' MUHAMMAD YUNUS SURAKHVI, J.---This appeal, with the leave of the Court, has been filed against the judgment and decree passed, by the High Court on 18-2-1998, whereby the appeal filed by the appellant against the judgment and decree passed by the District Judge, Mirpur, dated 30-12-1995, was dismissed.
2. The necessary facts, giving rise to the present appeal, briefly stated, are that a suit for recovery of Rs,1,96,276 was filed by the appellants herein, in the Court of District Judge, Mirpur against the respondents. The suit, in the said Court, was at its initial stage, when an application on behalf of one of the defendants-respondents to transfer the same to the Court of Additional District Judge, Bhimber, was moved. The aforesaid application, after receiving the objections from the opposite side, was accepted and the suit was returned to the plaintiffs-appellants for its presentation to the Court of competent jurisdiction at Bhimber vide the order of the trial Court, dated 30-12-1995.
Against the aforesaid order, an appeal was preferred by the appellants in the High Court which was dismissed vide the impugned order, dated 18-2-1998. It is the aforesaid order of the High Court which is the subject of present appeal.
3. In support of the appeal, it was vehemently contended by Ch. Riaz Alain, the learned counsel for the appellants, that both the District Judge and the High Court hive committed an error by returning the plaint to the plaintiff-appellants with a direction that the same may be filed before the Court of competent jurisdiction at Bhimber as the defendants permanently reside at Bhimber and the work was also accomplished within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of Additional District Judge, Bhimber. The learned counsel submitted that both the Courts below lost sight of the fact that section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure regulates and determines the jurisdiction within whose limits, the suit is to be instituted. The aforesaid provision of the Code clearly postulates that the suit may be tiled within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the Court where the defendant or defendants voluntarily reside, or carry on business or personally work for gain or where the cause of action wholly or in part arose. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, since the agreement between the parties was executed at Mirpur, therefore, the cause of action partly arose to the plaintiff at Mirpur as such, the District Judge at Mirpur was also clearly vested with the jurisdiction to try and proceed with the suit.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants and perused the relevant record. It has been averred by the plaintiff-appellants in para. No,9 of his plaint that the agreement in question between the parties was executed at Mirpur, therefore, the District Judge, Mirpur was also competent to try the suit. The suit was at its initial stage and yet the defendants had not filed their written statement, that an application was moved by one of the defendants, to transfer the case to Additional District Judge, Bhimber, and on this application the District Judge, Mirpur, transferred the case to Additional District Judge, Bhimber.
5. It is indeed correct that under section 20, C.P.C. Every suit is to be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction--- "(a) the defendant or each of the defendants, where they are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain; or
(b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain; provided that in such case either the' leave of the Court is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or carry on business, or personally work, for gain, as aforesaid acquiesce in such institution; or
(c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises."
In accordance with clause (c) of section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, all classes of suists can be filed in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, the cause of action arises, either wholly or in part. The term "cause of action" refers to every facts, which if traversed, it should be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to judgment and which, if not proved, gives the defendant a right to judgment and for this purpose, only the facts stated in the plaint are to be considered to determine whether they constitute a cause of action or not? It must be remembered that even a fraction of cause of action is a part of cause of action and therefore, if even a fraction of cause of action accrues within the local limits of jurisdiction of a Court, that Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Clause (c) of section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure is based on broad principle to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and inconvenience to the parties. In a case titled D. Munirangappa v. Amidayala Venkatappa and another AIR 1965 Mysore 316, it was observed at para. 4 of the judgment as follows:-- "Thus, it is clear that every suit has to be instituted in a Court within the local limits of a whose jurisdiction the cause of action wholly or in part arises. It would not be right as has been done by the Court below to proceed to examine the extent of cause of action or to try to find out the percentage of cause of action. If a part of the cause of action arises within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a Court, then, such a Court would have jurisdiction to entertain and try such a suit, irrespective of the extent of the cause of action. It is in my opinion wholly wrong to state that a very small fraction of the cause of action accrued within the jurisdiction of the Tumkur Court, which would not entitle the plaintiff to institute a suit in that Court. This process of examining the cause of act would be wholly wrong in view of section 20, clause (c) which provides that every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. The words 'in part' have not been defined. Even a fraction of a cause of action is a part of cause of action therefore, if a part of the cause of action arises within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Tumkur Court, then, it must be held that Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The provisions of clause (c) of section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, are based on broad principle to avoid the multiplicity of the proceedings and inconvenience to the parties. If the reasoning adopted by the Courts below is accepted as correct, it would lead to many inconvenient results which the Legislature sought to avoid by enacting the provisions of clause (c) of section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure. For the reasons, I hold that the Courts below were wrong in taking the view they took and thus declining to exercise the jurisdiction vested in them by law."
6. In a case reported as Rehmat Bibi v. Ramzani (PLD 1967 Lah. 1074) Mr. Justice Sardar Muhammad Iqbal, J. Defined "cause of action" as sum total of all allegations upon which right to relief is founded. It includes every fact which it would be necessary to prove, if traversed, in order to enable the plaintiff to sustain his action. In Chand Kuor v. Partap Singh (16 Cal. 98), Lord Wastson observed as follows:- "Now the cause of action has no relation whatsoever to the defence which may be set by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the grounds set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour."
' In a case reported as Hari Dutt Prasad and another v. Shib Kumar Jha (AIR 1935 Pat. 449) Mr. Justice Noor, J. Was of the opinion that for the purpose of deciding whether the plaint discloses any cause of action, the evidence of the defendant was not necessary. Such question could be decided on the allegation of the fact in the plaint and if necessary, after examining the plaintiff.
7. The expression "cause of action" used in the Code in its general sense, refers to and signifies averment of fact or state of facts, giving rise to a claim or right of the plaintiff, against the defendant, sufficient to enable a Court in rendering a judgment or to grant relief. It excludes relief sought for and plea of defendant. It may mean fact or allegations, contemplating a claim or right and infringement of a right. In Seven Stars Goods Transport Co. (Regd.), Karachi v. The Administrator, Karachi Municipal Corporation, Karachi (PLD 1976 Kar. 21), it was observed as under:- "It is axiomatic principle of law that while considering the question of cause of action, the Court should apply its mind to the facts given in the plaint, and not to any other matter, and it has to presume that every allegation made in the plaint was true. It could therefore, reject the plaint, if it came to the conclusion that if all the allegations are proved, the plaintiff would not be entitled to any relief whatsoever further, if there is any vagueness about the pleadings, the proper course is to order the party to remove the vagueness and not to reject the plaint."
' In a reported case titled Pahloomal Motiram v. Abdul Quddus Behari and others (PLD 1971 Kar.
250), Mr. Justice Qadeeruddin, C.J. Was of the view that the Court should reject the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. Only if it came to the conclusion that even if all the allegations which were made in the plaint, were proved to be correct, the plaintiff would not be entitled to get a relief. In P.I.D.C. v. Sh. Muhammad Amin (PLJ 1975 Kar. 258) facts were that West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, a statutory Corporation established under a Central Ordinance, owned Bannu sugar Mill in Bannu District which was being managed through a separate department of sugar at its head office at Karachi. The P.I.D.C. Had a branch office at Lahore which also acted as a Sales Office. Defendant, Sh. Muhammad Amin & Co., carrying on business at Layllpur, entered into a contract to purchase bags of Bannu Sugar. The terms and conditions of the contract were contained in a letter of acceptance issued at the branch office of the P.I.D.C. At Lahore after obtaining previous authorisation of the head office in Karachi. Consequemly there was a breach of contract and a suit was filed by P.I.D.C. In the original jurisdiction of the Karachi High Court. One of the issues related to the territorial jurisdiction of the Court at Karachi to try the suit. A learned Judge of the Karachi High Court decided the issue in favour of the plaintiff on the ground that the contract had been executed at Karachi. It was held as follows:--- "That case again is distinguishable, because in the present case, part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Court. The letter of acceptance (Exh.5/1) was issued by Mr. Saeeuddin as the Resident Representative of the plaintiff at Lahore after obtaining a prior authorisation from the plaintiff on the telephone. Therefor, the defendant is deemed in law to have contracted with the plaintiff at Karachi. But apart from this, the contract was modified by the plaintiff at Karachi at the instance of the defendant's letter, dated 13th June, 1967 (Exh.5/2) which was addressed to Mr. Khilji, Deputy General Manager (Sugar) at Karachi, payment was also demanded at Karachi by Mr. Khilji's notice (Exh.5/6), dated 19-9-1967. My finding on this issue is that this Court has jurisdiction to try the suit."
' The same view was expressed by Supreme Court of India in A.B.C. Laminart (Pvt.) Ltd. And another v. A.P. Agencies, Salem (1990 MLD 1344), Ratan Lalji Gulab Chand v. Dali Chand and others (AIR 1954 Hyd. 39) and Muhammad Idris v. Rati Ram & Sons and others (AIR (29) 1942 Oudh 250).
In view of the survey of the case-law, referred above, we are of the opinion that the learned District Judge as well as the High Court committed an illegality by returning the plaint to the plaintiffs- appellants for its presentation to the Court of competent jurisdiction. Therefore by setting aside the impugned judgment and decree of the High Court, and the District Judge, Mirpur, we accept the appeal and direct that the suit filed by the appellants shall be tried by the learned District Judge in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case we pass no order as to costs.
Appeal accepted/