' This is an appeal against the decision dated 23.8-1976 of Punjab Labour Court No, 3, Lyallpur.
2. Mohammad Rafique, respondent was employed as a worker in the Crescent Jute Products Ltd., Jaranwals. On 21-3-1976 he was working on a machine. Shaukat Khan, Supervisor, who had come to check the work of the respondent found him absent from his machine. The respondent came back after ten minutes. Supervisor, then asked the respondent as to why he was absent. The respondent replied that he had gone for a walk. The Supervisor further asked him as to why single yarn was being used. The respondent, thereupon, became rude and said that the work would he done in the same manner and that (he) Supervisor was at liberty to do whatever he liked. Shaukat Khan, thereupon, reported the matter to the Labour Office of the factory. The Labour Officer examined the report and issued charge-sheet Exh. D-2 dated 24-3.1976. The respondent was asked to furnish his explanation to Ibrahim Hussain, Shift Incharge. It is not clear as to whether the charge-sheet was actually handed over to the respondent. The respondent appeared before Ibrahim Hussain on 25-3.1976 and pleaded not guilty. On the same day Ibrahim Hussain conducted the inquiry against the respondent. He recorded the statement of Shaukat Khan, Supervisor, who implicated the respondent. After that the statement of the respondent was recorded, denying his guilt. The Inquiry Officer on 28-3.1976 submitted the Inquiry report Exh. D-9 wherein he had recommended that a warning be issued to the respondent that he should be careful in future.
Wasim Ahmad Farooqi, Labour Officer did not agree with that recommendation. He reported that the respondent was a habitual offender and there were three charge-sheets, pending against him.
On that report the Mills Manager directed that the respondent be proceeded against under Standing Order 15(3)(a) and (h). Accordingly, on 6-4-1976 show-cause notice Exit. D-12 was issued to the respondent, in which it was mentioned that the respondent was guilty of misbehaviour previously on four occasions, but he was warned only, and that he was informed that as his previous conduct was bad he should explain why he should not be dismissed from service. The respondent appeared before the Mills Manager and denied all the facts mentioned in the show- cause notice. Ho pleaded that since he was an office bearer of the C. B. A., the permission of the Labour Court under section 47(2) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 was necessary before any punishment could be imposed upon him. The Mills Manager found the above explanation unsatisfactory and directed that the Labour Court be moved in this connection. Instead of going to the Labour Court information was obtained from the Registrar, Trade Unions about the office- bearers of the respondent's Union. The Registrar on 15-5.1976 sent a list Exh. D-16 of the office- bearers of the Union, in which the respondent's name was not mentioned. Thereupon, on the same day, dismissal order Exh. D-18 was passed. The respondent challenged the order of his dismissal by way of a petition under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 before the Labour Court, which accepted the same and directed the re-instatement of the respondent with back benefits vide decision under appeal.
3. Aggrieved by the above decision, Managing Director, Crescent Jute Products Ltd., Jaranwala, appellant has preferred this appeal.
4. From the perusal of the record I find that P. W. Mohammad Idrees General Secretary of the Union stated that the respondent was elected as an Officer of the Union on 8-4-1916 and that his name was approved by the Registrar on 24-7-1976. There is no evidence in rebuttal.
5. It is no doubt true that on 15-5-1976 when the order of dismissal was passed against the respondent, the Registrar of Trade Unions had not given his approval to his election as an Officer of the Union on 8-4-1976. It is also true that when the petition under section 25-A was filed by the respondent on 294-1976, the approval of the Registrar had not been given. The approval was given by the Registrar on 14-7-1976. Unfortunately, under the law there is no time limit prescribed as to when the Registrar should either give his approval or reject the election of the officers of the Union.
Therefore, the point now arises is as to whether the approval by the Registrar becomes effective from the date when it is given or from the date of election. If there is a refusal by the Registrar then the election in 4 Which officers were elected becomes null and void and as such ineffective. But on the other hand if the Registrar gives his approval it means that the election in which the officers were elected becomes effective and, therefore, the officers would be deemed to be in office from the date when they got elected. Therefore, in the present case, even though the approval of the Registrar was given on 14.7-1976, the election of the respondent had become effective on 8-4-1976 and as such he would be deemed to be in office from the date when he got elected. Therefore, in view of section 47(2) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, the permission from the Labour Court had to be obtained before passing the order of dismissal against the respondent. Union these circumstances, the order of dismissal is not in accordance with law.
6. Even on merits I find that the case of the appellant is rather weak. In the first instance I find that the Mills Manager had neither seen the initial report against the respondent nor had seen his explanation to the allegations made against him. He had also not ordered the inquiry. Further the charge framed against the respondent was under Standing Order 15(3)(a)(h) but he was dismissed on the ground that he was a habitual offender. In other words he was dismissed for the charge under Standing Order 15(3)(g). Thus it is clear that the dismissal order was passed by taking into count extraneous considerations and, therefore, the said order is liable to be quashed on that ground also. I am fortified in this view by the judgment of the High Court in Sher Mohammad v. Bashir Ali Khan and Esmat Maid v. Government of West Pakistan.
7. In the result 1 find no merit in this appeal, which is hereby dismissed. 1 2