1. ' I propose to dispose of the application moved 'by defendant No,3 (C.M.A. No,8500 of 1999) Under Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C. For abatement of the suit on the ground of ouster of the jurisdiction of this Court by virtue of insertion of section 2-A in Service Tribunal Act. The application moved by the defendant No,3, is supported by defendant No,1, i,e,. Karachi Development Authority, wherein it has been contended that plaintiff claimed to be employee of K.D.A. Has filed with following prayers:- "(i) Declaration that the Gradation list on which retirement of plaintiff is based is a document of plaintiff of no legal value and its entries are to be taken from service book/record of the employees as Secretary-KDA in Grade-20 with special pay or Rs,275 per month.
(ii) The plaintiff is entitled to all his dues of salary, fringe benefits and a plot of 600, sq. Yds and also damages in the sum of Rs,5 lacs per year from 1979 individually or commutatively against the defendants until such time the defendants 1 and 2 induct the plaintiff in his post as Secretary-KDA Grade-20 with retrospective before the remaining period of his services expires on 25-6-1996.
(iii) Pending disposal of his suit the plaintiff claims payment of his to be deposited in Court as payable to the plaintiff on the original documents official communicated to him ensuring payment of all the dues on the decision of the Supreme Court.
(iv) Permanent injunction restraining the defendant No,1 from taking further prejudicial or harmful steps persuant to the entries in the alleged Gradation list.
(v) Cost of the suit in sum of Rs,25,000 plus court-fee.
(vi) And as a special case to preserve the sanctity of judicial proceedings from pollution be false claims/defences by contesting parties this Hon'ble Court be pleased to order prosecution of the officials of defendant No,1 including the present D.G., K.D.A. Defendant No,3 and its Law Officer under section 209, P.P.0 as may be found guilty of introducing the Gradation list and alleging the documents to be forged and fabricated because the same were not on the re-cord of KDA filed on in C.P. No,2523 of 1993 and the previous litigation which took place in this Hon'ble Court and the Supreme Court cited hereinabove."
2. ' It is their case that by virtue of section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, the services under any authority, corporation; or organization established by or under a Federal law or which is owned or controlled by the Federal Government or in which the Federal Government has a controlling share or interest has been declared to be service of Pakistan and every person holding a post under such authority, corporation, body or organization shall be deemed to be a civil servant for the purposes of this Act. It has been claimed that all the suits, appeals or applications relating to the terms and conditions of a person holding a post in a corporation pending in any Court stands abated.
3. ' I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The main contention on behalf of the defendants Nos, 1 and 3 are that by virtue of insertion of section 2-A in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), whereby a new category of persons holding a post under any authority, corporation body or organization established under a Federal Law, which . Federal Government has a controlling share, have been brought to the jurisdiction of Service Tribunals Act.
4. ' The provisions of section 2-A can be conveniently reproduced as below:--- "2-A. Service under certain Corporations, etc. To be service of Pakistan.--Service under any authority, corporation, body or organization established by or under a Federal Law or which is owned or controlled by the Federal Government or in which the Federal Government has a controlling share or interest is hereby declared to be service of Pakistan and every person holding a post under such authority, corporation, body or organization shall be deemed to be a civil servant for the purpose of this Act."
5. ' It has been contended by the counsel for the defendants that the proceedings in the shape of suit stand abated in view of the provisions of section 6 of the Act, which read as follows:- "Abatement of suits and other proceedings.--All suits, appeals or applications regarding any matter within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal pending in any Court immediately before the commencement of the law as may be enacted by the Parliament, extending clause (2) of Article 212 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to a Tribunal shall abate on the commencement of such law: ' Provided that a party to such a suit, appeal or application may, within ninety days of the commencement of such law, prefer an appeal to the appropriate Tribunal in respect of any such matter which is in issue in such suit, appeal or application."
6. ' The learned counsel for the plaintiff contended that the Service Tribunal is a Court of appellate jurisdiction and has jurisdiction to hear the appeal filed by a person aggrieved by Departmental Authority, thus, the Tribunal is a special forum.
7. ' His second contention is that KDA is not a corporation, as such, the plaintiff does not come within the ambit of the Act of 1973 by virtue of insertion of section 2-A. He further contended that the plaintiff get the cause of action by virtue of office memorandum dated 21-6-1993, whereby, he was reinstated and simultaneously stand retired from service of KDA on attaining of age of superannuation.
8. So far the contention of Mr. Niazy Abdul Khailq, Advocate that the Service Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the appeal only, it may be said that a special forum has been provided pursuant to the powers conferred by parliament, administrative Tribunal to be called the Service Tribunals under A the Services Tribunals Act, 1973 were established and in view of Article 212 of the Constitution such established Tribunals have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the matter enumerated in Article 212 of the Constitution to the ouster of all other Courts, as such the contention of Mr. Niazy Abdul Khaliq, Advocate is not tenable.
9. ' Effect of Article 212 of the Constitution came under consideration before the Court and in fact in the case of Federation of Pakistan and another v. Malik Ghulam Mustafa Khar (PLD 1989 SC 26), the Honourable Court of Pakistan has held that: "17. There is a presumption against the ouster of jurisdiction of the Superior Cowls and any law which has the effect of denying access to them has to be narrowly construed for the reason that these are the fora created by the people for obtaining relief from oppression and redress for the infringement of their rights. But then where the ouster clause is clear and unequivocal, admitting of no other interpretation, the Courts unhesitatedly give effect to it. Thus, in State v. Zia-ur-Rehman (PLD 1973 SC 49) after reviewing the case law on the subject Hamdoorur Rahman, C.J. Observed:- 'These decisions do indicate that where the jurisdiction of the Courts to judicially review any executive act has been competently taken away, then the Court will not be able to assert its jurisdiction to do so under any circumstances but this must, in my opinion, depend upon the nature of the jurisdiction sought to be ousted and the nature and extent of the ouster itself. If the language used is such that it leaves no room for doubt as to the intention of the Legislature to oust the jurisdiction of the Courts in all circumstances, then that will have to be given effect acts performed without jurisdiction or mala fides will not be 'open to judicial scrutiny. But the Courts having the right to interpret the law will in each given case decide the precise nature of the ouster clause and the extent to which the jurisdiction of the Courts has been ousted, keeping in mind the principle consistently affirmed by all Courts that provisions seeking to oust the jurisdiction of superior Courts are to be construed strictly with a pronounced leaning against ouster': From the dicta laid down by the apex Court in the case of Malik Ghulam Mustafa Khar (supra), it is settled that where the Legislature has ousted the jurisdiction of a forum specifically such forum is devoid of having any jurisdiction in the matter even in a case where action of the executive authority is challenged on the ground of same being mala fide, ultra vires or coram non judice.
10. ' The second contention raised by him that the KDA is not a corporation, it is not disputed that the KDA was established under the Presidential Order No,5 of 1957 as such, it cannot be said that Karachi Development Authority is not a authority/corporation established by Federal Government.
11. ' Third contention i,e,. The accrual of the cause of action, as pointed out it touches the terms and conditions of the service and in fact on perusal of the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff, it can be said that it enmates from the terms and conditions of the service.
12. ' Section 2-A, which has been inserted in the Service Tribunals (LXX) Act, in 1997, provides that services under any authority, corporation, or organization established by or under a Federal law or which is owned or controlled by the Federal Government or in which the Federal Government has a controlling share of interest is declared to be service of Pakistan and every person holding a post under such authority, corporation, body or organization shall be deemed to be a civil servant for the purposes of this Act. If the provision of section 2-A are examined, there can be no escape from the conclusion that only forum for adjudication of dispute in respect of terms and conditions of service of employee of authority, corporation, body or organization controlled by the Federal Government has been changed and in respect of such dispute Service Tribunals established under the Service Tribunals Act, have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain such causes as provided under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973.
13. ' The next question is whether the pending suits stand abated?
14. 'There is no cavil to the proposition that pending proceedings in the shape of suits, appeals and applications stand abated. In this regard, Federation of Pakistan v. Muhammad Siddiq, (1980 SCM R 443) can be referred, more particularly, the following passage:--- "In such-like situation the underlying principle appears to be that when a statute is extended to a territory or class of persons who were originally not covered by it, regarding those 'territories and persons when a new statute is enacted by reference to the original statute, the date of commencement given in the original statute is synchronized with the date on which the said statute is extended to the new territories and or person. In these cases, the original statute, i,e,. The Act was enacted on 20th of September, 1973. The Water and Power Development Authority (Amendment) Ordinance, 1975, whereby the Act was extended to WAPDA employees came into force on 30th of September, 1975. Therefore, the Act would apply mutatis mutandis to the WAPDA employees on and after 30th of September, 1975. The Civil Appeals by WAPDA filed before the District Court against the decree passed by the learned trial Judge were pending before the District Court on 30th September, 1975. Therefore, they abated on the said date. That being so, the WAPDA, had the right to file appeals before the Tribunal under the proviso to section 6 of the Act of course, the said provisions, on account of matural barrier of time would commence from the date of the abatement namely 30th September, 1975."
15. As pointed out above, the suit filed in the year 1994 remained pending when section 2-A was inserted by Act 17 of 1997 Gazetted on 10-6-1997. Thus, the suit stands abated by operation of law with effect from the said date.
16. ' In view of the legal position, the suit filed by the plaintiff against the defendants stands abated.
17. ' With the above observations, the application is disposed of accordingly.