' JAVED IQBAL, J.---This is a civil petition for leave to appeal preferred on behalf of the Bakkarmandi Union (Regd.) (petitioner) under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, passed by learned Division Bench of Lahore High Court, Lahore, in R.F.A. No.218 of 1996 and R.F.A. No.191 of 1996, dated 29-9-1999.
2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that a suit was -filed for possession and recovery of a sum of Rs.9,59,88,944.35 including bank interest by Syed Qaisar Hussain with the averment that suit land measuring 21 Kanals and 5 Marlas bearing Khasra Nos.210, 211, 212 and 234, situated in Kot Kamboh (Bakkarmandi), Lahore, is owned by him which was acquired vide order, dated 18-5-1973 for the use and occupation for a period of three years purely on temporary basis. No compensation whatsoever was paid in spite of repeated demands and consequently a suit as mentioned hereinabove was filed which was finally decreed in favour of plaintiff after completion of necessary formalities and conclusion of trial in the following terms:-- "In view of my above said observations the suit of the plaintiff is decreed against defendant No.1 for possession of the disputed property and for recovery of compensation/rent at the rate of Rs.12,222 per Kanal per annum for three years before the institution of this suit till today at 14% annual interest on the said amount with costs of the suit. File be consigned after completion."
' Being aggrieved both the parties approached Hon'ble Lahore High Court, Lahore, by means of R.F.A. No.218 of 1996 and R.F.A. No.191 of 1996. R. F . A. No.191 of 1996 was dismissed while R.F.A. No.218 of 1996 was allowed.
3. It is the case of the petitioners that the land in dispute was in their possession for the last so many years but no opportunity of hearing was afforded to them which resulted in serious miscarriage of justice and they have become shelterless because the Metropolitan Corporation, Lahore, has been directed to hand over the vacant possession of land in dispute to legal heirs of the plaintiff namely Syed Shabbar Hussain by whom initially the suit was filed. It is mainly contended on behalf of petitioner that the judgment and decree passed by the learned Division Bench is against law and facts of the case as the petitioners are in possession of the land in dispute and running their business of cattle market at a very large scale to earn their livelihood and the land was allotted in their favour for carrying the said business and thus a valuable right has been created in their favour which has been infringed without any lawful justifiable excuse and without impleading the petitioner as party. It is pressed time and again that the impugned judgment would create huge problems for the petitioners who would be deprived from earning their livelihood in a respectable manner. It is also requested in the alternate that reasonable- time may be given enabling the petitioners to make some alternate arrangements.
4. The abovementioned contention as raised on behalf of the-petitioner has been strenuously controverted by the learned counsel for the respondents who mainly argued that the petitioner has no locus standi whatsoever to be impleaded as a necessary party and furthermore that the impugned judgment being strictly in accordance with law and settled norms of justice for any interference.
5. We have carefully examined the respective contentions as agitated on behalf of the parties in the light of relevant provisions of law and record of the case. We have minutely perused the impugned judgment. The evidence which has come on record has been thrashed out with the eminent assistance of the learned counsel. It transpires from the scrutiny of record that Syed Qaisar Hussain (respondent No.4) was having a valid title of the land in dispute which was never challenged and 'furthermore the said land was never acquired by adopting the mechanism as evolved in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. No evidence worth the name is available that any proceedings whatsoever were initiated under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Even for the sake of argument if it is admitted that the land was acquired the factum of acquisition would hardly render any assistance to the case of petitioners for the simple reason that they have absolutely no locus standi to be impleaded as a necessary party and their status at the best can be equated to that of "an unauthorized, occupant" and mere possession without, any lawful justifiable excuse does not confer any legal right to retain the land in dispute for an indefinite period. We are conscious of the fact that the parties can either be classified as a necessary party or a proper party. A person who ought to have been joined, is a necessary party, and a person whose presence is necessary to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all points involved in the suit is a proper party. (PLD 1975 SC 463 + 1995 CLC 1566 + 1984 CLC 286 + 1979 CLC 891), but the petitioner does not fall either within the ambit of necessary or proper party and cannot be allowed to be impleaded at this belated stage. It is amazing that the learned counsel on behalf of petitioner could not show even the lease deed enabling this Court to examine the terms and conditions as enumerated therein which smacks of mala fides and a futile attempt seems to have been made on behalf of petitioner to frustrate the decree obtained by Syed Qaiser Hussain (late). It would be a mockery of law to get the trial afresh by impleading the petitioner as a party which would ultimately prove an exercise in futility. We are of the considered opinion that the petitioner has absolutely no locus standi to be impleaded as necessary party, that too at this belated stage. It is too late in the day to accept such baseless and unfounded request having no substance at all.
6. The upshot of the above discussion would be that this petition being devoid of merit is dismissed.