JUDGMENT AMIR ALAM KHAN, J. ~ This revision petition is directed against the judgment and decree dated 8.5.1983 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Toba Tek Singh, whereby first appeal of the petitioners was dismissed and judgment and decree dated 18.2.1981 passed by learned Civil Judge, Toba Tek Singh was affirmed, resultantly, the suit for declaration and injunction tiled by the respondents/original plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 34 was decreed in their favour and against the petitioners as also respondents Nos. 35 to 53 by both the Courts afore-noted.
2. The plaint in the suit filed by respondents/original plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 34 proceeded on the ground that about 8/9 years preceding the filing of the suit, the petitioner No. 1 prepared a scheme whereby a plot of the measurement of 10 x 8' feet was allotted to original respondents Nos. 1 to 34 for the purpose of constructing pacca shops from their on pockets in accordance with sanctioned construction plan. In pursuance of the orders in regard to allotment of the plots, the respondents/original plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 34 constructed the shops in accordance with the sanctioned plan and has also been paying rent for the same. An agreement was also executed between petitioner No. 1 and the respective respondents and according to the version of the respondents/original plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 34, the relationship between the parties was that of lessor and lessee. The said relationship was, however, allegedly terminated by petitioner No. 1 vide its order dated 1.9.1972 whereby it was also ordered that the compensation shall be paid to the said respondents/original plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 34 in so far as their construction is concerned but it. Shall be paid after due determination thereof. The above said order was challenged on the ground that the order is without lawful authority, collusive and that the same has been passed ex pane resultantly, the respondents/original plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 34 were not liable to ejectment as they have not violated any of the conditions of the agreement, hence the prayer that the respondents/original plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 34 be declared to be in possession of the respective plots in their capacity of being lessee and since there is relationship of lessor and lessee, therefore, the Administrator has no right to terminate the same and to allot the shops to the occupiers thereof along with the injunction thereby seeking to restrain the petitioners as also the other respondents from interfering with their rights qua the shops in dispute.
The plaint in the suit filed by respondents/plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 34 is a classic example of muffish pleadings. It lacks in material content but is to be construed liberally as ordained by the various precedents.
The suit was primarily contested by petitioner No. 1 who inter alia maintained that respondents/original plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 34 were in fact licensee, to be more precise that they were "Tehbazari ticket" holders who having constructed shops at the site had It out the same to various tenants and it was thus obvious that they did not acquire the same for their on personal use and occupation, therefore, the petitioner No. 1 proceeded to issue show cause notice to various occupiers whereafter "Tehbazari tickets" were cancelled which action was lawfully taken by the Committee. The respondents/original plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 34, if aggrieved, must have filed an appeal before the controlling authority. In any case the Civil Court had no 'jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
It was specifically alleged that respondents/original plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 34 are not in possession of the property in dispute and since their allotment had been cancelled, therefore, they cannot maintain a suit of simple declaration. Plea of estoppel was also raised. By and large it was submitted that respondents/original plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 34 are not self occupying the property, therefore, they are not entitled to the decree as prayed for.
3. The suit was actively contested between the parties and the two Courts below having appraised the evidence on the record and discussed the same came to the conclusion that the shops in dispute were constructed by the respondents/original plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 34 in accordance with the sanctioned scheme of the Town Committee, Pir Mahal, and as per agreement entered into between the parties the said Town Committee had failed to make out any case of breach of contract or violation of any terms and conditions of the agreement agreed between the parties, therefore, the action of the Town Committee in determining the lease or license existing v in favour of the respondents/original plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 34 is illegal. Consequent upon the findings noted above, the suit of the original plaintiffs was decreed vide judgment and decree passed by the two Courts afore noted.
4. The findings afore-noted have been assailed in the present revision petition. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners conceded that the works of permanent character were raised and constructed I at the site by the respondents/original plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 34 but argued that since the shops were not self occupied by the respondents Nos. 1 to 34 and they had sub-It the same to the occupiers thereof, therefore, the Town Committee was within its right to cancel the license or to determine the lease, as the case may be.
5. At the trial volume of evidence was produced by the parties to prove their respective pleas. The plaintiffs produced Danish mand Khan ex- Member of the Town Committee, Pir Mahal as PW-1 while Qadir Bakhsh, one of the plaintiffs as also attorney of others appeared as PW-2. The documentary evidence produced by the plaintiffs consisted of Ex.P-1 to P- 12 out of which Ex.P-1 was the power-of-attorney in favour of Qadir Bakhsh while Ex.P-2 and Ex.P-3 are the agreements executed by the allottees of the shops in favour of the Town Committee. Ex.P-4 and Ex.P-5 , are the copies of the plaint and the decree passed in the suits filed by the persons similarly placed. Ex.P-6 to Ex.P-8 are again the copies of the allottees executed by the allottees of various shops in favour of the Town Committee. Ex.P-9 is the copy of the report forwarded to the Deputy Commissioner in his capacity of being Controller, Town Committee. Ex.P10 to P-12 are again the copies of the plaint and the judgments rendered in the suit filed by the persons similarly placed. The defendant/petitioner No. 1 on the other had, examined i.e witnesses including the actual occupiers of die shops in dispute. The documentary evidence produced by them consisted of Ex.D-1 which is a copy of the plaint in the suit titled "Ghulam Qadir Vs. Town Committee, Pir Mahal". Ex.D-2 is a copy of the report submitted by some supporting officials in regard to the agreement entered into between the parties and the effect thereof. Ex.D-3 to Ex.D-24 are the copies of the notice allegedly issued to the licensees or the lessors as the case may be.
Ex.D-25 is the order dated 1.9.1972 by the Administrator of Town Committee, Pir Mahal, whereby the "Tehbazari Tickets" of respondents/original plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 34 have been cancelled while it has been ordered that the occupiers thereof be temporarily recognised as t "Tehbazari Ticket" holders of the shops. Ex.D-26 is the copy of the extract from the register showing that the notices had been served on the original allottees. Ex.D-27 is a copy of the letter dated 7.4.1972 from the Deputy Commissioner, Faisalabad (the then Lyallpur) whereby the proposal , regarding the allotment "Tehbazari Ticket" had been approved. Ex.D-28 is the photo-stat copy of the Memorandum containing recommendations about the cancellation of "Tehbazari Tickets" issued by the Administrator, Town Committee, Pir Mahal. Ex.D-29 is an approval of some decision of the 1 Committee taken on 1.7.1947. Ex.D-30 is the "Tehbazari Scheme" which was approved by the Administrator, Town Committee, Pir Mahal. Ex.D-31 is the last of the documents which contains by- laws in regard to "Tehbazari Tickets".
6. It may be observed at the very outset that all the documents ' produced by the defendant/petitioner No. I have been tendered in evidence by the learned counsel for the Town Committee without the formal proof thereof. It is true that certain documents such as copies of judicial record are received in evidence without any objection but when the notices itself are denied by the recipients thereof, it is the legal duty of the person to prove that such a notice was issued and has been served on the addressee.
7. In the background afore-noted, it was canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the shops, though, constructed by the original respondents/plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 34, were not occupied by them. This being a case of sub-letting, the Town Committee was within its right to issue them notices thereby determining their status as lessees or licensees, as the case may be.
The above said argument has been raised in complete oblivion of the law applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case. The plots on which the shops were constructed by the respondents/original plaintiffs M Nos. 1 to 34 were allotted to the said plaintiffs on "Tehbazari Tickets" and I the Tehbazari tenure did not create an estate in favour of the allottees rather f it meant a grant for a period of time. This grant was to be regulated by a contract between the parties and while it is true that the Town Committee, Pir Mahal having granted licenses in favour of the respondents/original plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 34 did also grant permission to the licensees to construct at the site, it is equally true that the said grant was subject to the conditions as agreed by the licensees i.e. To vacate the premises, if so required by the grantor/licensor. It is an admitted position of fact on the record that the respondents/original plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 34 had constructed shops at the site, thus, acting upon the licenses, the said plaintiffs and executed a work of permanent character and incurred expenses in the execution, ^earned counsel for the respondents/original plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 34 argued that the Town Committee, Pir Mahal having itself allowed to build works of permanent character on the premises subject-matter of the licenses, the same could not be determined as is ordained by sub-section (2) of Section 60 of the Easements Act, 1882. He referred to the cases of "Jagat Singh and others Vs. District Boar Amritsar (Air 1940 Lahore 509), Madhusudan Das Vs. Bissuji (AIR 1918 Nagpur 180) and Guman Singh Vs. Pyarelal and others (AIR 1929 Nagpur 141).
The rule laid down in the judgment afore-noted is to the effect that if the licensor grants permission to the licensees to build works of permanent character on the premises, the same cannot be got vacated by the licensor for the license itself become irrevokable. Their cannot be any cudgel with the rule of law laid down in the judgments noted above, but their can be cases and the present case is no exception where the intention of the parties to the contract is to be gathered so as to find out as to what were their real intentions at the time of entering into a contract of license. In the instant case the licensees having agreed to vacate the premises, if needed by the licensor, had bound themselves by the terms of the contract whereby they had agreed to vacate the premises, if so needed by the Town Committee, Pir Mahal, the only other material condition being that one month notice shall be given to the licensees. It would thus be seen that apart from the law as contained in Section 60 of the Easements Act, 1882, wherein it is provided that if the licensee is allowed to raise works of permanent character on the site allotted to him, the license granted in his favour becomes irrevokable, the licensor and licensee could also agree by way of a contract to a different mode whereby the license is agreed to be limited for a particular duration for which the grantor/licensor shall remain bound and in such eventuality the licensee shall not be protected by the provisions of Section 60 but would be governed by the contract between the licensor and the licensee. If any authority is needed, reference may be made to "M.F. De Souza Vs. Children's Education uplift Society" (AIR 1959 Bombay 533). Again the two terms of the contract cannot be read in isolation of each other for it would lead to absurd results. The rule of harmoneous construction if applied, would lead to one irresistible conclusion that the licensee would remain hound by the terms of contract whereby it was agreed between the parties that in the event that the site upon which he had constructed works of permanent circumstances, it is not only difficult rather impossible to believe that such notices were issued. Again in the contract entered into between the parties, it was agreed that the shops would be vacated only when the same are required by the Town Committee, Pir Mahal. The notices said to have been issued were on the premises that the allottees of the shops have sub-It the shops, therefore, they have violated the terms and conditions of the agreement. Basically there was no such term and condition in the agreement itself and the one for which the site could be got vacated i.e. The same is needed by the Town Committee was neither urged nor proved. It seems that the site in question was not needed by the Town Committee rather they were trying to make the case of violation of terms and conditions.
8. Coming to the case of the plaintiffs/respondents that they are lessees of the shops in dispute and since an agreement has been concluded between the parties wherein no penalty is provided for sub-letting, therefore, their status as lessees could not be determined by way of order dated 1.9.1992 passed by the Administrator, Town Committee, Pir Mahal. As noted earlier also it would be seen that this plea has been raised on the premises that the allottees of the shops had executed an agreement in favour of petitioner No. 1 wherein the terms on which the allottees were to hold and occupy the plots were enumerated but at the same time it has no where been described as to under what capacity they could occupy the same. The allottees, therefore, considered themselves to be the lessees of the shops because in the agreement itself it had been recited that they would pay rent to petitioner No. 1. Since it was a case of "Tehbazari Tickets", therefore, the recital that the respondents/original plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 34 shall pay rent from month to month for the shops constructed by them would not mean that the respondents/original plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 34 were the lessees of the said shops. Obviously, the relationship between the parties was that of licensors and the licensees which was wrongly described by the respondents/original plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 34 as lessors and the lessees. As it has been observed earlier that the plaint filed in the suit lacks in material content and since the case itself comes from mufasal, therefore, it has to be construed liberally. Keeping this aspect in view, it would be noted that the total controversy between the parties having been brought on the record, it would be appropriate to decide the same one way or the other rather than to remand the case for its decision afresh. It has already been held that the I respondents/original plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 34 were allotted the site underneath the shops as licensees and not as lessees, who having built the 1 shops at the site were entitled to retain the same till such time that the site underneath was required by the Town Committee, Pir Mahal for which requisite notices as agreed between the parties were to be issued and served 1 upon the respondents/original plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 34. Since no such notice was proved to have been served on the respondents/original plaintiffs Nos.
(1 to 34, therefore, the findings of the two Courts below are affirmed, though, for some what different reasons.
9. In result, this petition is dismissed with no other as to costs.