' BASHARAT AHMAD SHAIKH, J.----This appeal by leave of the Court has been filed to challenge the order passed by the Service Tribunal on 7th April, 1999 by which Government order passed on 5th May, 1998 appointing the appellant as Assistant Director B-17, on current charge basis, in Civil Defence Department by transfer from the Education Department was vacated as being illegal. The Tribunal also issued a direction to the Government to promote respondent Muhammad Sabir as Assistant Director B-17 and respondent Ghulam Rasool Magray as Warning Officer B-16 on regular basis if they are otherwise found fit.
2. The rules applicable to civil servants of Civil Defence Department are known as the Azad Jammu and Kashmir (Civil Defence) Service Rules, 1985. The post of Assistant Director carries Basic Pay Scale 17. Appointment to that post can be made by initial recruitment or by promotion, but the ratio between initial appointment and promotion is not specified. Promotion can be ordered on the basis of selection on meritcum seniority and fitness from amongst Civil Defence Officers/Warning Officers B-16 with three years' service as such. The undisputed position is that respondents Muhammad Sabir Khan and Ghulam Rasool Magray both were Chief Instructors B-14 when the appellant, Zahida Mahmood, was appointed as Assistant Director Civil Defence on current charge basis on 5th May, 1998. However, Muhammad Sabir Khan was working as Warning Officer on current charge basis from 24th September, 1997 and was still in that position when appeal was filed by him in the Service Tribunal. It is clear from the Rules that both the respondents could not even be considered for regular promotion as Assistant Director when the appellant was appointed as Assistant Director on current charge basis because only a Civil Defence Officer or Warning Officer B-16 with three years' service as such could be considered for promotion as Assistant Director. Both of them were substantively in B-14 and there is no question that they could be considered for promotion as Assistant Director B-17. It may be stated that according to Rule 10-B of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1977 appointment on current charge basis is not a promotion and also that it is only for a period of six months.
3. In light of the position stated above it was vehemently contended before us by Mr. M. Tabassum Aftab Alvi, the learned counsel for the appellant, that the respondents had no locus standi to file appeal in the Service Tribunal. In this connection he vehemently relied on judgments of this Court reported as Syed Shaukat Hussain Gillani v. Abdul Rehman Abbasi and others (1993 SCMR 369 = 1992 PLC (C.S.) 438) and Umar Din Kiani v. Azad Government and others (1995 SCR 166). In Shaukat Hussain Gillani's case it was held by this Court as under:--- "Under section 4 of the Service Tribunal Act, 1975 a civil servant is competent to prefer an appeal only if he is found to be an aggrieved person. At least a civil servant challenging the appointment of another civil servant should prima facie, show that he had a chance to be considered for appointment against the civil post at the relevant time. If he is not found to be qualified for appointment either by initial recruitment or otherwise, he cannot be permitted to challenge the appointment of another civil servant on the ground that although he was not qualified to be considered for the appointment yet his rival was also suffering from the same disqualification. "
' In Umar Din Kiani's case the following dictum was laid down:- "The Service Tribunal has rightly held that under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act an appeal can only be filed before the Service Tribunal by an aggrieved civil servant but the appellant before us cannot be termed as aggrieved. As already noted by us, under section 8 of the Civil Servant Act a person can only be promoted to a higher post if he possesses minimum qualification prescribed for the higher post. It means that the appellant cannot be promoted to the post under dispute.
Although it is not necessary to qualify as an aggrieved person that a right in a strict juristic sense be vested in him, yet a person must at least show that he has some interest that the respondent should act in accordance with law. The appellant does not seem to fulfil even this condition. Even if the objections raised by him are accepted and consequently the appointment of respondent No,3 is held to be invalid no benefit would accrue to the appellant because he is not eligible for promotion to the disputed post. The points raised by him may more appropriately be raised in a writ of quo warranto which can be filed by any person as distinguished from an aggrieved party.
Therefore, we uphold the view taken by -the Service Tribunal that the appeal filed by the appellant was not maintainable before the Service Tribunal.
4. In light of the aforesaid principles, it is clear that the two respondents could not be termed as aggrieved civil servants and that they could not challenge the current charge appointment of the appellant. In our view the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents, Mr. Muhammad Noorullah Qureshi, the principle that to qualify as an aggrieved person it was sufficient to show that he had some interest that the official respondents should act in accordance with law is not applicable to present facts seen in light of the dictum in Umar Din Kiani's case. We may add that since the respondents were not substantively in B-16 they stood no chance of getting even an indirect advantage because they could not be considered for appointment even on acting charge or current charge basis. Thus, if the appointment of the appellant was illegal, the respondents did not stand to gain anything, therefore, they cannot be termed as aggrieved persons and appeal filed by them was not maintainable.
5. There is another aspect of the case which needs to be attended to. On 30th July, 1998 respondent Muhammad Sabir Khan was duly promoted as Warning Officer B-16 on the recommendations of the Selection Board. However, this promotion was given effect from 24th September, 1997. The Tribunal brought this development under consideration and then proceeded to issue the direction that Muhammad Sabir Khan may be promoted on regular basis, if found fit, as Assistant Director B-17. It was vehemently contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Tribunal was not legally authorised to base its judgment on a development which had taken place during the pendency of the appeal before the Tribunal. When respondent Muhammad Sabir Khan's promotion was ordered on 30th July, 1998 the written statements on behalf of the respondents, including the official respondents, had already been filed. Although aforementioned promotion order is available in the file of the Service Tribunal but there is no application on the record requesting that the said order may be allowed to be made a part of the file. Even in the order sheet there is no mention that the said order was being brought on the record or that it will be considered at the time of adjudication of the appeal. It is well-settled that a judgment has to be based on pleadings of the parties and a Court or Tribunal cannot travel beyond pleadings. This proposition finds full support from judgments of this Court cited by Mr. M. Tabassum Aftab Alvi which are reported as Muhammad Hussain v. Abdul Majid and others (1993 SCR 319), Muhammad Amin v. Muhammad Yunus (1993 SCR 340) and Muhammad Siddique Farooqi v. Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government through Chief Secretary, Muzaffarabad and 3 others (PLD 1994 SC (AJ&K) 13).
It follows that the Tribunal fell in error in bringing into consideration the promotion order mentioned above while deciding the appeal.
6. The matter does not end here. As noted above the Tribunal has directed that, if found suitable, respondent Muhammad Sabir Khan may be promoted as Assistant Director B-17 on regular basis but the Tribunal failed to take note of the fact that this direction is not in consonance with the relevant provision of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir (Civil Defence) Service Rules, 1985 which stipulates that only a person with three years' service as Warning Officer/Civil Defence Officer can be promoted as Assistant Director on regular basis. Respondent Muhammad Sabir Khan will complete his three years' service as such on 24th September, 2000 while the respondent Ghulam Rasool Magray is still in B-14. This illegality is sufficient in itself to vitiate the order passed by the Service Tribunal.
7. Before parting with the case we may point out that the finding given by the Service Tribunal that the appointment of Zahida Mahmood, the appellant herein, as Assistant Director on current charge basis is not in consonance with law was not challenged by the learned counsel for the appellant and he only restricted his arguments to maintainability of the appeal before the Service Tribunal.
This judgment-also does not deal with that question.
' As an upshot of the foregoing, this appeal is accepted and the order passed by the Service Tribunal shall stand vacated leaving the parties to bear their own costs throughout. It follows that the appeal filed by the respondents in the Service Tribunal stands dismissed.