' MUHAMAMD BASHIR JEHANGIRI, J.---This petition for leave to appeal raises the question whether the District Court exercising its powers under section 11 of the N.-W.F.P. Waqf Proprieties Ordinance (I of 1979) (hereinafter called as the Ordinance) was debarred to allow impleadment of the private respondents as party to the petition filed by respondents Nos.1 to 6 hereinbefore the District Court.
2. Shorn of unnecessary details narrated by the learned two Courts below and the learned Judge in Chambers of the High Court, suffice it to state that during the pendency of the proceedings of the petition filed by the petitioners herein under section 11 of the Ordinance, respondents Nos.1 to 6 moved an application for impleadment as respondents in the petition. It was emphatically contested by the petitioners. The learned District Court vide the impugned order dated 2-5-1998 accepted the application "after holding that in view of issue No,9, where under "the Court has to draw a conclusion respecting the averments of respondents Nos.1 to 6, that they are also the descendants of Bukhari Baba and their status as Mutawalis, they were necessary parties".
3. Feeling aggrieved of the order of allowing impleadment of respondents Nos.1 to 6 in the petition, the petitioners challenged it in Civil Revision No,318 of 1998.
4. It was contended on behalf of respondents Nos.1 to 6 before the learned Single Judge that remedy of civil revision was not available to the petitioners under the provisions of the Ordinance and, therefore, the civil revision before the High Court was not competent. The second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners was that the District Court wrongly exercised its jurisdiction under the provisions of Order 1, Rule 10 of the C.P.C. Which were not applicable to the petitions under section 11 of the Ordinance.
5. The learned Single Judge in his impugned order repelled the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that right of appeal had been provided under section 27 of the Ordinance only to an aggrieved party against the final order and that there is no such right against an interlocutory order. The learned Single Judge further held firstly that "the High Court has supervisory jurisdiction under section 115, C.P.C. Over the Courts subordinate to it which may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to it to satisfy itself whether that subordinate Court has acted without jurisdiction, or has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it or has exercised its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity." As a cumulative effect of these findings, the civil revision filed by the petitioners was dismissed and the impugned order was upheld.
6. In support of this petition, Syed Asif Shah, learned Advocate Supreme Court has reiterated the contentions which he had raised before the High Court.
7. The first and foremost question is whether the relevant provisions of the C.P.0 are applicable to the petitions under section 11 of the Ordinance particularly when no "procedure "had been prescribed therein for processing and disposal of such petitions. A proceeding under section 11
(ibid) is essentially a civil proceeding to be disposed of by a District Court in its original jurisdiction conferred thereon under the Ordinance. As regards the application of the provisions of the Code in writ jurisdiction of the High Court, a Full Bench of five eminent Judges of this Court, in Hussain Bakhsh v. Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi and others observed: "A proceeding taken for the enforcement of a civil right is a civil proceeding, whatever may be the source of the Court's jurisdiction invoked for enforcement of such a right. According to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 'Civil Proceeding' is a process for recovery of individual right or redress of individual wrong, inclusive, in its proper legal sense, of suits by the Crown. See Bradough v. Clarks (8 AC 354). Whether a proceeding is civil or not depends on the nature of the subject-matter of the proceedings and its object, and not on the mode adopted or the forum provided for the enforcement of the right. A proceeding which deals with a right of a civil nature does not cease to be so merely because the right is sought to be enforced by having recourse to the writ jurisdiction.
Judged from these aspects, a proceedings under Article 98 of the Constitution relating to a civil matter is a civil proceeding, although the High Court's jurisdiction in such a proceeding is constitutional jurisdiction of an original kind. A civil proceeding in a Court of civil jurisdiction is governed by the Code of Civil Procedure (see its preamble). By virtue of section 117 of the Code, a civil proceeding in a High Court is also governed by the provisions of the Code other than the provisions which are specially excepted."
8. The second question is whether the learned District Court was legally not justified to have impleaded respondents Nos.1 to 6 as party to the petition under section 11 of the Ordinance, particularly when the provisions of the C.P.C. Generally and those of Order I, C.P.C. Qua the impleadment of the party particularly were not made applicable.
9. We are of the considered view that the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that the provisions of the C.P.C. And particularly those of Order I thereof were not applicable in view of the limited scope of the petition within the contemplation of. Section 11 of the Ordinance is misconceived. It is not denied that no special procedure had been prescribed for disposal of the petitions under section 11 (ibid). If it be so, then general provisions of the C.P.C. Which are founded on the principles of natural justice having not been specially excluded in the Ordinance from application shall be applicable. Conceding for the sake of argument that the provisions of the C.P.C. Are not applicable even then every Court or Tribunal is vested with inherent jurisdiction to add necessary or proper parties to the proceedings or strike out the unnecessary parties impleaded before it irrespective of the provisions of Order I of the C.P.C. The exercise of Power by the learned District Court under Order I, Rule 10, C.P.C. Whether they were applicable or not are, therefore, of no legal consequence.
10. We have perused the impugned order of the learned District Court which has clearly held as under:-- "I find that issue No,9 which is to the effect that 'whether Hazrat Khawaja Sajjad Hussain Pir Blukhari Baba was the ancestor of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs are the Mutwalis and Majawars over the suit property' was struck in the light of the pleading of the original parties and it is relevant to mention here that Muzaffar Shah is the uncle of the petitioner. The case has been remanded to this Court for its disposal afresh in accordance with law. In presence of issue No,9 petitioner seems to be necessary party in the matter. In these peculiar circumstances, I find that the controversy in suit, in the absence of petitioner, cannot be completely and effectively adjudicated upon..
Consequently, I allow the petition by impleading the petitioner as defendant in the suit".
11. This finding is not shown to be suffering from any infirmity of the kind calling for our interference under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.
12. We are also of the considered view that right to claim review, revision and appeal against any decision of a Court of law is substantive right and not a mere matter of procedure. Actually appeal, review and revision though they differ in scope are substantive rights. As such neither of them is available unless it has been conferred by law. The right of civil revision, therefore, in the matter not covered by Code of Civil Procedure could not be exercised under what has been described as supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court". In the instant case, the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court was not available and the revision petition was liable to dismissal on this score as well.
13. Simultaneously we would like to express a word of caution in application of the provisions of the C.P.C. To the proceedings under special laws to be tried by Court, Tribunal or forum like that falling under section 11 of Ordinance. We cannot possibly visualaize the application of each and every provisions of the C.P.C. Only the relevant provisions of the Code in the discretion of the Tribunal, which is obviously to exercise it justly, properly and equitable, shall be invoked to advance the cause of justice keeping in view the scope of the law providing for the establishment of the Tribunal. In short, as observed in Messrs Vulcan Company Ltd. v. The Province of Punjab and another (1982 SCM R 430), Civil Procedure Code is not meant to be a clog in way of proper dispensation of justice inasmuch as provisions prescribed therein are meant for facility and smooth running of wheels of justice to enable Court to arrive at proper conclusion in accordance with facts of case and law.
14. In this view of the matter, we are not inclined to grant leave to appeal and the petition is, therefore, dismissed.