1. ' This revision application has been directed against the order, dated 16-10-1998 and 22-10-1998, passed by the learned lq Additional District Judge, Kharipur in a Summary Suit No,3 of 1997.
2. ' The learned counsel for the applicant has mainly contended that the trial Court in its order, dated 16-10-1998 has directed the respondent to furnish security before the learned trial Court on or before 26-10-1998, and thereafter vide order, dated 22-10-1998 security has been accepted in the sum of Rs,2,00,000, but actually instead of security surety has been accepted which is in violation of the spirit of the order impugned in this revision application.
3. ' On the other hand, Mr. Kalandar Bux Phulpoto the learned counsel for the respondent has contended that not only security has been furnished but a bond has also been executed by surety Ghulam Hussain son of Muhammad Ismail in compliance of the order, dated 16-10-1998 and, therefore, the present revision application is totally misconceived. He has further contended that even if the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant, that surety has been furnished instead of security, is taken as correct, then again the furnishing of surety is fully covered by the term security as ordered by the trial Court. In support of his contention he has referred to the case of Lagu Venkataramanayya Setty and another v. Gunda Subbayya Chetty and others AIR 1962 And.
4. Pra. 175 wherein while relying on another decision of the Indian Jurisdiction reported as Foulks v.
5. Suppan Chettiar AIR 1945 Mad. 13 the Honourable Judge has made following observation:-- "Security.-- (1) A 'Security', speaking generally, is anything that makes the money more assured in its payment or more readily recoverable; as distinguished from e.g., a mere I.O.U. Which is only evidence of a debt.
6. ' It does not, therefore, exclude the guarantee which can be provided by any surety. In fact, the same dictionary adds further on 'security given by the borrower' may mean a third party's guarantee provided by a borrower and may be 'security given by the borrower'. Of course this has been with reference to the English Money-lenders Act, 1927 (17 and 18 Geo, 5 c 21 S.6) but could be said to be of general application also. There is yet another indication which can be culled out from the manner in which the term 'security' has been employed in the Civil Procedure Code itself. That word occurs with reference to the proceedings under Order XXXVII, Rules 2 and 3, and also in the matter of furnishing sureties when property is distrained or a person is arrested. In that context also, the words 'security' has been used as synonymous with 'security' and, therefore, in my view, the meaning that has to be given to the word 'security' should be taken to be comprehensive enough to include a 'surety' or at least not to exclude it."
7. I have considered the above arguments and perused the case record. The perusal of the case record reveals that vide order, dated 22-10-1998 security has been accepted in the sum of Rs,2,00,000 and not surety as contended by the learned counsel for the applicant. Even otherwise the case-law referred by the learned counsel for the respondent applies with all force in the present case and in such circumstances this Civil Revision Application is misconceived and is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.