' MUHAMMAD ASHRAF LEGHARI, J.--- Through this appeal, the State has challenged the acquittal, dated 19-7-1999 passed by Judge, Special Court (Anti-Terrorism) No,VIII, Karachi Division, in Special Case No,17 of 1999 whereby acquitted the respondents Haji Lal Muhammad alias Laloo, Muhammad Hamid, Muhammad Younus Khaskheli, Muhammad Jawad alias Irani.
2. The abovementioned respondents were booked in F.I.R. Bearing No,345 of 1997 under section 365-A/34, P.P.C. Of Police Station Nazimabad, Karachi, lodged by one Syed Asifullah on 14-9-1997 at 18-40 hours.
3. He has stated in his First Information Report that on 12-7-1997, he was informed on telephone by the family members of his cousin Khalidullah that the latter had gone to the house of his friend Safian situated at Nizamabad in his white car and had not come back as yet. The complainant went to the house of Safian and found that the car of Khalidullah was parked there and some people were standing around it. On his enquiry, he came to know that at about 8-15 hours 3/4 young men came in a yellow cab and kidnapped Khalidullah and Safian on gun point just in front of the house of Safian.
4. The complainant further stated that on the same day at about 10-15 hours a telephone call was received in the house of Khalidullah that the abductees were in their custody and they would talk to them later on, but in the meantime they should not try to be cleverer. On 13-9-1997 some telephone calls were received at different times on which demand of Rs,15,00,000 was made for the release of Khalidullah and Safian. On 26-5-1999 same demand was made again. The complainant, however, agreed to pay Rs,2,00,000 and such type of negotiations continued. In the meantime the complainant went to police station and lodged F.I.R. Against some 4 persons.
5. On the night between 17th and 18th September, 1997 the police raided a house and recovered abductees Khalidullah and Safian and arrested the respondents and allegedly recovered some weapons from them.
6. The police carried out further investigation and submitted challan in the Anti-Terrorism Court. At the trial prosecution examined, P.Ws. Complainant Syed Asifullah, abdcutee Sufian Hussain Karni, Ejaz Nabi Khan, Amjad Rafi, A.S.-I. Rao Akhtar, abdcutee Syed Khalidullah, Dr. Muhammad Khalid, Muhammad Azeem, Judicial Magistrate and Pervaiz Akhtar, Investigating Officer.
7. After the conclusion of trial the learned Judge, Special Court found the case of prosecution doubtful and consequent upon which acquitted the respondents.
8. It is contended by Mr. Habib Ahmed learned Additional Advocate-General for State that the abductee Syed Khalidullah has not been declared hostile and his evidence has not been appraised in accordance with the principles settled by the superior Courts. He has further, contended that the evidence of Police Officers is as good as any other witness and the trial Court has wrongly discarded their evidence. He has further, stressed upon the point of recovery of abductees from the accused persons. The learned Additional Advocate-General further urged that weapons were recovered from the respondents and the prosecution has proved the case against the respondents beyond any reasonable doubt. He urged that the impugned judgment is a result of misreading of evidence and is in disregard of principles laid down by superior Courts. He has placed reliance on the cases of Muhammad Shah and others v. The State PLD 1984 SC 278, Muhammad Rafiq v. The State 1991 PCr.LJ 857, Leemon v. The State 1978 PCr.LJ 232, Ali Hassan v. Haji Khamiso and 2 others 1986 PCr.LJ 21 and Muhammad Sadiq v. Muhammad Sarwar and 2 others PLD 1973 SC 469.
9. Mr. Muhammad Saleh Panhwar learned counsel for the respondents has contended that the star witnesses of this story are the two abductees viz. Sufian Hussain Karni and Syed Khalidullah but they have not supported the prosecution case. He further, contended that the evidence of the Police Offices has been rightly discarded by the learned trial Court.
10. It is further urged that the only evidence of police officials of concerned police station cannot be implicitly relied upon against the accused without any other corroboration.
11. Perusal of record shows that abductees Sufian and Khalidullah have not supported the, prosecution case against the present respondents/accused. P.W. Sufian was declared hostile by the prosecution and was cross-examined by the Special Public Prosecutor. It is true that the rule "falsus is uno falsus in omnibus" has all along been discarded in this country and the grain is to be sifted from chaff.
12. But from the evidence of P.W. Sufian we do not find any slightest clue that the present accused were involved in their abduction. He has categorically stated that accused present in the Court are not the same. Another abductee Khalidullah has stated in his evidence that the accused present in Court are same whose names were given by police. Nowhere in his testimony he has said a word against the present accused except that their names were given by the police.
13. In view of such a situation we have not been able to persuade ourselves to convict the accused in capital charge merely on assumptions and conjectures.
14. Now the only point of recovery of abductees and weapons from the respondents is left to be seen in the light oT surrounding circumstances. The two Mashirs viz. Ejaz Nabi and Sabir Ali were taken by the police and made as witnesses on the above stated points. Ejaz Nabi Mashir was examined by the prosecution but he has not supported the case of prosecution. He has testified as under:-- "Police parked the vehicles at some distance in the street and I was standing there. The police party went in the street and after one hour they brought abductees Sufian and Khalidullah and some accused alongwith some weapons."
' Another Mashir Sabir Ali was not examined by the prosecution.
15. Again we have to dilate upon the evidence of Police Officers of concerned police station although the testimony of Investigating Officer Pervaiz Akhtar, S.-I. Amjad Rafi and A.S.-I. Rao Akhtar reveals that about 100 police officials on 14/15 mobiles had gone to make a recovery of abductees but the prosecution found it not necessary to examine any police official from other police station so as to make the story probable and believable. The examination of some police officials from other police station could provide the corroboration and could reflect upon the prosecution story in positive terms: In the present situation when the two abductees have turned down their story and the Mashir of recovery has not supported the case, we find that the only evidence of police officials Amjad Rafi, A.S.-I. Rao Akhtar and Investigating Officer Pervaiz Akhtar would not be sufficient to bring home the guilt of the accused.
16. This is an appeal against acquittal and the consideration for appeal against acquittal and an appeal against conviction are altogether different. The principles have been laid down by the apex Court in a case of Muhammad Iqbal v. Abid Hussain alias Mithu and 6 others 1994 SCM R 1928 wherein their Lordships have held as under:--
(i) that with the acquittal, the presumption of the innocence of the accused becomes double; one initial, that till found guilty he is innocent, and two, that after his trial a Court below has confirmed the assumption of innocence;
(ii) that unless all the grounds on which the High Court had purported to acquit the accused were not supportable from the evidence on record, Supreme Court would be reluctant to interfere, even though, upon the same evidence it may be tempted to come to a different conclusion;
(iii) that unless the conclusion recorded by a Court below was such that no reasonable person would conceivably reach the same, the Supreme Court would not interfere;
(iv) that unless the judgment of acquittal is perverse and the reasons therefore are artificial and ridiculous, the Supreme Court would not interfere; and
(v) that the Supreme Court, however, would interfere in exceptional cases on overwhelming proof resulting in conclusive and irresistible conclusion, and that too, with a view only to avoid grave miscarriage of justice and for no other purpose."
' The same view was earlier taken by the Honourable Supreme Court in case of Yar Muhammad and 3 others v. The State 1992 SCM R 96 as under:- ' The High Court was hearing an acquittal appeal and the principles of setting aside an order of acquittal are now well-settled. Unless the judgment of the trial Court is perverse, completely illegal and on perusal of evidence no other decision can be given except that the accused is guilty or there has been complete misreading of evidence leading to miscarriage of justice, the High Court will not exercise jurisdiction under section 417, Cr.P.C. In exercising thus jurisdiction the High Court is always slow unless it feels that gross injustice has been done in the administration of criminal justice."
17. We find that the trial Court has rightly acquitted the respondents due to the discrepancies stated above. The principles for setting aside acquittal are now well-settled. The impugned judgment is neither perverse, illegal, ridiculous nor there was misreading of evidence leading to miscarriage of justice. High Court is always slow to reverse acquittal in conviction, unless it feels that gross injustice has been done in the administration of criminal justice. The view also gets support from the cases of Imran Hussain v. Amar Arshad and 2 others 1997 SCM R 438 and State through Advocate-General, Sindh v. Bashir and others PLD 1997 SC 408.
18. The case-law cited by the learned Additional Advocate-General has no bearing with the facts and circumstances of the present case and we have not been able to find out any portion from the depositions of abductees on the basis of which acquittal could be changed into conviction. Many authorities were cited on the point of examining the testimony of hostile witness.
19. On examining the list laid down by the series of judgments of apex Court and this Court, it is clear that in view of the discrepancies pointed out and analysed above, it is difficult to observe that impugned judgment of acquittal is perverse or is a result of complete misreading of evidence which has caused miscarriage of justice.
20. For the reasons stated above the Special Anti-Terrorism Acquittal Appeal No,103 of 1999 merits no consideration and is hereby dismissed.