990 and after completing her house job she cleared her Post Graduate Course in 1992. Since her daughter was keen to start her own practice as such she required the abovesaid shops for setting up a clinic and laboratory alongwith ancillary facilities. She through notice dated 19-7-1990, asked the appellants to vacate the shops in their possession as she required the same in good faith for the use of her daughter. According to the rent application appellants were misusing the passage of building for commercial purposes and obstructing the right of way and indulging in such activities which were causing nuisance to the neighbourers and thus impaired the material value and utility of the premises. They had also encroached upon footpath outside the authorized area by extending the area of shops in their possession and had also constructed iron shutters there which amounted to alterations and additions in violation of the terms and conditions of the Lease Agreement.

4. The appellants, in their respective written-statements, denied the allegations of the respondent and claimed that the area of all the three shops was 640 sq. Ft. According to them, the shops were let out in the year 1981 at the rate of Rs,250 per month and goodwill of Rs,50,000 was also paid to the landlady by each tenant. They denied that the respondent had kept Shop No,3 vacated for the use of her daughter, Dr. Nelofar Hassan. They, in the written-statements, further stated that respondent was taking undue advantage by showing that the said shops were required for the personal use of her daughter, an already married woman. In fact, she wanted to enhance the rent and in that respect she had asked them, in writing about two years ago. They also denied the allegations of misusing the passage and creating nuisance and encroaching upon footpath.

5. In support of their cases the parties led their respective evidence. Respondent examined Mir Ghulam Hassan, her husband/attorney, and her daughter, Dr. Nelofar Hassan, whereas appellants examined themselves and also examined Muhammad Anwer Sehgal and Fasihullah Shaikh.

6. On assessing the evidence, the learned Rent Controller allowed the abovementioned rent cases on the ground of personal need. The said orders were assailed by the appellants in First Rent Appeals Nos.85 and 97 of 1996 and were set aside and the matter was remanded to the trial Court for passing judgment afresh on considering the evidence led by the parties within 30 days. The Rent Controller after assessing the evidence afresh again allowed the ejectment applications vide orders dated 4-7-1997. It was these orders which were challenged in F.R.As. Nos. 155 and 156 of 1997 by the appellants before the learned High Court of Sindh, Karachi, which were dismissed by the impugned judgment.

7. We have heard Mr. Naraindas C. Motiani, Advocate Supreme Court and Advocate-on-Record on behalf of the appellants and Mr. S.M. Abbas, Advocate-on-Record for the respondent, at length and have gone through the record and proceedings of the matter in minute particulars.

8. Mr. Motiani mainly contended that both the Courts below have failed to consider whether the married independent daughter can be termed a family member and that eviction can be sought on the ground of her personal need. According to him, a married independent daughter will not fall within the purview of section 15(2)(vii) as such impugned judgment is not sustainable in law. He further argued that the learned High Court has failed to appreciate that Shop No,3 was lying vacant and furthermore there was sufficient accommodation available on the second floor of the building to run the clinic. Mr. Motiani contended that the premises were rented out to the appellants on acceptance of Pugri amount of Rs,50,000 and in view of terms of the agreement appellants cannot be evicted from the premises till such time they observe its terms. In support, he cited following case-law:

(1) Mst. Anwar Jehan v. Ismail Khan 1984 CLC page 2849.

(2) Abdul Aziz v. Ali Muhammad PLD 1979 Note 135 at p.97.

9. Mr. S.M. Abbas, Advocate-on-Record for the respondent, vehemently controverted the contentions of appellants' counsel and argued that in Islam a married daughter is provided right of inheritance from the estate of her parents as such she can equally be entitled to use the properties of her parents for personal bona fide need.

10. It would be pertinent to note that respondent, for the first time, asked for vacating the premises for the use of her spouse and children by sending notice to the appellants on 19-7-1990. According to the record, her daughter, Dr. Nelofar Hassan, got married on 3rd August, 1992 much after the above-referred notice. The respondent, in the rent cases, filed on 21st September, 1992, has categorically mentioned the reasons about the personal bona fide need of the premises for establishing the clinic for her daughter, Dr. Nelofar Hassan. The respondent/landlady started the endeavour to get the shops, in question, vacated and in that respect she had already got vacated Shop No,3 for the said purpose. It has also come in the evidence that the respondent started getting the shops, in question, vacated in the year 1990 because of the fact that by that time her daughter had passed M.B.B.S. Examination and wanted to open clinic therein. In that connection Shop No,3 was already got vacated. On this aspect of the matter, respondent has adduced sufficient evidence and two Courts below have rightly established the same beyond any doubt.

11. On the 1st point in the leave grant order that whether word "children" in section 15(2)(vii) of the Ordinance, includes a married daughter, it would be appropriate to reproduce this provision of law, first: "Application to Controller: (1)

(2) The Controller shall, make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the premises within such period as may be specified in the order, if he is satisfied that-- (i)

(v) .

(vi) ..

(vii) the landlord requires the premises in good faith for his own occupation or use or for the occupation or use of his spouse or any of his children."

Here word "children" is significant and requires to be defined and discussed thoroughly. The word "child" has been defined in Concise Oxford Dictionary, IXth Edition, means son or daughter (at any stage). From this, even a married son or married daughter comes within the definition of word "child". The above-referred law does not say that the children must be dependent upon the landlord. Reference can be made to the case of Haji Lal Bux v. Mistri Allah Dad 1980 CLC page 984 whereby High Court of Sindh while interpreting section 13(3)(1)(a) of West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance observed that the expression "for his own occupation" be considered liberally and interpreted to include not only need of family, dependents and persons essential for such occupation but also other genuine requirements of landlord. It has also been held that the premises are required for occupation of grown-up and married son of the landlord, there is absolutely no bar in law for the landlord to put his son in occupation of the disputed premises. The High Court of Sindh in the case of Mst. Razia Begum v. Pakistan Medical and General Store 1982 CLC 659 while interpreting section 13(3)(1) of West Pakistan Rent Restriction Ordinance and section 15 of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance has given liberal meaning to the term "children" and has observed that it has been used in a broader sense and no such qualification, as mentioned, can be read therein. In this case the need of independent married son was found to be bona fide. When the eviction of the premises can be sought on the personal bona fide need of a married son of the landlord it can also be sought on the same principles for the married daughter of the landlord when both fall within the same category.

12. No doubt, after marriage, the daughter passes out of the parents' house and goes to that of husband. The fact of the marriage does not sever the blood relationship which exists between parents and their daughter. The above relationship gives rise to certain moral obligations and parents are bound by such obligations to support and maintain their married daughter in case of her husband does not afford whereas parents are well-off and can afford. It would be advantageous to refer some Islamic provisions of law prescribing certain rights and liabilities in between parents and children. In this respect reference is made to section 337 of Mahomedan Law: "337. Paternity and maternity.--Parentage is the relation of parents to their children. Paternity is the legal relation between father and child. Maternity is the legal relation between mother and child.

These -legal relations give rise to certain rights and liabilities as regards inheritance, guardianship and maintenance."

This provision of law provides right of maintenance to the children by the parents. The word 'maintenance' has been defined in Concise Oxford Dictionary, as "1. The process of maintaining or being maintained;

2. The provisions of the means to support life." Liberally interpreting the word 'maintenance', it would be a moral obligation upon the parents to provide the means to support the life of their children.

13. The rights of a woman are fully protected by Islam. This Court in the case of Ghulam Ali and 2 others v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi PLD 1990 SC 1, irrespective of other aspects, has dealt with the position of a woman on her marriage in detail and has referred at side line 'U' page 16 as under:-- "On her marriage, her individuality is not lost and she remains a distinct member of the society; her existence or personality is not merged into that of husband. The contract of marriage gives no power over her person beyond what the law defines, and none whatever upon her goods and property.Her property remains hers in her absolute individual right; the doctrine of coverture is not recognized in Islam. She can sue or be sued by her debtors or claimants without joining a next friend, or under her husband's name. After she has passed from her father's house into her husband's home, she continues to exercise all the rights and privileges which the law allows. She can alienate or transfer her property in any way she pleases without any extraneous control of her husband; she can act as an administratrix or executrix or be appointed a Mutawalliah. She has a distinct lien upon her husband's estate for ante-nuptial or post-nuptial settlements. She can enter into binding contracts with her husband and proceed against him in law Courts, if necessary. Her earnings acquired by her personal exertions cannot be touched by her husband, Nor can she be treated with impunity. She can receive property without the intervention of the trustees. It is not by way of courtesy that she enjoys this unique position and legal status, but it is due to the injunctions of the Book of God."

Comparison with other system of law: It would, therefore, not be far from truth to say that under the Islamic Law a woman occupies a superior legal position in comparison to her English or Hindu sister. Thus it is apparent that she occupies the best position as regards her legal status, and no other system of law stands any comparison to the Islamic system in this respect.

Conclusion: Muhammad (p.b.u.h.) effected a complete change of the legal status of females, from that of complete dependence and servitude to that of complete independence and enjoyment of full legal rights and privileges, so much so that he placed them on a footing of perfect equality with men in the exercise of all legal powers and functions, which stand in bold relief when compared with the state of law amongst ancient Arabs of the pre-Islamic days." At page 17 inside line 'W' of the same case, reference has been made to the last 'Khutba' of the Holy Prophet (p.b.u.h.) which contains several Injunctions. One Injunction clearly prescribed that men have rights qua women and they have similar rights qua men.

14. The law referred by appellants' counsel is on different facts and circumstances. In the case of Mr. Anwar Jehan (supra) learned High Court has held that nothing has been brought on record to explain as to why the respondent had to provide accommodation to his married daughter. The case of Abdul Aziz is only a note and no findings of any sort have been given as such cannot be considered.

15. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and the case-law, discussed above, we do not find any justification to interfere with the concurrent judgments of the Courts below.

Accordingly, these appeals fail and are hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.

Cited by 9 cases

For educational and research use only — not legal advice. Verify against the official report before relying on it. See our Disclaimer.
Disclaimer·Privacy·Terms·Search